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INTRODUCTION 	  
Migration has been widely studied in the social sciences, as an increasingly 
important social phenomenon and as a specific kind of human experience, which 
in turn, has an effect on social identity. Much of the research on migration has 
focused on the marginalization of migrants as a result of economic inequalities 
and cultural stereotypes. There is a vast available body of studies that addresses 
migrant experience, which has developed a theoretical framework that regards 
migrant identity as a distinct type of identity (Brah, 1996, Clifford, 1997, Knott 
and McLouchlin, 2010 etc.). Since the early ‘90s different strands of this growing 
discourse have been grouped together under the term ‘Diaspora Studies’. This 
scholarship is dedicated to studies of migration in its diverse forms and focuses on 
the dynamics of ‘othering’ that migrants are subjected to. As Knott and 
McLouchlin explain, use of the term ‘diaspora’ for exiled communities broadened 
in the early ‘90s: 
It began to encompass those groups hitherto identified as immigrants, 
ethnic minorities, exiles, expatriates, refugees, guest workers and so on. 
The social sciences, from political science to anthropology, had begun to 
explore the intersections of diaspora with other aspects of social, spatial 
and cultural relations. Thus, not all diasporas were necessarily to be seen 
as the victims of great catastrophes. (2010, p.9) 
 
This scholarship emerges out of cultural socio-constructivist theories that 
emphasize the role that power structures play in defining the individual, but which 
also attribute to him or her the agency to change them. Post-colonial studies and 
third-wave feminism intersect in Diaspora Studies and shape its conception of 
cultural contexts and the role of the individual in them (Spivak, 1996; Gopinath, 
2003; Anzaldua, 1987; etc.). I have mainly focused on this literature, as it is 
dedicated to theorizing about migrants, based on sociological empirical studies, 
which is used to generate and support theories of migration.  Although there are 
plenty of issues that these scholars have encountered that I consider crucial to the 
migrant experience, some of the basic assumptions underlying their theories are 
open to criticism. Perhaps the most serious problem, as I see it, is that they intend 
to bring about social changes by affecting the way migrants think of themselves. 
To this end they tend to promote new terms that migrants should ascribe to 
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themselves in order to feel ‘empowered’, while these terms in fact remain largely 
inaccessible to such migrants due to the nature of academic writing and 
publishing. This scholarship is problematic not only due to its severely limited 
reach, but also because it is contentious in its agenda and inherent assumptions.  
One of my main objections is the extent to which Diaspora Studies 
theorists emphasize differences between the experiences of migrants and non-
migrants. To make their case, they need to highlight the ‘othering’ processes in 
host societies, which force migrants to choose between assimilation and 
exclusion. However, the laudable aim of respecting individual differences and 
fragmented identities has also led to a self-ghettoizing tendency, where there is 
little, if anything, in common even amongst individual migrants. As a result, the 
‘oppressor’ is deemed incapable of understanding the ‘oppressed’; and the 
‘oppressed’, even as they have their oppression in common, are left with their 
differences, which theorists tell them they should emphasize, only to be left with 
little to no bonding similarities. Social difference, for example, according to race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc., thus becomes a source of value that is taken to 
express and underscore the uniqueness of each individual migrant. Alternatively, 
the intersectionality of migrants’ oppression is what is considered the centre of 
focus. Bernard Waldenfels calls such approaches the ‘divinization of the other’, 
where the other, in its status of difference, is elevated onto a moral pedestal as that 
which is ‘entirely other’ (Waldenfels, 1951, p.5). In this respect, the framework 
presented by much of theory of migration remains superficial, clouded by the 
preferred ways in which migrants are to supersede the social dynamics that 
marginalize them.  
However, looking at human experience in its social environment requires 
more depth and is far more complex than just the categorization of differences and 
the presentation of ethical and normative solutions. Waldenfels (1951, p.10), 
whose aim is to develop a more accurate Phenomenology of the Alien1, also 
criticizes the marking of cultural differentiations as superficial. He does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 The alien is that which is other or strange. Waldenfels applies the terms to intercultural 
encounters from a phenomenological perspective. The alien is distinguished from the Other by 
processes of exclusion, “I am where you cannot be, and vice versa” (p 73). 	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advocate a universalist approach to culture, but rather sees human experience 
within culture as something that neither belongs “to each of us nor to all of us” (p. 
71).  In that sense, the experience we share is something that both separates us and 
connects us simultaneously, where both dynamics play equal importance. It is my 
contention that a Heideggerian perspective offers an important contribution to a 
study of migration that can speak both to that which separates us (which, with 
Heidegger, we might refer to as the ‘ontic’ differences) and to that which connects 
us (which, with Heidegger, we might refer to as the shared ‘ontological’ 
concerns). 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger addresses the superficiality of the study of 
certain social phenomena. He accuses the sciences of forgetting the main 
question, that of Being. His aim is to develop a fundamental ontology, one that 
reveals the shared grounds of our Being. Instead of assuming an abstract 
ontology, Heidegger first looks at Being as it is experienced by us on a daily 
basis, and then draws out the elements that are foundational for our existence. An 
approach that complements our interpretations of empirical data on migration 
with an ontological basis does not presume that we have exhausted our studies 
into individual differences amongst different social groups. However, it is my 
contention in this thesis that such an approach, which inquires into what it means 
to be “us” by drawing common aspects of existence, is required. There is a side 
that has been forgotten in the social sciences: that of the shared grounds that shape 
us. Heidegger believes that inquiring into our Being will result into looking at the 
different elements that define our daily existence. Inquiring into Being ‘arises 
from the average understanding of Being’ but which also speaks of its ‘essential 
constitution’ (BT, 1962, p.28). Leaving such an account unanalyzed allows 
superficial assumptions to be made (for instance, through ascribing moral 
characteristics to Being) that may simply reflect what the researcher wants the 
object of study to be, which explains the abundance of unjustified prescriptive 
terminology in Diaspora Studies. The lack of both depth and of an account of the 
common aspects of experience on the part of Diaspora Studies research is a 
problem that I believe can be addressed through Heidegger’s phenomenology. 
	  	   10 
Heidegger offers a thorough analysis of issues or questions that we have in 
common as ‘Dasein’, i.e., as beings who are concerned with their existence and to 
whom things matter and are meaningful. The idea is that, while we share those 
issues or questions (for example, that we all know of our own mortality, that we 
are all inextricably embedded in a life with others, and so forth), we respond to 
them in different ways, depending on our individual circumstances and on the 
specific social and historical contexts in which we find ourselves. The existential 
analysis that Heidegger proposes intends to reveal how we exist in our world, 
what concerns us as human beings, and what the existential structures common to 
all of us are, in order to allow us to understand the wider existential context of the 
specific ways in which we engage with those shared concerns and common 
structures in our everyday dealings. As important as it has been for the social 
sciences, specifically for branches such as Diaspora, Migration, Post-Colonial and 
Feminist studies, to understand and highlight the differences amongst different 
groups of people, and to make those differences visible and portray them as 
valuable for society, a look at the grounds of experience as a place for bridging 
such differences will provide a different kind of insight into the social phenomena 
addressed by the aforementioned schools. To this end, it is critical that we remain 
aware of the particular contexts in which different lives take place. This is why a 
fundamental ontology, according to Heidegger, first requires a study of everyday 
experience. The reasons for the focus on everyday experience are that 1) it is what 
is most familiar for us (bringing ontology closer to us); and 2) it shows that 
although we are all different at the level of everyday life, we still have in common 
certain questions to which we all respond in different ways. There is an ontology 
of every-day-life; and ontology is an everyday practice of human beings (although 
rarely made explicit).   
This is a further crucial insight of Heidegger’s that can be brought to bear 
on migration studies: not everything that influences how we experience our life 
can be made explicit. Especially in his later work, Heidegger makes mystery an 
important aspect of his philosophy as something that must be preserved. There are 
phenomena, or aspects of phenomena, ‘enigmas (Rätsel)’, that will remain 
unintelligible to us, and such lack of accessibility already changes our 
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understanding of that which can be understood. He points at the ‘mystery of 
Being’ (WICT, 1951, p.52), towards which we must be open in order to attain a 
deeper understanding of ourselves, as such mysteries cannot be penetrated, but 
can only be ‘sensed’ through their presence (O’Donoghue, 2011, p.10). The 
enigmas that Heidegger emphasizes in his later work serve, in a way, as a 
humbling mechanism towards that which we think we know by pointing out that 
there are things that we cannot know, but can only infer. In this sense, he poses 
enigmas as part of our inquiry, but that are normally conceived as in conflict with 
science. Such understanding posits any query of a phenomenon as limited by its 
nature and its context, where truths also depend on the recognition that there is a 
limit to our knowledge. Opposing the classical scientific tradition that posits the 
object of study as something that can be comprehensible in its totality and can be 
fully described through definitions and categories, Heidegger offers a relational 
and dynamic explanation of things, which are dependent on their contexts and 
may thus change with them. Any concepts used in a study therefore work as a 
provisional interpretation of reality, as opposed to a fixed theoretical 
determination. In Being and Time Heidegger already states that the validity of 
scientific concepts is temporal. As these come to a crisis, such crisis opens the 
possibility for the renewal of any science. In this sense, proposing the revision of 
the concept of the migrant by opening new perspectives on it, will allow for the 
reorientation of this concept into new directions that will hopefully provide a 
more accurate understanding of this social phenomenon.  
The revelation of a shared ground of experience and common existential 
structures, I believe, already transforms our understanding of individual existence, 
since it implies that there is something existentially prior to individual differences, 
which can be appealed to as a basis for mutual understanding.  Emphasizing such 
grounds does not negate the importance of social dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion, but it offers alternative ways of understanding them based on both a 
common existential structure that grounds our being and on a shared world where 
our existence takes place in a variety of ways. The main aim of the present project 
is to show, first, how Heidegger is a valuable source of new ways of 
understanding for the social sciences, and, second, how his philosophy can be 
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mobilized to expand and deepen the analysis of the migrant experience. 
Furthermore, it lets us discover the existential structures common to human 
beings, which can serve as a meeting point for communication and mutual 
understanding. It places the emphasis on the fundamental concerns as opposed to 
the socially constructed differences, directing the focus towards that which is 
shared and not towards that which segregates, without overlooking the individual 
or cultural differences that arise from particular contexts.  
The first chapter is meant to set the scene for different issues in migration 
opened up by a Heideggerian perspective.  First I present a summary of the 
relevant literature on migration as it appears in the school of Diaspora Studies.  
Beginning with the event of physical displacement, this literature attempts to 
describe the transformation of the migrant’s identity as a redefining process in 
which marginalizing circumstances play an essential role.  The marginalization of 
migrants is explained in terms of colonization and economic social order, which, 
from this perspective, define who stands as the ‘other’ in society. They emphasize 
the political position of standing against the ‘oppressive structures’ that, according 
to them, define the migrant experience.  Concepts like ‘hybridity’ and ‘third 
space’ are proposed as means to deal with and oppose cultural oppression. Also in 
the first chapter, I explain my main three criticisms against Diaspora Studies´ 
view of migrants and their experience.  Firstly, the concepts Diaspora Studies uses 
to attempt to change the social order can, at most, serve as alternative forms of 
speaking of diversity, but not as political tools that can grant power to 
marginalized groups of migrants in any given context.  In this regard, a 
Heideggerian perspective would highlight that the many issues that migrants 
struggle with may not be just ‘their’ issues (i.e., issues of ‘marginal interest’), but 
actually issues that are of shared general concern.  
Second, the widely used concept of the ‘hybrid subject’, originally 
proposed by the cultural theorist Homi Bhabha (1994), stands for those culturally 
and socially fragmented identities that do not necessarily cohere with one another, 
but that are so often part of the same individual.  Bhabha and his fellow scholars 
claim to use this ‘new ensemble’ as a way to destabilize the dominant cultural 
forms.  I propose that hybridity, as an identity that marginalized groups can 
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ascribe to, can only be result of combinations of other previously established 
sources of identity, such as religion and class, which undeniably remain more 
identity-defining than a self-definition as a ‘hybrid subject’.  Hybridity is a new 
form of identification, but not one that ‘destabilizes’ previous ones; it does not by 
itself transcend marginalization. In this sense, a Heideggerian perspective denotes 
the lack of need for definite ethical stances through his understanding of both 
authenticity and becoming homely.   
My third criticism is that the mentioned scholarship misuses its own 
concept of identity. They state that identity is fragmented and multiple and 
therefore lacking a centre and impossible to unify. However, by assuring that it is 
also possible to liberate the migrant, it is implied that the migrant functions as a 
unit, or that his/her identity is based on a central aspect that can be liberated. This 
means that the idea of social liberation often promoted in theories of migration is 
not necessarily compatible with the description of the fragmented identity of the 
migrant, as if the migrant needed to step out of its own characteristics and become 
something more than itself, since identifying as a migrant presupposes both an 
oppressed state and a fragmented identity. Heidegger can possibly offer an 
understanding of identity that is based on our engagement and response to shared 
ontological concerns, not on a normative agenda of personal improvement.  
I conclude the first chapter by arguing that many current theories on 
migrant identity are insufficient and biased towards the goal of political liberation. 
I criticize the Diaspora Studies project for making the description of migrant 
experience a normative one. Masked by the presupposed rigor of the social 
sciences, a description of the migrant´s characteristics is turned into a set of 
guidelines to be followed. I propose that we do not need such a teleological 
understanding of migration. On the contrary, assuming a political stance makes 
any analysis of the migrant experience problematic, since it is based on the 
assumption that the invention of new concepts must aid a specific social agenda.  
Chapter Two addresses important criticisms against the social sciences 
approach including that of Diaspora studies. The main focus of this chapter is the 
normative status often given to claims regarding migration, especially those based 
on assumptions of individual agency and of the need of emancipation and 
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representation of the other. Such claims are contested through Heidegger’s 
concept of authenticity. Through the use of Heidegger’s philosophy, the need for 
an account that considers ontological as well as contextual and particular aspects 
of experience is introduced. In order to understand the foundations of Being, 
Heidegger first looks at everyday existence in order to disclose its fundamental 
structures. This is the main axis that can be exploited in the social sciences. 
Because Heidegger not only pays attention to individual differences, but also 
makes a point to uncover a common shared world, this could provide a balance 
for the research on migrants. Those shared grounds destabilize the fixed concept 
of the migrant as something that cannot be fully explained, but they also open 
themselves up as bridging concerns that facilitate an understanding of connections 
amongst different (types of) migrants and between migrants and non-migrants. In 
this respect it is important to understand a Heideggerian approach as a 
phenomenological method, which does not so much target the what of the objects 
of philosophical research, but rather, the how of that research. For Heidegger, this 
means to allow things to show themselves as they are. Instead of presupposing the 
answer through the question, through the ‘what’, phenomenology informs us of 
the how without predetermining the what of the studies object (BT, 1962, p.59). 
Heidegger does not look for objective definitions, but for answers to fundamental 
questions that are common to everyone. His aim is not to define things through 
ascribing to them properties or categories, but by identifying the main issues that 
arise through experience. This, according to Heidegger, is the way to access the 
theme of ontology: that of ‘Being’ that is accessed through lived existence, in its 
manifold expressions.  According to Heidegger, the social sciences do not address 
the question of the meaning of Being but only the characteristics specific to 
different entities. He proposes a fundamental ontology that accounts for the 
context. I adopt this Heideggerian stance insofar as I argue that looking into 
shared ontological issues and not only individual and cultural differences, can 
bring about a better understanding of migration. The shared grounds that the 
literature on migration proposes are based in empirical characteristics, like race, 
class, legal status, not in existential issues that are not confined to empirical data.  
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 The first section of the second chapter is dedicated to Heidegger’s 
criticism of the social sciences as presented on Being and Time. Summarizing, 
Heidegger opposes the distinction between an observer and a separate reality, 
such position is now commonly held in the social sciences research. However, 
Heidegger criticizes the objective posture within the social sciences regarding 
their concepts as they are assumed to be timeless. Heidegger points out that both 
questions and concepts are always already shaped by human values that are not 
absolute. In terms of the literature on migration, social science understands its 
normative claims as based on true and universal values, without recognizing that 
those values are contextual. Heidegger also accuses the social sciences of being 
anthropocentric, of ascribing too much importance to the individual. This aspect 
can still be found within the Diaspora studies through the assumption of 
individual agency and the relevance given to subjectivity.  
The second section of Chapter Two is dedicated to the concepts of Dasein 
and World and how they can contribute to the discourse on migration. Heidegger 
uses Da-sein (Being-there) as a way of expressing that in order to be, one must be 
placed or located somewhere. Dasein brings the real, seemingly external world, 
into individual existence. Our understanding of subject/object as separated 
entities, where the observer is detached from the observed external reality is also 
challenged by the concept of Dasein. A being that is always already located 
somewhere cannot be described as a kind of being (its what) without making 
reference to its situation (its how), that is, Dasein’s involvement in the world is 
self-defining. Heidegger incorporates the necessary contextualization into the 
nature of who we are, as existing beings. Dasein is the only entity whose being is 
an issue for itself, that is, we are concerned with our ontological status and that of 
others. One of Dasein´s distinct ontic characteristics is that it is ontological, 
concerned with its own Being (BT, 1962, p.35) Although Dasein is always 
expressed through an entity because it must express itself with certain 
characteristics; it is dynamic and temporal. It is not fixed and, although it 
possesses specific characteristics, it is not reducible to them. When dealing with 
Dasein, Heidegger states, “an understanding of Being…is already included in 
conceiving anything which one apprehends in entities” (BT, 1962, p. 22). The 
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ontological priority for Dasein is the implicit understanding of the relation with its 
being and with the being of other entities.  
As expressions of Dasein, we are able to understand entities and ourselves 
in our ontic states, or our existentiell possibilities, but this understanding is 
grounded in Dasein´s capability to also grasp entities ontologically. In this sense, 
through Dasein’s involvement in the world, its possibilities are restricted by its 
circumstances. Not everything is possible for any given Dasein; Dasein cannot 
make anything it wants out of its circumstances as these are restricted by a 
definite context. Dasein does have possibilities, but these are not under its 
complete control.  The world, thus, restricts but also discloses Dasein’s 
possibilities (BT, 1962, p.182). Dasein and world share an intrinsic and 
inseparable link. The world is also what allows us to understand these interactions 
as it forms what Heidegger calls the totality of significance, this is what 
Heidegger calls ‘the worldhood of the world’ (BT, 1962). The world provides 
Dasein with meaningful relations through which Dasein understands itself. Dasein 
and World stand for essential ways in which we exist, even if the forms these 
ways take vary depending on the social, historical and cultural context of each 
Dasein. They inextricably form part of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. 
Analyzing migrants from a Heideggerian perspective is not only to account for the 
differences amongst them, but also to look into a general underlying ontological 
structure, which is rooted in specific ontic characteristics.  
The third section of the second chapter focuses on the question of 
authenticity, which is not only a core concept in Heidegger’s early work but also 
addresses the agenda of ‘liberation’ as it is formulated in current social theory of 
migration. I criticize the Diaspora Studies literature for offering a better and 
prescriptive understanding of oneself as a migrant in order to oppose prejudices 
and discrimination dynamics. In order to explain my criticism through 
Heidegger’s concept of Authenticity, I first review his concept of das Man, as 
they are closely related.  
Das Man refers to the anonymity of social practices that one tends to 
conform to, usually without reflecting on their merits or purposes. Heidegger 
claims that Dasein prefers to flee into the anonymity of das Man, averaging itself 
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out with everyone else into a state of normalcy and comfort (BT, 1962, P.164). 
The relevance to migration shows in that das Man determines the social norms 
that we rarely stop to question because we live in them, in the social context that 
created them. In migration, switching societies also involves an adaptation to a 
new das Man. In the new das Man, the migrant can feel excluded and exposed if 
he/she is not acquainted with the social norms of the host society. In this way, 
migration exemplifies the element of intelligibility that das Man provides to any 
Dasein. The relevance of authenticity for Heidegger shows through the question 
of how to “be one’s own” in the midst of the inherent phenomenon of das Man. 
Heidegger speaks of modifying existentiell (or concrete) possibilities while 
remaining in das Man. Even though Dasein is always restrained by a definite set 
of possibilities and by society, Heidegger claims that Dasein must engage in a 
kind of understanding, one that understands those material possibilities that he/she 
has been thrown into. Heidegger does not specify whether authenticity is 
attainable but he speaks of Dasein´s ‘ownmost potential’, as if the possibility of 
becoming authentic was there for any Dasein, but not necessarily actualized in 
each of them (BT, 1962, p.223). 
For Heidegger, being authentic is a fundamental issue for Dasein because 
it stems from our necessary involvement in das Man. In this sense, the question of 
authenticity can arise for the migrant in terms of understanding his/her 
possibilities within the context he/she is situated in, just as for any other Dasein. 
Questioning the norms in the social realm might be more accessible to migrants as 
they face social adaptation. The migrant’s confrontation with the new society 
presents more concrete possibilities for such fundamental questioning although it 
does not necessarily lead to authenticity. I analyze authenticity in migration also 
as a challenge against normative claims in Diaspora studies. The circumstances 
that allow migrants to face situations that bring about the questioning of social 
norms provide neither an ideal nor permanent characteristics that make migrants 
more “aware” than other people. Thus, the assumption that there is something to 
be prescribed about how to understand oneself as a migrant is one step too far 
from what is a fundamental question in Dasein’s existence which  shows itself 
through the experience of migration.  
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Chapter Three is dedicated to the notions of home as a crucial concept 
both in the research on migration and in Heidegger’s philosophy. I attempt to 
present the beginning of a regional ontology of the home, as an in-between 
analysis that draws Heidegger’s fundamental account of the home and the 
empirical findings that point at certain concrete characteristics and elements in 
regards to the relevance of the home in migration. I begin with a literature review 
on the research of migration that focuses on this topic. Relations between home, 
identity, belonging, and the experience of homeliness are drawn. Questions arise 
regarding the fixity of the home and its temporal and spatial transformations. 
There is a parallel made between the findings of the research on home and 
migration and Heidegger’s analysis of the home. In the first section, home is 
divided in sense of belonging (rootedness), mobility, and return. For Heidegger, 
the journeying towards the home is, instead of linear, cyclical and an existential 
aspect of our lives (HHI, 1996). Thus the account given by the research on 
migration is empirical and dedicated to concrete (ontic) factors, while Heidegger 
views the home as something of fundamental relevance.  
In the second section, I examine the different elements that Heidegger 
points out as relevant to the home. He also distinguishes the experience of the 
homely from the physical place of origin, or the homeland. For Heidegger, the 
desire to feel at home is an existential one. He speaks of the necessity of a 
homecoming, or a return to the homeland, as a rediscovery of what was once 
familiar.  The idea of homecoming already points at a journey outside of the 
home, away from the unfamiliar. Not only do we stop feeling at home when we 
are taken out of our comfort zone, but we are already in a state of homelessness as 
part of our existential structure. This is Heidegger’s main contribution to the 
social sciences analysis of the home, its opposite. For Heidegger, homelessness is 
important existentially as he considers it an inherent element of our being. To be 
homeless is to turn away from it, and to Heidegger, this is something we 
constantly do in order to forget our own nothingness and finitude. However, to 
become homely, we must experience the strange, the uncanny, the foreign. 
Drawing a comparison with the social research on migration, the importance of 
the foreign for the migrant is that it also allows him/her to see the differences 
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from his/her home. The migrant is then able to compare that which is foreign with 
that which is familiar. An existential analysis of the distinction 
homely/homelessness in migration expands such notions beyond the concrete 
experience of not-being-at-home, and gives it existential relevance. For 
Heidegger, homecoming and becoming homely are cyclical processes that 
establish a constant relation between the home and the foreign. This, for him, also 
involves an understanding of the familiar in a historical sense, of what is one’s 
own, one’s culture and one’s history. I also analyze Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling. For Heidegger, dwelling is a fundamental activity of Dasein.  To dwell 
is to find oneself at home, to inhabit a place and make a home of it.  In the 
lectures on Hölderlin, Heidegger explains that since human beings “are not of 
themselves”, to “dwell in one’s own is what comes last and is seldom successful, 
and always remains the most difficult” (1996, p.21). In this sense, Heidegger 
draws a relation to the home through engaging with it. Dwelling is an activity that 
requires one to be involved in the place where one is situated, and that place is 
also linked to a world that contextualizes it. Finally, I focus on Heidegger’s 
lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry (1996) on rivers as directly related to dwelling. 
There he uses the river as a representation of the locality of dwelling of human 
beings, and relates its journeying to our own history. The river is both locality and 
journeying: through its course, it allows for dwelling places to arise, while it itself 
dwells in its own journeying.  The river represents the movement out of the 
homely into the unknown and the process of homecoming. 
Heidegger’s main contribution to the discussion of the home is the 
introduction of the relevance of homelessness. By examining existence in a 
broader sense, in the way we relate to the world and how we live in it, Heidegger 
points to homelessness as an inherent element to the ability to dwell and 
experience a feeling of familiarity anywhere. Heidegger implies that we have an 
existential desire to feel at home, and as such it is part of our ontological 
constitution. The importance that Heidegger gives to homelessness provides a 
different perspective on migration. If this element brings about common concerns 
regarding the grounds of our existence, then, the feeling of being without a home, 
or a place where we feel comfortable, in migration, gives rise to such concerns 
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more readily. The responses to such concerns, however, differ depending on the 
particular experiences and not all necessarily lead to rediscovery of familiarity.   
The fourth and last chapter is dedicated to Heidegger’s concepts of the 
uncanny, finitude and groundlessness. None of these issues have been addressed 
by the social sciences and yet Heidegger sees them as fundamentally rooted in our 
existence.  The first section of the chapter explains Heidegger’s anti-
anthropocentric view, which helps with understanding the groundlessness that he 
then claims as our existential ground. I then address the concept of the uncanny as 
explained in his early writings, in relation to nothingness, Anxiety and Being-
towards-death. Heidegger affirms that Dasein constantly refuses to acknowledge 
the groundlessness of its existence, and instead takes refuge in the assumption that 
our surroundings are stable. However, he claims that Dasein, in moments of 
anxiety, is called back to its own Being, where Dasein faces the dilemma of 
whether or not to confront its own groundlessness. Feelings of anxiety are 
common in the first stages of migration. Facing a nothingness in the sense that we 
don’t really know what is coming because it might be completely unfamiliar can 
easily bring existential issues to the foreground. Furthermore, the endings of the 
lives that were lived before migration (even as these endings might be only 
temporal) are also mourned while the migrant is confronted with building up a 
new life. I compare Heidegger’s treatment of the uncanny in Being and Time with 
that of his later writings, where he separates different ways of encountering this 
experience. In Der Ister, Heidegger states that we are the most uncanny of beings 
because we turn away from ourselves. Thus, for Heidegger the negation of our 
essence as finite and groundless determines our everyday existence. Yet, such 
groundlessness erases the possibility of ever finding absolute and permanent 
truths for us. Our life is shaped by such fragility and instability, and yet we turn 
away from it in order to be able to carry on with our daily lives.  
I conclude the last chapter explaining how fundamental issues, such as 
groundlessness, that have been forgotten by the social sciences, surface in 
particular instances, but can also be shaped by regional circumstances. For 
instance, migration as a region that has been defined by, for instance, border-
crossing, physical displacement, etc., can bring to the foreground fundamental 
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issues such as the instability of our individual lives. I thus criticize the social 
sciences for not addressing such fundamental concerns while explaining why 
Heidegger provides a more in depth analysis of human experience which can 
contribute to the research on migration.  
Heidegger specifies that in order to revise the empirical sciences and 
develop more appropriate approaches, it is necessary to disclose the underlying 
structure of existence, that is, not only to describe the characteristics of entities, 
but to discuss the structure of their Being.   Heidegger clarifies that ‘to be’ is not 
only the description of the characteristics of entities, but is also the relation to 
Being which all beings share. The Diaspora studies scholarship has applied ontic 
characteristics to the migrating experience and has called it ontology. Although 
through the crisis of homelessness in migration, ontological questions are brought 
to the foreground, this does not mean that only migrants are capable of such 
crises, but that through these experiences, the foundations of Being surface as an 
issue. It also does not mean that the migrant possesses the privilege of a 
permanent state of questioning and remembering Being; such a claim would 
merely repeat the mistake made by Diaspora Studies, of failing to acknowledge 
Dasein´s temporality and understanding it as a fixed entity alone, by speaking of 
the ontic aspects as ontological characteristics. It would be a mistake to ascribe 
ontic characteristics to the awareness that comes with migration, since that would 
imply an understanding of the migrant as a ‘better’ type of entity. In certain 
situations, questioning our being becomes more pressing, for instance, if we feel 
unstable or vulnerable (i.e. migration). However, those specific situations can also  
be experienced by non-migrants, altough the migrant can speak of that which is 
foundational to any other Dasein.  
The relation between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Being and its 
exemplification in the migrant is the main issue to be addressed, if Heidegger’s 
philosophy relates and contributes to redefining migrant identity. How does the 
relation between Heidegger’s existential analysis and the experience of the 
migrant play out and how do they help explain each other? In the final section of 
this fourth chapter I outline some of the implications of using Heideggerian 
ontology to explain the migrant experience. It is necessary to disclose the 
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underlying fundamental structure of being, not reducing migrants to their 
characteristics.  This concludes my reassessment of the experience and concept of 
the migrant.  
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CHAPTER 1: Migrant Identity in the Social Sciences 
  
 
In order to address the topic of migrant identity, it is important to review briefly 
the theories that have brought about the current conception of identity in relation 
to society, that is, social identity. This concept gained central focus in the social 
sciences from the second half of the 20th century, primarily as a result of the rapid 
change in surrounding social contexts (Howard, 2000).  With the rise of 
migration, the expansion of communication technologies, and the current global 
exposure to the emphasis on individuality, social identity became an issue that 
needed to be addressed and defined. Its political implications in terms of race, 
class, gender, and other systems of social stratification have become evident.  The 
concept of social identity was and continues to be questioned and (re) defined in 
differing social contexts, in attempts to explain society itself. Two prominent 
examples of this can be found in the fields of cultural theory and the social 
sciences. I review here the main trends of each field, outlining my main criticisms 
of these theories regarding their assumptions about social structures and the 
individual. Outlining the main problems of these theories is essential as these 
theories limit our understanding of the migrant identity. 
 
1.1 IDENTITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 	  
Psychology is the discipline that has primarily discussed social identity, its roots 
and its building process. It has characterized social identity as something that is 
intrinsically related to its context in a variety of ways. There are four main 
approaches to identity in this field: social cognition, social psychology, 
psychoanalysis and developmental psychology.  
In the area of social cognition, for instance, psychology defines cognitive 
schemas as the representations of identity in our minds. Schemas are organized 
packages of information which can be divided into two kinds: self-schemas, 
defined by one’s personal characteristics, preferences, goals, behavior patterns; 
and group schemas, indicating social positions and stereotypes (Howard, 2000). 
These schemas serve as ways of explaining social relationships, indicating that 
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identities are rooted in the social context (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  Thus, in social 
cognition, identity is the mental processing of external stimuli in relation to the 
individual.  
In social psychology, Henri Tajfel & John Turner (1986) developed Social 
Identity Theory, which was originally employed to understand the psychological 
basis of intergroup discrimination and studied the extent to which individuals 
identify themselves in terms of group membership. They also conducted several 
studies that focused on the individual’s relation towards in-groups vs. out-groups 
and how an individual distributes rewards or is more prone to discriminate against 
certain groups depending on his/her relation to them. Schemas of representation 
are drawn from the cognitive tradition and applied such schemas to different 
populations in terms of the individual. It explains social identity in terms of the 
internal representations of the group to which the individual belongs, but it does 
not explain how the process of forming an identity occurs.  
In the psychoanalytic tradition, Sigmund Freud describes identity as 
unstable and as a constant negotiation among the different elements of the id, the 
ego and the superego. The ego develops through a dialogue between the inner 
drives and the expectations of the external world. Identity is then constructed 
through this process of negotiation, which, according to Freud, is fundamentally 
generated through interpersonal interaction, especially during infancy (Howard, 
2000, Martin-Alcoff, 2000). Freud adds the ‘unconscious’ as an underlying layer 
of identity, one we have no access to but that affects our behavior. In this sense, 
Freud views part of identity as determined by drives we cannot control or change.   
Carl Jung (1953) would later emphasize the idea of a stable centre as an 
expression of a primordial unconscious state during infancy, in which subject and 
object were not yet differentiated. According to Jung, this ‘oneness’ would later 
develop into the unconscious of the adult mind as a ‘permanent state of identity 
with objects’.  Closely related to psychoanalysis, Melanie Klein developed the 
concept of ‘projective identification’, explaining identity as composed of 
representations of the self in relation to others throughout a process primarily 
developed in early infancy (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).  In summary, the 
psychoanalytic tradition emphasizes three major points in terms of identity. It sees 
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the self as a centre where the ego, super ego, and the id meet. This meeting point 
allows for the construction of identity, which is primarily determined during 
childhood. Lastly, the unconscious, while remaining inaccessible, determines 
identity construction and is in direct relation with the ego. 
Erik Erikson, a developmental psychologist, focused on the development 
of the individual’s identity throughout his/her lifetime. Erikson established 
different developmental stages as crucial in order to form a healthy identity. 
Erikson asserted identity as maintaining continuity and coherence over time.  He 
viewed the different developmental stages as a coherent process that leads the 
individual to maturity. Although he recognized that identity was never an 
‘achieved’ state of being, he held the notion that a sense of continuity is 
maintained in order for the self as a single unit of being (Brah, 1996).  Erikson 
also endorsed the notion of an inner essence of identity. Third wave feminists 
have problematized this view by contrasting it with one where identity is 
fragmented and the different fragments are not necessarily coherent (Ortega, 
2001).  
 In sociology, Erving Goffman´s application of symbolic interactionism 
(originally proposed by George Herbert Mead) stated that people attach symbolic 
meaning to objects, behaviors, themselves and other people (Howard, 2000). 
These meanings are developed and transmitted to others through social 
interaction. Language plays the key role in communicating these meanings in 
society.  Goffmans´s elaboration on this theory suggested that the meaning of 
identities varies across situations given that these identities are located in certain 
social spaces. Furthermore, this theory attempts to explain that role identities 
obtain different levels of importance in any individual, establishing a hierarchy 
that is based on the social context. It also emphasizes the negotiating process that 
is required for identity construction. Symbolic Interactionism, among other 
prevailing theories within the social sciences, sees identities as generated and 
constructed through an internal and external dialectic that is conditioned within 
specific social worlds (Howard, 2000; Vertovec, 2001). 
More recently, Richard Jenkins developed an overview of different 
theories on social identity within the social sciences. One of the highlights of his 
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work is his take on social identity which he defined as ‘collective identity’. He 
described it as a dialectic interplay of processes of internal and external definition 
(Lamont & Volnar, 2002). Similar to Mead´s idea that we cannot realize 
ourselves, except insofar as we can recognize the other in his/her relationship to 
us, Jenkins claims that this dialectic shows, on the one hand, how our internal 
identification process must be recognized by others for a collective identity to 
emerge, and, on the other hand, how we draw our internal identification from the 
community in order to differentiate ourselves (Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Taylor & 
Spencer, 2004). Similarly, Gergen & Gergen (1987), endorsing the social 
constructionist perspective, view identity as a patchwork that is not necessarily 
coherent. They observe that one individual can express different identities and 
behaviors depending on the social context.  
 Further developments in social interactionism propose an ‘overall self’ 
formed by multiple identities, each of which is linked to different elements of the 
social structure. According to Stryker (1980), an identity is a ‘internalized 
positional designation’ for every different position that a person has in society. 
Interaction does not occur between people, but between people’s differing 
elements that relate to certain groups or contexts. This approach differentiates 
between placing an emphasis on the social structure, which is the fixed role that 
the context demands of the person, and an emphasis on the agency of the 
individual of transforming or creating this role (Stets &Burke, 2003). 
Although these theories on identity generally agree on the inherent relation 
between the individual and its context, the main debates that arise from them are: 
the question of identity as a unit or as multiple identities, the possibility of an 
essential core, the possibility of a sense of continuity of identity and the 
possibility of agency. Identity, even when addressed as a social phenomenon, is 
normally perceived as unified and cohesive, or at least of possessing an 
underlying core to which we can refer to as the ‘self’.  However, as we look more 
closely at our roles in society, as part of the economy, the political spectrum, and 
our respective families; independent expressions of different identities appear. 
Our roles vary depending on what function we perform in different contexts, and 
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given the structural variety of these, our identities at times seem incoherent and 
discontinuous.  
Nonetheless, the notion of an axis that regulates our different social 
identities still permeates many discourses. An essence or a centre that makes us 
‘who we are’ seems to alleviate the fragmentation that we encounter in society. 
When Stryker (1980) states that ‘parts of the person’ are the ones that interact 
with the context, but not people per se, he explains that the parts that are ‘held 
back’ are irrelevant in terms of the meaning required from each identity in every 
different context. However, he refers back to a ‘self’ in which these identities are 
contained. I would suggest that this ‘overall self’ is just as irrelevant as the parts 
that are ‘held back’ during distinct social interactions.  Moreover, some social 
theories go further proposing that we are active agents able to transform our roles 
in society for our convenience. Agency has been endorsed by a number of social 
theories as the motor for radical social change (Anzaldua, 1987; Butler, 1993; 
Lugones; 1989).  It implies that there is always a possibility for individual action 
in a social context. I will argue that it is possible to add new elements to the way 
different aspects of society operate, without implying that there is an essential 
core to our identities and without erasing already existing elements of the 
structure that form our social environment.  
 
1.2 IDENTITY AND MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY 
CULTURAL THEORIES  	  
Recently, the relationship between identity and physical space has been more 
thoroughly addressed within the social sciences as an expression of the 
importance ascribed to context and social worlds. This focus normally brings up 
issues of mobility, migration, and identities based on a sense of being at home. 
These issues have been addressed by recent cultural theories focusing on diasporic 
communities. The current approaches view identity as socially constructed, as a 
constant, and normally conflicting negotiation between the individual and the 
social structures that oppress him/her, and signal the possibility of resisting these 
structures (Anzaldua, 1987; Bhaba, 1994; Hall, 2000; Said, 2000, Spivak, 1996). 
The trends addressing migrant identity tend to focus on the political implications 
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of oppression, which are mainly based on social identities (sexual, racial/ethnic, 
religious, etc.). They base their discourse on the assumption that there is a 
historically and socially established ‘other’, the post-colonial, the migrant 
diasporic, or the gendered/queer subject, and believe there are ways of ‘resisting’ 
the structures that oppress the ‘othered’ identities. In the present section, I review 
major current cultural theories that focus on the importance of physical space, and 
social and historical context regarding identity construction.  
 
1.2.1 Diasporic Identity 	  
The field that deals with migration and identity is that of Diaspora Studies. 
Heavily influenced by the works of Stuart Hall (1990), Homi Bhabha (1994) and 
Paul Gilroy (1993), it originates primarily from post-colonialism and Black 
studies. The concept of Diaspora is etymologically rooted in Greek and is 
translates as ‘to scatter through’. In Diaspora Studies, identity is seen as a hybrid 
multiplicity that can never be reduced to a unity. The link established between 
physical space and identity construction becomes evident through the process of 
leaving one’s homeland, that is, by migrating. Madan (1996) defines the migrant 
as ‘a person who has crossed the border’, seeking to engage in a new beginning in 
order to increase his/her possibility of a better life. Similarly, Diaspora also refers 
to the dispersal of people who, metaphorically and/or physically, ‘will never be 
able to return to the places from which they came (Hall, 1990)’. This concept was 
initially used to highlight ‘the catastrophic origin, the forcible dispersal and the 
estrangement of diasporic people’ in their places of settlement (Brah, 1996; 
Cohen, 1997). It has also been defined as ‘expatriate minority communities that 
are dispersed from an original ´center´ to at least two ´peripheral places´ (Safran, 
1991)’. Diasporic individuals tend to maintain a ‘memory, vision, or myth about 
their original homeland and believe that they are not and perhaps cannot be fully 
accepted in their host country’ (Safran, 1991). They see the ancestral home as a 
place of eventual return and are committed to the maintenance or restoration of 
this homeland. Their consciousness and solidarity is significantly defined by this 
continuing relationship with the homeland (Clifford, 1997).  They often go 
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through a difficult process of settling in the new society and struggle to build new 
kinds of identities, ‘consciously or unconsciously by drawing on more than one 
cultural repertoire (Madan, 1996)’. 
Clifford (1997) makes a point of differentiating diasporic populations from 
diasporic discourses. Diasporic populations do not ‘mean’ to stay in the host 
society. Unlike immigrants, they do not travel to recreate their original ‘home’ in 
the new place. However, he does recognize that there are diasporic forms of 
longing, memory and (dis) identification that are shared by a broad spectrum of 
minority and migrant populations, who, once separated from their homelands, 
increasingly find themselves in relations with the former country of residence. He 
states: ‘diasporic discourses reflect the sense of being part of an ongoing 
transnational network that includes the homeland not as something simply left 
behind but as a place of attachment in contrapuntal modernity’ (Clifford, 1994). 
However, the term diaspora is now used to describe other social groups that have 
been displaced or have migrated for a variety of reasons, such as economic 
inequalities within and between regions, expanding mobility of capital, people´s 
desire to pursue opportunities that might improve their life chances, political 
strife, wars, etc. (Brah, 1996). These changes lead to multi-locale attachments 
across nations, which involve a ‘dual loyalty’ to the homeland and the host 
country (/countries) (Clifford, 1994).  Given this alienated spatiality, it is possible 
to feel both that one belongs and does not belong to either society at the same 
time (Radhakrishnan, 1993).  
 Addressing the modern crisis of identity, Diaspora Studies generally views 
this crisis as part of a wider process of social change. This process involves 
avoiding fixation on a stable identity in society (Hall, 2000; Talyor & Spencer, 
2004). Identity, within Diaspora theory, is conceived as constructed, fragmented 
and unstable, as well as rooted in spatial metaphors (Brah, 1996, Clifford, 1997; 
Hall, 1990; Madan, 1996). Stuart Hall (1990) defines identity as a ‘production’ 
which is never ‘complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not 
outside representation’ (Hall, 1990, p.222).  It is not continuous or discontinuous, 
but framed among the simultaneous vectors of similarity, continuity and 
difference (Hall, 1990). Identities are also multiple, and given that they are always 
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in ‘flux’, they are neither fixed nor singular (Brah, 1996).  The perceived 
continuity, or ‘core’ of identity is enunciated as the ‘I’ and is the process by which 
that enunciation occurs. Thus, ‘Diaspora identities are constantly producing and 
reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference’ (Hall, 
1990). For Clifford (1997), we can learn from diasporic identities that cultures are 
not preserved by being protected from ‘mixing’, but exist as a result of it.  
Hall defines collective cultural identities as a matter of ‘becoming’ as well 
as ‘being’.  They have histories in common, but undergo constant transformation. 
They are neither fixed nor ‘essentializable’, but are subject to a continuous play of 
history, culture and power (Hall, 1990). Collective identities are not reducible to 
the sum of the experiences of the individual members of a group. These identities 
share something in common around a specific axis of differentiation that is 
established through social structures (Brah, 1996). In this sense, the concept of 
identity that Diaspora studies endorses is similar to that of symbolic 
interactionism and social constructionism, but it also erases the idea of a ‘centre’ 
that unifies the multiple identities. Unity is proposed only for communication 
purposes among individuals when referring to themselves (by using ‘I’ to refer to 
themselves, they bring together such multiple identities). Although this view of 
identity arises from the different physical environments, it is also the case that our 
identities are multiple and change according to the social roles we partake in, for 
instance, as a father, a student, a lover, etc. We behave differently depending on 
the role we play with different people in different social environments.  The 
question is, if our identities are multiple and at times radically different from each 
other, is the ‘individual’ at all relevant in society beyond its fulfillment of the 
different roles he/she plays?  
The diasporic subject becomes ‘other’ after its border-crossing. ‘Other’, in 
this context, is not only understood as the unknown, the stranger, or the foreigner, 
but according to Lavie and Swedenburg (1996), the diasporic ‘other’ is also a 
legal and political entity that ‘disrupts’ the ‘homogeneity’ within the host society 
by virtue of its mere presence. Paradoxically, it is also proposed that the diasporic 
‘other’ stands at the ‘periphery’ of society. Gayatri Spivak (1996) used the 
concepts of ‘periphery’ and ‘centre’ to refer to the relation between marginalized 
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populations and those in power: those who have a ‘voice’ within the dominant 
global discourse, and those who do not (Spivak, 1996). Thus, even when the 
diasporic ‘other’ stands out by its physical difference within the new society, 
he/she is not part of the dominant social discourse and holds no positions of 
power. Post-colonial authors have posited that the “other” is a result of 
colonization, ‘other’ being the populations colonized by the West (Spivak, 1996). 
The focus on those colonizing and central societies is exemplified by 
contemporary migration trends and the attempt to imitate and obtain the privileges 
of the North American lifestyle in developing countries. Thus, the diasporic 
subject aspires to the centre, but cannot get rid of his/her marginality.   
The diasporic subject becomes ‘other’ through border-crossing, engaging 
in an active and planned endeavor towards a foreign land, where he/she is then 
exposed to political, social, cultural and legal ‘othering’ It is the constructed 
binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, that defines the experience of 
the diaspora (Brah, 1996).  Diasporic subjects therefore find themselves as ‘other’ 
within a context that has already established their ‘otherness’. The diasporic 
subject, in turn, experiences this context, as ‘other’.  Clifford (1997) states that the 
diasporic experience is then constituted by experiences of discrimination and 
exclusion, forcing the diasporic subject to acquire a different sense of historicity 
and identity within their new location. The diasporic self is often made aware of 
his/her ethnicity, if it is different from that of the host society. This poses the need 
for negotiation with mainstream identity while at the same time understanding the 
link with one’s own history, that being personal and cultural (Radhakrishnan, 
1993). The diasporic subject symbolizes the ‘out of the country’ and in many 
occasions, the ‘out of language’ experience and its representations (Lavie & 
Swedenburg, 1996). 
The permeating influence of power structures is evident not only through 
the ‘othering’ of the diasporic subject, but in the global context as well.  
According to Clifford (1997), Diasporas and diasporic forms are, to varying 
degrees, the product of regimes of political domination and economic inequality. 
Demographic phenomena such as the conflict in the U.S. border with Mexico, the 
legal and illegal population movements migrating to Europe (mainly originating 
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from developing countries), and the recent increase on stricter immigration 
policies in developed countries evidence the influence of economic inequalities in 
population movements. Relations among countries, normally based on power, are 
the main regulators between and across changing diasporic constellations. 
According to Brah (1996), the concept of diaspora is centered on these 
configurations of power that differentiate and situate Diasporas internally and in 
relation to one another.  
There is a notion of uprootedness among diasporic populations, of 
occupying no specific cultural space, but of being immersed in different social 
circles and cultural ties (Gray, 2000). At the heart of the concept of diaspora lies 
the image of a journey. Paradoxically, the aim of diasporic journeys is to settle 
(Brah, 1996). Paradoxes of this nature continually appear within the diasporic 
experience and its elements.   
 
1.2.1.1 Home within Diaspora 	  
According to Brah (1996), one of the central elements of the diasporic experience, 
home, becomes a place of desire for the diasporic imagination, while it is also the 
lived experience of locality at the same time. Home is defined, within this 
theoretical framework, as ‘an invocation of narratives of ´the nation’ (Brah, 1996). 
It becomes a floating, yet rooted signifier, portraying a site of daily lived 
experience where ‘feelings of rootedness ensue from the mundane and the 
unexpected of daily practice’ (Brah, 1996, p. 4). The concept of home includes 
social networks of friends and family and is a place with which we remain 
intimate ‘even in moments of intense alienation from it’(Brah, 1996, p.6). It is 
initially conceptualized and understood as the location where ‘feeling at home’ 
was first experienced. For this reason, the concept of home is tied to the notion of 
identity; it is implicit in the story we tell about ourselves (Sarup, 1996). 
Diasporic theorists agree with the importance ascribed to the concept of 
home regarding those who migrate (Brah, 1996; Clifford, 1997, Lavie & 
Swedenburg, 1996). According to Radhakrishnan (1993), the diasporic self 
inevitably historicizes the moment of departure as the moment of rupture from the 
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‘natural home’, which in turn becomes a desire for a ‘homely’ feeling. This 
moment becomes self-defining for the diasporic subject. Furthermore, Gilroy 
(1993) states that within the diasporic experience, there is a ‘homing desire’, or a 
search for ‘feeling at home’. This feeling, however, does not necessarily have to 
stem from the place of initial departure or origin. Previous to Diasporic studies, 
Said, writing on the experience of exile in his book Orientalism, describes home 
as an unreachable location once one has departed from it. Home, metaphorically, 
not physically, becomes a mythic place of no return.  The “feeling at home” that 
Gilroy (1993) mentions, no longer arising from the place of origin, is fragmented 
into two or more locations. This does not imply, however, that the diasporic 
subject does not feel anchored in the place where he/she happens to be settled. 
According to Brah (1996), the question of home becomes linked with processes of 
exclusion or inclusion and how these are experienced subjectively. The political 
and social environment and the personal struggle directly influence the question 
of home over ‘belonging’. Inclusion entails ‘feeling at home’ as individuals when 
we conform to the roles or identities we are expected to fulfill in different social 
environments. Brah distinguishes the experiential ‘feeling at home’ from the 
physical declaration of a place as one’s ‘home’. This distinction becomes 
repeatedly relevant throughout the diasporic experience.  
If return is no longer possible, the question emerges of whether there is 
such a thing as a Promised Land for diasporic communities. In terms of migration, 
in some diasporic populations, the promise is that of the return, while in those 
migrating populations striving for a higher standard of living, the promise is that 
of the land across the border or the host society (ie. immigration towards the U.S). 
Nonetheless, return to the homeland is perceived as a necessity with regards to 
diaspora, because of a sense that living in the diasporic stage is to live in 
alienation from one´s true history and heritage. The return is sometimes conceived 
as the cure for the ills of diaspora, as a result of ‘feeling inauthentic’ in the 
receiving land (Radhakrishnan, 1993).  The return, if possible and plausible, is 
viewed as a political choice, as a desire to restore the homeland or to continue to 
struggle with the diasporic state (Clifford, 1997).  However, oftentimes it is not 
the case that once the migrant returns to the homeland their feeling of alienation 
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will subside. On the contrary, the individual is confronted by the revelation that 
‘home’ no longer brings about the ‘feeling of home’. It is not necessary that even 
given the possibility of restoring or changing the homeland, that the individual 
would desire to do so. The idealization of ‘home’ and the experience of alienation 
in diasporic populations figure in diasporic discourses as a necessity for action 
and change. If the individual feels alienated, there is the sense that he ‘must’ do 
something about it, at ‘home’ or in the host societies, as a mode of acceptance, or 
as political action.  
Another constitutive element for the diasporic subject is the border, since 
it becomes a metaphorical and physical symbol of migration. Brah (1996) defines 
borders as arbitrary lines that are social, cultural and psychic, and have been 
constructed to sustain the segregation of outsiders or ‘Others’. Borders limit the 
possibilities of identities. All migrants necessarily encounter a border that closes 
the nation in on itself and distinguishes it from the other nations. These borders, in 
the view of Diaspora studies, are also open the possibility of communication 
among individuals pertaining to different nation states (Madan, 1996). Within 
diasporic and transnational communities, the stranger, the diasporic subject, 
becomes an instrument in redrawing the boundaries of national identities (Lamont 
& Volnar, 2002). Diasporas are then seen as means of transportation for symbolic 
boundaries from one cultural context to another.  
 The concepts of border and diaspora are referred within some feminist 
circles as ‘politics of location’. In Notes towards a Politics of Location, Rich 
(1984) speaks against a totalizing gaze, proposing a focus towards the local. Brah 
(1996) considers this approach valuable given that when one speaks about 
‘Diaspora’ in general, the issue of displacement and dislocation can easily fade 
out of focus. Feminist theories have played an important role in addressing the 
issues of home, location, displacement and othering from a political perspective. 
Regarding the issue of ‘politics of location’, the notion of ‘locationality in 
contradiction’ has emerged as a way of explaining a ‘dispersed positionality’, or a 
‘simultaneous situatedness’ within spaces of class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc., 
and of movement across both cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries and 
geographical and psychic borders (Brah, 1996). This approach intends to 
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overcome those discourses about border-crossings and diasporic identities that 
imply a common standpoint or a universalized notion of ‘border consciousness’. 
The politics of location, on the other hand, places the multiplicity of semiotic 
spaces at diasporic borders in the discursive foreground, emphasizing the play of 
political power and how it can be either maintained or eroded by certain ways of 
thinking (Brah, 1996).  
Borders symbolize the binary oppositions established by nation states. 
However, they also signal the hybridization of identities that resist the 
arbitrariness of these lines (Anzaldúa, 1987; Bhabha, 1994; Lavie & Swedenburg, 
1996).  The border is seen as a way of transcending the imposed national 
boundaries through possible models of ‘corroding’ the center by making it 
‘marginal’ (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).  Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), who makes the 
borderlands the central axis of her theory regarding chicano lesbian identity, 
believes in the possibility of creating spaces between the borderlands, where 
tolerance of contradictions and ambiguities would be nourished. 
Lines drawn discursively or physically can be open to questioning and 
repositioning. However, the ‘border’ is no ‘open space’, it is only a line defined 
by global politics and nation states. It becomes ‘materialized’ when you know you 
will be asked for a passport as opposed to not asked; where an individual legally 
belonging to a certain state, has to prove his/her legality in another. The space 
surrounding the border is a place where different elements of each state 
communicate, but only certain elements can communicate. It is not the case that 
‘cultures just meet in the border’. This is impossible because of the complexity of 
any culture or the variety of cultures within one state.  The physical closeness 
between two states is much more visible in the lands surrounding the border, 
which allows for a stronger cultural influence in the way societies comport 
themselves on either side. However, it is not in this space that different cultures 
can influence the legal or the political systems of the nations in question, given 
these systems establish the physical border as such. It is not possible to ‘resist the 
line’ by virtue of hybridization. The ‘line’ is ‘there’, expressed only through the 
legal operations that take place in a territory and that split such territory in two. 
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This split is evidenced only by the change in the legal treatment of individuals 
that depends on whether they belong to one side or the other.  
Spivak (1996) initially proposed the solution of “making the centre 
marginal”. She stated this process was possible by being aware of one’s own 
privileges and through ‘hybridization’. This statement is problematic since it 
assumes that through one’s thoughts, it is possible to relocate and/or (re)signify 
the individual’s peripheral position. If it were the case that one could convince 
others that the periphery were actually central in thought, this would pose 
problems. Since these peripheral and central positions are tied to the physical 
space and political structures, how does this communication change anybody’s 
position, let alone privileges? It is fair to say that by envisioning the centre as 
marginal, there will be, for instance, no decrease of migration towards developed 
countries, so this political agenda will have no political impact whatsoever. It is 
not only about the impact on the political spectrum, but about the impact on other 
‘centres’.  What is the centre that becomes marginal?  It is not clear whether the 
centre to be ‘marginalized’ is an economic, an academic, or a legal centre, or 
whether all centres are to be targeted. If these different aspects are addressed, it 
becomes much simpler to challenge the possibility of a political change through 
‘self awareness’. What then becomes questionable is whether that is even the 
point; whether this political agenda of emancipation and reposition is something 
we can or should strive for in the manner suggested by these scholars. The 
problem is not the questioning of the dichotomy, but the periphery/centre relation 
to the social environment. Thus, the link between the subject as actively engaged 
in the (re)signification of peripheries and centres, and what actually occurs in 
terms of inclusion and exclusion in society, has not been properly addressed by 
Diaspora studies. 
 
1.2.1.2 Imagined Spaces in Diaspora 	  
Although most Diaspora theorists emphasize a sense of loss and displacement, 
they also present the benefits of the diasporic experience.  Paul Gilroy (1993), for 
instance, emphasizes the possibilities and opportunities that diaspora opens 
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through cultural exchange, endorsing the development of transnational cultures 
and identities (Gray, 2000). According to Gilroy (1993), diasporic communities 
highlight ‘intercultural positionality’ on a global scale. He views the tension 
between the concepts of “home” and “dispersion” as creative and as being critical 
of essentialist discourses that defend fixed origins (Brah, 1996). Similarly, for 
Clifford (1997), the process of identification with historical and political global 
forces throughout the diasporic experience is not restricted to patterns of inclusion 
or exclusion, but can also incite a sense of ‘feeling global’. The dialectic between 
‘here and there’ breaks linear history, ‘the present is constantly shadowed by a 
past that is also a desired and obstructed future; a renewed, painful yearning’ 
(Clifford, 1994, p. 318). For Clifford, this reveals the possibility of renewal and of 
a transnational community. Nonetheless, it is unclear how his understanding of 
temporality in the diasporic experience differs from the understanding of time of 
any other human being or how such understanding contributes to the ‘renewal’ of 
a ‘transnational community’. Diasporic populations are able to make ‘the best’ of 
their experiences of loss, marginality and exile, channeling them into skills of 
survival, strength, and cosmopolitanism (Clifford, 1997).   Avtar Brah (1996) has 
attempted to enclose the common elements in the current diasporic forms in her 
concept of ‘diaspora space’.  This term is supposed to serve as the point of 
convergence between the concepts of diaspora, border and dis-location, and 
current economic, political, cultural and psychic processes. Brah expects this term 
to challenge the subject position of the ‘native’, positing the global condition of 
culture as a site of ‘migrancy’.  
 
The concept of hybridity has become prominent within diasporic and post-
colonial discourses. It is the positive and emancipating aspect of diaspora. As 
initially presented by Homi Bhabha (1994), this concept depicts the fragmented 
identity, where different homelands for different cultures meet, where borders are 
blurred and a sense of continuity in identity is vague and sometimes lost. 
Hybridity stands within and in opposition to the ‘hegemonic power’ that created 
the minorities that conform to it. Through the segregation of cultures, hybridity is 
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able to form alliances, without trying to force all of its fragments into coherence, 
yet welcoming them into a heterogeneous existence (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). 
Regarding notions of hybridity, there is disagreement as to whether its 
emergence in society is active or passive. Homi Bhabha is accused of constructing 
hybridity only as a passive response to the ‘Eurocenter’, instead of endorsing a 
constant self-search and self-production (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996; 
Radhakirshnan, 1993). Radhakrishnan (1993) splits hybridity into two kinds:  
metropolitan and post-colonial. The former is that which occurs accidentally in a 
certain location as a result of being the meeting point for national and 
transnational citizenships, while post-colonial hybridity symbolizes the struggle to 
obtain the constituency and legitimization of the hybrid’s political identity. Just as 
diasporas have differing reasons for their departure and differing experiences of 
their journey and host society, hybridities are not equal, and, paradoxically, the 
heterogeneity within them has now been overshadowed by a generalized, 
softened, and even occidental notion of hybridity (Radhakrishnan, 1993). 
Similarly, bell hooks has pointed out that through the ‘diasporization’ or 
‘hybridization’ of minorities, attention is deflected onto a broader generalized 
global spectrum, while long standing structured inequalities continue to occur at 
the local scale (Clifford, 1997).   
Another example of these idealized spaces is the ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 
1994). The ‘third space’ is a symbol of hybridity and of the imaginary homeland 
where the fragmentation of the self is recognized as an important factor in the 
construction of various forms of solidarity (Bhabha, 1994). Bhabha proposes it as 
a productive location for creativity and imagination, negotiating a space for 
diversity (Rath, 2004).  It evidences the ‘in-betweenness’ of the diasporic identity, 
even when this ‘in-betweenness’ does not exist physically. This ‘in between’ is 
the hyphen of mixed identities (ie. African-American, Chinese-American, etc.), 
and attempts to empower the hyphen, at least symbolically. Hyphenated identities, 
normally marginalized, are intended to be repositioned within the hegemonic 
discourse by highlighting and ‘exploding’ the hyphen as the meeting place for 
their diversity (Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).  This ‘in betweenness’, some claim, 
is also a strategic mobility tool, a culturally hybrid link that can be applied from 
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many spaces at once without fully inhabiting any of them (Bhabba, 1994; Fisher, 
2003). However, Radhakrisnan (1993) stays skeptical regarding the power of the 
hyphen, given that in actuality one still has to face unequal mediation in terms of 
what aspect society chooses to focus on. She sees the emphasis on the hyphen as 
an attempt to ‘de-historicize’ the hyphen within the diasporic subject, when it 
would be more productive to emphasize its ethnic identity.  
Bhabha’s concepts of third space and hybridity present a passive 
representation of the diasporic individual. Through this representation alone, 
Bhabha assumes the possibility of challenging the ‘hegemonic discourse’ 
responsible for creating the margins of society only by the presence of the hybrid 
subject in a homogenous society. As new concepts emerge for different identities, 
such as the hybrid subject, more social differentiations are created. The illusion of 
endorsing solidarity through a permeating concept that covers ‘all the hybrids’ 
only adds another box, another identity that one can ascribe to. This is not 
necessarily good or bad, but just another created social category which will either 
remain, representing certain characteristics or traits, or will fade as time passes 
and new social categories emerge.  Not everybody has the same access to all 
identities. It is rather difficult to present oneself as a ‘hybrid’ if you are a 
Caucasian middle class male, or as a homosexual man if you are a Muslim 
female. The inclusion/exclusion dynamic always occurs, and is maintained by 
further differentiations. Radhakrisnan makes a good point in signaling this 
western version of hybridity as a new identity, but to say that it works as an 
opposition to social marginalization is a different matter. The ‘hybrid’ is a new 
layer that was originally presented within academic discourse. It poses an identity 
that theoretically ‘includes’ intercultural identities. However, in reality, it does not 
‘bring minorities together’ because these minorities, before considering 
themselves as ‘hybrids’, they are ascribed to other and previously differentiated 
identities (ethnicity, religion, etc.). Therefore, hybridity as an identity cannot 
resolve inequalities brought about by economics and politics.  
It may seem more soothing to believe there is a ‘third space’ where one 
can reach an ‘imaginary homeland’, but it cannot go anywhere beyond the mental 
picture that it portrays. There are spaces in urban societies where individuals from 
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different cultural backgrounds meet, and certain aspects of those backgrounds are 
communicated, but they do not create a ‘space’. Hybridization, as a concept that 
exemplifies the fragmentation of identities or that signals a new identity, is 
appropriate, but it does not unify cultures, it can only express an academic 
discourse that offers a new identity that, in turn, ‘speaks’ for and about the unity 
of certain identities.  
 Gloria Anzaldúa’s ideas (1987) have influenced the studies on diaspora 
and identity through her conceptualization of the mestiza. Mestiza is the female 
form of the Spanish word mestizaje, which signifies the process of ethnic mixing 
that occurred during the Spanish conquest in Mexico. To be a mestizo is to have 
both Spanish and indigenous ancestry.  The mestiza and the process of 
‘mestizaje’, become a representational space for all types of cultural hybridity 
(Aigner-Varoz, 2000).  Anzaldúa (1987) states that individuals who belong to the 
margins have the ‘facultad’, or the capacity, to understand the meaning of ‘deeper 
realities’ and to see ‘the structure below the surface’ because they have become 
sensitized through having undergone processes of displacement and exclusion. 
The borderland, for Anzaldúa, becomes an internalized metaphor that ascribes 
meaning to the mestiza. The mestiza situates herself within a ‘metaphorical 
borderland… a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of 
an unnatural boundary’ (Anzaldúa, 1987, p.80).  She considers these borderlands, 
in their ambiguity (that they are neither here nor there), as an empowering space, 
where definitions constructed by the colonial discourse can be actively questioned 
and refused (Ochoa, 1996). For Anzaldúa, it is in the experience of the 
borderlands where the basis for the social resistance and the creation of 
consciousness lies (Ramlow, 2006).  
  Anzaldua describes the ‘mestiza consciousness’ as one that has been 
produced and delimited by both sides of the binary (us and them, center and 
periphery), but never totalized by either (Ramlow, 2006).  Through the ‘mestiza 
consciousness’, it is possible to break down dualistic hegemonic paradigms, by 
learning to ‘juggle cultures’ and to maintain a ‘plural personality’ where ‘nothing 
is thrust out, the good, the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned’ 
(1987, p.79). The new mestiza not only sustains contradictions but ‘turns 
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ambivalence into something else’(Anzaldúa, 1987). Anzaldúa attempts to turn the 
‘mestiza consciousness’ into a new value system, with images, symbols and 
metaphors that may serve to erase socially established dichotomies (Aigner-
Varoz, 2000). She endorses tolerance for contradictions and for ambiguity 
because they offer the opportunity to perform differing roles in differing contexts. 
She refuses to synthesize identities within the mestiza, and it is this multiplicity 
that allows her to understand other marginalized identities.  The mestiza is the 
meeting point for multiple personalities.  The mestiza is restless and in constant 
internal conflict. Anzaldúa describes this ‘psychic restlessness’ as a ‘struggle of 
borders, an inner war’. (1987, p.78) This state of conflict symbolizes the mestiza´s 
vulnerability.  
 Anzaldúa also uses metaphors, mainly drawn from Aztec mythic imagery, 
to portray the multiplicity of meanings that a concept can contain. Anzaldúa 
believes that metaphors have the power to redefine individual realities and, 
thereby, to build intersubjective spaces in the social realm (Aigner-Varoz, 2000). 
She normally chooses figures from Aztec culture in order to ‘rework’ the past, in 
order to expose its current hybridity (Radhakrishnan, 1993). She attempts to offer 
a decontextualized and dehistoriziced manipulation of indigenous narratives with 
the objective of constructing a contemporary and radically different ethnic identity 
(Aigner-Varoz, 2000). This exercise is meant to show that it is possible to 
empower marginalized communities with intersectional identities by revealing 
how marginalized communities can exercise agency.  
 Anzaldua pushes for a ‘mestiza consciousness’ that is at the same time a 
‘space’ for hybridity. Anzaldúa seems to remain largely unaware of the different 
philosophical questions and debates regarding the nature of consciousness, or, at 
the very least, seems adamant about ignoring them. Her concept of the ‘mestiza 
consciousness’ is just a term that she uses that contains some of her ideals 
regarding identity, but it does not acknowledge any of the proposed meanings and 
contents of consciousness. In the best case scenario, Anzaldúa’s consciousness is 
posed as a ‘different’ kind of self awareness, that of the mestiza, which is implied 
to be superior to others in terms of its capacity to understand tolerance and 
contradictions.  Furthermore, Anzaldúa ascribes power and agency not only to 
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physical spaces (the borderlands), but to the mestiza. The mestiza is supposed to 
have the capacity to see deeper realities. Regardless of how “deep” reality can be, 
the mestiza can be nothing more than a lens, a mode of observing society. 
Evidently, Anzaldúa’s mestiza does not exist as a person, but as a perspective. 
The mestiza is not a meeting point of marginalities and cultures, it is not a space, 
and it cannot create consciousness. Anzaldúa is quite comfortable with speaking 
in metaphors in order to transmit certain feelings and ideas about what she 
envisions a new identity could be like, but enforces no rigidity in her arguments 
nor does she outline any defined concepts which could support her flowery 
language. As she says, the mestiza is ‘neither here nor there’, and neither is she. 
Moreover, one cannot ‘empower’ an individual or place, because people and 
places only reflect the social structure. Through discourse, it is possible to add 
elements to the description and explanation of these structures, but that does not 
give one power to ‘resist hegemony’.  
 Anzaldúa imbues her concept of the mestiza identity with ‘a plural 
personality’ where ‘nothing is rejected’; no identity and no culture are rejected. 
Besides her idyllic perspective of tolerance, it seems doubtful that she means this 
non-rejection in any serious sense. Must one not reject a racist personality? Must 
one not reject a person who endorses oppression and violence? Furthermore, one 
naturally dismisses certain identities depending on the context where one finds 
oneself. A ‘no rejection’ attitude would be dysfunctional and catastrophic in 
society. The same applies for elements of different cultures. Also, how are the 
characteristics of the mestiza extrapolated to others, for instance, to those others 
that define the borderlands? Is it only the mestiza communities and identities that 
can ‘understand’ the structures that have relegated them? This would prove as 
exclusive as the margins that Anzaldúa so severely criticizes. Furthermore, how 
are the mestiza identities to change the status quo through their new systems of 
symbols and metaphors if they are the only ones who can understand them?  
Anzaldúa’s attempt to dehistoricize ancient Aztec mythology in order to 
ascribe a different meaning to it seems to diminish the relevance of the history of 
colonial oppression; a relevance which has been a crucial element in discourses 
that address migration and its political causes and consequences. The myths used 
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by Anzaldúa are historical and contextual, and should be recognized as such. 
Regardless of the different interpretative modes and the possible symbolisms that 
can be ascribed to these myths, there is a history to them that must be 
acknowledged if there is a point to be made regarding oppression and 
marginalization.  
 
1.2.1.3 Feminism and Migration 	  
Feminist theories influenced Diaspora Studies, not only because they view women 
as part of the marginalized in society, but because of the emphasis placed on the 
necessary application of their theories in the social and political realm. These 
theories, sometimes called Third world feminism, hold an ethical position of 
condemning oppression and endorsing human rights and respect for diversity. 
Similarly, third wave feminists address the topics of migration, race and 
colonialism and relate them to gendered identities. They believe these socially 
constructed borders can and must be transgressed. 
Defining identity, Judith Butler (1990) states that this concept is a 
descriptive feature of experience. To her, the general idea of identity as 
continuous and coherent has been socially constructed. Butler sees identities only 
as impositions of a patriarchal society, ideals that have been created to control; 
they become internalized through a process involving social and historical 
relations that occurred mainly through inequality (McNay, 1999). In turn, these 
ideals do not exist but are only imperfectly replicated in society. Butler affirms 
that identities are copies of an idealized ‘original’, they are performative because 
there is no essence to them (Butler, 1993).  The subject has the possibility of 
(re)signifying the terms that define identities.  Since identities work through a 
socially recognizable and determined code that varies according to the context, the 
performativity inherent to identities allows them to be open to change and 
(re)construction, and specifically, to equate dominant and marginalized gender 
norms (Butler, 1993).   
One of the main themes of Third World feminism is that of multiple 
identities within the self (Alarcón, 1990; Anzaldua, 1987; Lugones, 1989; Ortega, 
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2001). The heterogeneous representations of race, gender and class across 
languages and cultures form multiple, shifting, and often self-contradicting 
identities within the subject (De Lauretis in Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). Gloria 
Anzaldúa (1987) adds that these multiple and contradicting identities can also be 
performed. This performativity adds a playful aspect to identity, in which it is 
possible to blur the boundaries that confine them. For instance, in the immigrant 
queer community, the ‘closet’ opens up as a possibility for strategizing the use of 
their queer identity; it is no longer a confining boundary (Fisher, 2003). These 
feminists see the axes of domination as contradictory, and also as mutually 
supporting (De Lauretis, in Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996).  
The ability to ‘perform’ these identities in order to blur their boundaries 
stems from the idea that the subject can be active with regard to its own identity, 
which expresses an assumption of agency. Although Butler (1993) is correct in 
assuming the lack of originality in any identity, it is not only through individual 
action that it is possible to change gender norms since gender is not ‘performed’ 
equally, nor it is equally relevant in all social contexts. It cannot be assumed that 
performing certain identities differently will necessarily lead to an interpretation 
that will result in equality of gender norms.  
 De Lauretis states that one decides ‘to reclaim one’s identity’ in order to 
establish a strategy (in Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996). It is as if one willingly 
occupied the subaltern position in order to push its boundaries. Alarcón (1990) 
explains it in terms of ‘being driven to grasp’ certain subject positions across 
varying contexts. As a socially displaced individual, one must ‘embody’ this drive 
to understand him/herself and his/her relation to the social reality. Whether this is 
a mode of consolation for one’s marginalized status or therapeutic self-acceptance 
remains unclear, but it is supposed to be an empowering discourse that attempts to 
push towards social action. This endeavor is evidently flawed because it assumes 
we can ‘choose’ identities. We cannot just spontaneously ‘choose’ to be white, or 
to be a lesbian. The possibility of performing certain identities that could be our 
own is a privilege only available to some.  
By blurring the boundaries amongst identities, they propose a means for 
social action, one that seems to be based on a ‘different’ kind of consciousness 
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within these feminist discourses. Whilst Anzaldúa pushes for a ‘mestiza 
consciousness’, Chela Sandoval endorses a ‘differential consciousness’, which is 
supposed to enable movement “between and among ideological positioning”. This 
consciousness “enables” us to choose to engage with or disengage from a power-
transmitting system (Ortega, 2001). While for Sandoval we can enter and exit 
power systems at will, for Norma Alarcón, this consciousness allows us to ‘lose 
sight’ of the subject-object dichotomy in experience (in Lavie and & Swedenburg, 
1996). Through all of these new conscious elements, the goal is to create new 
grounds upon which to ‘bridge’ the restricting social borders and form coalitions 
among marginalized gendered communities (Alarcón, 1990; Anzaldúa, 1987; 
Ortega, 2001).  
Feminist perspectives on these issues make the mistake of ascribing 
characteristics to identity that it does not have. They establish certain ethical 
grounds assuming a superior status of authority when making judgments about 
what is good or bad for marginalized identities. These feminists end up engaging 
in the same behaviors they condemn.  These perspectives also state that by virtue 
of agency it is possible to ‘disengage’ from ‘power transmitting systems’. 
Regardless of the lack of clarity about what system they are referring to, the claim 
seems to be based more on fantasy than on the requirement of clarifying 
definitions. At no point is any identity disengaged from a social system. One is 
engaged in certain elements of it, and disengaged from others, but in a social 
environment, unless one is outside the economy, has no voting rights and has no 
identity card, it is impossible to willingly and entirely disengage from it. 
Disengagement is only possible if one is located ‘outside’ society, and to be 
‘outside’ society is to be excluded from ‘the rights’ that these authors highlight as 
the basis of their arguments. Furthermore, Butler´s (1990) assumption that 
identity was ‘created to control’ is simplistic and unclear. Identities emerged as a 
way of identifying with one’s group and one’s family, and in order to differentiate 
one’s group from other groups. They were not ‘created’, but certainly, power 
works in different ways for different identities in a much more complex way than 
Butler suggests.  It has been through multiple differentiations in society that 
inequalities and discrimination towards many identities have come about. 
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1.3 CONCLUSION: CRITICISMS OF MIGRATION AS ANALYZED 
BY DIASPORA STUDIES  	  
Although Diaspora studies and other contemporary cultural theories have focused 
on some crucial elements of migration, there are certain assumptions about 
identity and society within these theories that need to be revised in order to enable 
a more holistic understanding of migrant experience.  I have identified three main 
problems that come up continually across these perspectives. They not only limit 
those perspectives, but invalidate them.  
In their descriptions of society, these views place an emphasis on power 
structures in order to explain discrimination and marginalization. Inequalities and 
differentiation are inherent processes in our society, but power does not work in 
the same hierarchical manner across all parts of society because society itself is 
divided into different fragments. These demand that individuals play different 
roles according to the function they serve. There is no ‘hegemonic’ centre that we 
can blame marginalization on. I do not intend to deny that history and the current 
structure of our society have engaged individuals into exclusion/inclusion 
dynamics in different social realms. However, simplifying these dynamics into a 
binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ across the board negates the complexity of our society 
and is conducive to further segregation. 
Additionally, these approaches endorse the view of the individual as a 
social agent. According to them, an individual is capable of transgressing and 
changing the ‘social order’ through individual agency and political action. 
Interestingly, while recognizing the fragmentation of identities in society, these 
views hold on to the concept of the individual as a unity when it comes to social 
change. This is a self-contradicting viewpoint and grants power to the individual 
when it has none, especially in society as ‘a whole’. There is also the view that the 
individual can modify ‘society’ through collective action. Again, the ‘collective’ 
erases individual agency, defeating the argument these theories push for. If, 
however, we were to grant them the possibility of social change, it would have to 
be context specific. The aims would be directed to a specific goal within a specific 
part of society such as education, the legal system, etc. It is not possible to 
decrease, for instance, domestic abuse, through more classes on Gender studies.  
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The view of agency also allows for incorrect assumptions of causality. It is 
the perspective of the aforementioned theories that individual political action can 
lead to social change. Again, this is very simplistic. Even if specific targets within 
the political spectrum are established, one cannot assume A will necessarily lead 
to B. A may have many repercussions at different social levels that one cannot 
account for, one of which might be B, but not necessarily so.  Aims such as 
‘transgressing cultural boundaries’, or ‘equating gender norms’ are completely 
unrealistic, even more so if the belief is that the individual can achieve these 
goals. The individual cannot know what will happen when performing his/her role 
in a certain context because of all of the other social factors that come into play.  
The emphasis placed on power structures, coupled with the idea of agency, 
posits the migrant subject as a subject in need of emancipation. It becomes a ‘call 
for justice’, a constant political endeavor, which is too broad and unrealistic. It is 
based on an ethical discourse that presupposes a generalization of what should be 
the treatment of individuals in society at large, without accounting for the 
difference in the social realms and how they work.  A political agenda cannot be 
the point of academic theorizing since it cannot be assumed that the latter will 
translate into the political spectrum. It becomes only a mode of alleviating the 
concern for social inequalities, but it does not resolve them. These theories fail to 
achieve their goals simply because they cannot do it through the means available 
to them.  Their problematic assumptions regarding the structure of society and the 
individual (in terms of agency) only reveal their loopholes and allow for a severe 
questioning of their foundations. Nonetheless, they have pointed out crucial 
elements of migrant identity and have set the path for further and better 
understandings of it. The descriptions offered by these perspectives serve to 
identify the conditions that have brought about migration and identity, but they do 
not account for the experience of either. It is my objective to offer an 
understanding of the migrant experience while acknowledging social structures 
and the role of the individual in them.  	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CHAPTER 2: Contemporary Migration Studies in the 
Context of Heidegger’s Critique of the Social Sciences 	  	  
Theoretical positions in current migration studies commonly presuppose a socially 
constructed image of the individual migrant while at the same time assuming that 
migrants are able to change their identity and situation. For example, they claim 
that migrants are a product of their historical and social context but that they have 
individual agency to change it (Knott & McLoughin, 2010). Different ways in 
which migrants can understand themselves beyond exclusion practices and 
possibly change the characteristics of the society that have shaped their 
experience are proposed and discussed (for instance, as hyphenated identities, 
diasporic consciousness, etc.). However, while the importance of the social 
environment is undeniable, the normative stance inherent in a large number of 
current concepts of migrants and migration is problematic. Although it is obvious 
that certain attitudes and dynamics towards migrants need to change, a 
prescriptive view on migrants can easily lead to exclusionary dynamics towards 
those that do not meet a proposed norm. If, for instance, the characteristics that 
are attributed to migrants as hybrids (i.e. ambiguous, contradictory identities) are 
shared by some, but not by others, this can create further social division between 
the more “progressive, contemporary” migrants and the ones that are not. Despite 
the risk of such dynamics, the assumptions regarding migrants, even in their 
acknowledgment of individual differences, are nonetheless applied in a universal 
sense, not descriptively, but worse, prescriptively. That is, they are taken to 
describe not only the characteristics that (especially marginalized) migrants share 
in general, but also to establish characteristics of a normative kind, which specify 
supposedly “better” ways for migrants to live and understand themselves.  
That we have come to understand “the other” in society as in need of 
recognition, representation, and emancipation is tied to Western liberal values. 
There seems to be little awareness in current literature on migration that such 
assumptions regarding individual agency and the importance of individuality are 
historically and socially contingent (Lugones, 1989; Ortega, 2001). What is 
important to remember, then, is that any proposed norm maybe itself questionable 
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and will anyway not be applicable to all migrants universally, at least not in the 
same way.  Furthermore, such normative approaches to migration often suffer 
from methodological tensions because they, on the one hand, consider it 
beneficial to highlight differences amongst migrants and, on the other hand, still 
draw on categories that require that the experiences and situations of migrants are 
generalized. The attempt to define categories and to create ideals that can be 
ascribed to migrants ‘in general’ and at the same time to remain anthropocentric 
and individualist makes it difficult to look beyond what Heidegger calls “the 
ontic”, that is, the accumulation of objective facts and concrete characteristics.  
What is usually forgotten or neglected, however, are those issues that are not 
reducible to facts and definitions, but that nonetheless shape migrant existence as 
it is experienced and that are of concern to migrants and non-migrants alike. 
These issues Heidegger calls ‘ontological’. They comprise, for example, our self-
referential structure that allows for the questioning of ourselves and our 
environment, including the concern about our finitude (O’ Murchadha, 2008). 
This ontological dimension of human existence and thus of the lived, experienced 
existence of migrants remains unaccounted for in most of the social sciences. 
However, they are of fundamental importance for understanding how we come to 
interpret and live in concrete situations. For instance, that we are social beings is 
an ontological characteristic that defines our interactions with others in our daily 
lives. 
My point is not, of course, to oppose the existing scholarship on migration 
in its entirety, but merely to offer another possible, namely Heideggerian 
framework with which to augment current research on migration. In a sense, this 
framework builds on the very debates it also critiques. The insistence on the 
acknowledgement of the various differences amongst migrants (differences which 
some of the theories propose should be emphasized as a matter of pride), which 
drove much of scholarship in the 1990s, was of critical importance. Only on the 
basis of it, we can now take a new look at what underlies those differences; a look 
that does not make the universalist assumptions that the emphasis on difference 
rightly opposed. It is important to note in this context that Heidegger not only 
acknowledges the undeniable influence of the social environment in which we 
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happen to be situated, but that he also looks at the existential structure of that 
which ends up giving rise to a diversity of experiences and which relates the being 
of the migrant to the being of Dasein in general. His aim is not to develop a set of 
empirical descriptions but to develop a fundamental ontology that is manifest in 
concrete experiences. By this he means to reveal the conditions that make possible 
our particular mode of being (TER, 1969).  I believe that this framework can 
prove helpful in reconciling the currently conflicting tendencies in the literature: 
on the one hand, to reject universalizing and hence exclusionary practices, and, on 
the other hand, to assume that certain categories have general application and 
even normative force. 
  In Being and Time, Heidegger develops a critique of the social sciences, 
which still applies to contemporary social research, including research on 
migration. In the current chapter I first present Heidegger’s critique of the social 
sciences with a special focus on those aspects of his critique that are of direct 
interest to migration studies.  In general, Heidegger challenges tacit assumptions 
in the social sciences that are passed off as universal but are really determined by 
historical and social factors. Instead he demands that concepts be continuously 
revised as their relevant contexts change. Furthermore, he accuses the social 
sciences of anthropocentrism because they rely too heavily on conceptions of 
individual agency (BT, 1962, p.70). This last criticism, related to Heidegger’s 
general critique, continues to be an issue in Diaspora studies. In the second 
section of the chapter I address Heidegger’s conception of the relation between 
Dasein and World, which also serves as a means of critiquing the subject/object 
model and the idea of an observable reality separate from the subject. Heidegger 
claims inter-dependence between the context and the individual, making any 
assumptions about society contextually dependent and thereby unstabilizing any 
normative claims regarding how one should live and understand oneself ‘in 
general’. Also, through his concept of Dasein, Heidegger draws out ontological 
concerns that are shared amongst different groups (e.g.. finitude, inherent 
sociability, etc.), thus shifting the focus from empirical observable characteristics 
to those of an ontological kind. Finally, after laying out the general basis of 
critique against the social sciences, I focus on the problem of the normative. 
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Diaspora scholarship has dedicated much research to proposing prescriptive 
concepts while offering very little justification for them. It is my contention that 
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity offers a non-normative approach that 
challenges such prescriptive perspectives.  
 
2.1 HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 	  
Heidegger questions the assumptions made by the sciences regarding the entities 
or objects they investigate and regarding their relation to them. According to him, 
these assumptions, such as the detachment between observer and reality, have 
been established as metaphysical principles. In opposition to these assumptions, 
which still permeate the empirical sciences, Heidegger denies that the world is 
split between a detached observer and a separate independent reality, as the 
Cartesian model of subject and object maintained (Howarth, 2004, p. 242). 
Instead, he argues that all of these assumptions are historically contingent.  There 
are no ‘timeless truths’, but only ‘fossilized product[s] of specific theorists 
responding to specific historically inherited problems with the specific resources 
of their culture’ (Mulhall, 1996, p. 21).  Therefore, no enquiry is without 
presuppositions. As Heidegger states in his Introduction to Metaphysics: 
Questions ‘are not given like shoes, clothes or books. Questions are as they are 
actually asked, and this is the only way they are’ (IM, 2000, p. 21). This means 
that our questions are already shaped by the way we ask them and that the context 
in which we ask them constrains the range of possible answers. No question is 
unbiased, because any question has an enquirer behind it, who is always already 
situated in a certain environment at a given time. This does not mean that 
scientific and/or philosophical enquiries are rendered impossible, but it means that 
our presuppositions are to be acknowledged and their origins investigated as well 
(Mulhall, 1996, p. 31).  Heidegger attacks our blindness to such already made 
assumptions that shape the concepts we use in our sciences: 
 It simply no longer occurs to us that everything we have all known for so 
 long, and all too well, could be otherwise - that these grammatical forms 
 have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an 
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 absolute, that instead they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the 
 Greek and Latin languages” (IM, 2000, p. 56).   
 
Although in the quote above Heidegger makes reference to one specific 
assumption in particular, namely that of a neutral scientific language, whose 
historically contingent nature is usually ignored, his criticism targets the general 
failure to question established scientific concepts, which stands in direct conflict 
with the historical and fluid nature of our knowledge. In a similar vein, Heidegger 
also points at flaws in certain areas of philosophy insofar as they are driven by the 
search for timeless truths about reality. Heidegger accuses metaphysicians of 
being unaware of the background that constitutes our understanding and therefore 
of failing to acknowledge that this background shapes cultural changes and crises 
(Wrathall, 2000, p.12). There are no ‘eternal truths’; there is only contingent 
understanding, which in turn shapes historical changes. For Heidegger, such 
contingent understandings can be brought about by philosophy. Just as Descartes 
established the dualist model as a way to view and study the world, the 
deconstruction of the separation between subject and object can also open up 
different horizons of understanding. Heidegger does not think that philosophers 
can affect human activities in particular ways but that they can make way for ‘a 
change in all practices of an age’ (Wrathall, 2000, p. 23). In this sense, philosophy 
inherently ‘belongs to a higher order, and not just “logically” as it were, or in a 
table of the system of sciences’ (IM, 2000, p. 98). Philosophy thus may not have a 
direct impact on social dynamics or politics, as some scholars in Diaspora studies 
seem to expect, but it can shape the processes of understanding those dynamics. It 
can provide different grounds for understanding migrants without necessarily 
affecting migrants in particular.  
Heidegger believes that the sciences do not necessarily have to continue in 
the same manner and that there are other possible ways for the sciences to 
proceed. Explaining the development of scientific research, Heidegger indicates: 
‘the real movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo 
a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself’ (BT, 1962, p. 29). 
That is, any real progress that a science might want to achieve must be 
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accompanied by a revision of its concepts, regarding their accuracy and their 
coherence with their current context. He stresses:  
The level of a science is determined by the degree to which it is capable of 
a crisis of its basic concepts. In such immanent crises of the sciences, the 
relation of positively investigating and questioning to the interrogated 
matters becomes unstable” (BT, 1962, p. 29).   
 
When a science comes to a moment of crisis, the researchers become aware of the 
failure of their concepts and can then engage in the process of questioning and 
revising them (Boedeker, 2005, p. 170).  In crisis, it is possible to question the 
grounds and concepts of a science, as well as the approaches a science takes 
towards its objects of study (Polt, 1999, p. 32). If certain concepts of migration 
are shown to be inaccurate, a revision and re-conceptualization is deemed as 
necessary, maybe bringing about the questioning of the assumptions that 
grounded such concepts (for instance, the definition of migrant identity, the 
usefulness of imagined spaces, etc.).  
Heidegger warns against attempts to explain social practices and different 
entities through merely abstract metaphysical conceptualizations as opposed to 
looking at the practices and the beings themselves.  If we only look at things as 
‘matters of fact’, the norms that construe them and that form our background 
understanding of them, become unintelligible (Brandom, 2005, p.39). This is what 
he calls the ‘forgetfulness of Being’ (1975a, p.50). What we have forgotten in 
metaphysics is our everyday understanding of the world, beyond abstract 
universals, which includes our ready-made interpretations that are grounded in our 
society and our time (Frede, 1993, p. 57).  In the case of the human sciences, these 
‘depend on human beings and values’ and our understandings of them, since the 
express objects of these studies are human beings. We cannot do without those 
meanings and values in order to provide, what we think, could be an ‘objective 
science’, but those meanings and values are always present in our enquiries 
(Howarth, 2004, p. 243). There is then a twofold limitation, of us as enquirers 
through the meanings and values that we have at a given time, and of the entity 
that is being studied with its own characteristics, which constrain its possibilities. 
The point is to revise and clarify the limitations on both sides for the sake of a 
better understanding of both the respective enquiry and the entities in question. 
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What Diaspora scholars routinely fail to acknowledge is that the normative values 
they put forward are not ultimate, but only a reflection of the values we consider 
worthy at the time and which have shaped their approaches to the study of 
migration to begin with. For example, the value placed on individuality and 
difference is a Western value that is not shared historically with other cultures like 
that of China. However, these values have shaped the discourse of the Diaspora 
studies literature promoting the uniqueness about being different.  
Any human inquiry, shaped by the values and meanings of its time, is 
already investigating Being, in the sense that enquiring about a thing is enquiring 
about its being. Any of us, in any way we exist, has being. Any way of existence 
can be as a migrant, as a philosopher, as a mother, etc. Enquiring about migrants, 
for instance, is already enquiring about their being, about what makes peonies 
what they are.  For Heidegger, the question of Being, about our mode of 
existence, is the ultimate and most crucial question. Both philosophy and the 
sciences elucidate Being by enquiring about the ways we and other beings exist. 
The ways in which we comport ourselves, in which we construe meaning and 
understand and interact with others, are all manifest when we engage in scientific 
activity or in philosophy. It cannot be otherwise, since we cannot abstract those 
ways from our scientific endeavors, and thus our inquiries are shaped by the ways 
in which we are and exist.  In this sense, the question of Being is prior; it affects 
our understanding ‘of all other enquiries concerning particular things that are’ 
(Gelven, 1989, p. 30). As Heidegger explains:  
[…] the question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori 
conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine 
entities as entities of such and such a type, and in so doing, already operate 
with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those 
ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which 
provide their foundations (BT, 1962, p. 31).  
   
Looking into the conditions of possibility for the ontical sciences, such as social 
research on migration, is to look at the Being of Dasein as one that is able to make 
such ontical enquiries. A more accurate understanding will be possible in other 
ontical enquiries if we first look at our own being and what it is to exist for us 
(Mulhall, 1996, p. 31). For instance, looking into fundamental issues that arise in 
our existence will shed light into more particular understandings of migrants in 
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that if those issues are investigated, they will be part of the understanding of the 
migrant experience. For instance, if we understand migrants as dealing with 
fundamental issues, then the context is understood as shaping the way those issues 
are dealt with.  
Moreover, Heidegger accuses the sciences of being rigid and inflexible, 
which poses a threat not only to their relation to philosophy, but to critical 
thinking altogether (Babich, 2007, p. 218). Critical thinking implies a questioning 
of the information and knowledge provided, which demands the continuous 
challenging of the veracity of established concepts and value-laden norms. 
Heidegger criticizes the social sciences for being too narrowly focused on the role 
of man and to have developed a pragmatic approach to their studies. Instead of 
developing critical approaches to their concepts, Heidegger accuses philosophy of 
merely collecting data and directing it towards the use of man. In a late essay 
Heidegger states:  
It suffices to refer to the independence of psychology, sociology, 
anthropology as cultural anthropology, to the role of logic as logistics and 
semantics. Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all of 
what can become the experiential object of his technology for man, the 
technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it 
in the various modes of making and shaping. (The End of Philosophy, 
2003, p. 57)  
 
Heidegger criticizes the reduction of inquiry to an empirical focus alone, which 
turns the attention to concrete characteristics, without looking at the foundations 
of scientific research in critical thinking and analysis. Due to this reduction, the 
sciences end up being driven by the sole purpose of studying their objects for their 
pragmatic use, and not by how their concepts reflect the current social reality. If 
we take Heidegger’s criticism on board, then, research on migration, as an 
example of sociological research and of cultural anthropology, can deepen its 
empirical studies by questioning the foundations of its concepts and by further 
enquiring into the issues that arise through the experience of migration but that are 
an inherent part of human experience.  
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 Heidegger was keen to distinguish his study of being from anthropology. 
His concept of Dasein2, although often misinterpreted as simply meaning ‘human 
being’, is supposed to decenter ‘man’ from the main focus. Heidegger does not 
restrict his study to that of humans, as ‘human being’ is already one way (amongst 
many) in which Dasein may understand itself. Historically, we have understood 
ourselves in different ways, e.g., as mortals, as God’s creatures, as homo sapiens, 
etc. Similarly, ‘migrant’ is a historically contingent concept, which, as distinct 
from related to concepts such as ‘refugee’, ‘traveler’, ‘exile’, ‘wanderer’, etc., is 
linked to a specific understanding of the factors that are taken to constitute 
migration (border-crossing, legal status, etc); that is, the understanding of those 
factors is shaped by the cultural, historical and social context.  
However, with Heidegger, any study of migrants should not be considered 
a study of a particular type or group of persons. His aim is to find a different way 
of addressing the question of the meaning of being, away from the subject/object 
dichotomy, and not to construe a new anthropology (Haar, 1993). Heidegger sees 
anthropology as representing the “forgetfulness of Being”, that is, as humans 
being incapable of understanding themselves on the basis of the relations to others 
and their environment (Dastur, 2000, p.127). He thus rejects an anthropocentric 
perspective, which already implies the oblivion of being, as such a perspective 
constantly overlooks all of that which makes up existence by only focusing on the 
human.  For Heidegger, this is the main failure of metaphysics: constantly 
overlooking the features of Being with ‘the conviction that the whole of Being 
depends on human representation’ (Dastur 2000, p. 127). Research on migration 
as conducted in the social sciences can also consider fundamental issues that 
shape and link both research and migrating experiences with their context, that is, 
concerns that influence both enquirers and that which is being enquired (i.e. home 
is an important element of existence both for migrants and for non-migrants). 
Such fundamental issues reveal the concepts and categories of migration as 
reflections of our context and of our being as one that engages in scientific 
enquiry.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 From the German “There-being”, or “being-there”. A broader discussion of Dasein is offered 
later in this chapter.  
	  	   57 
 An anthropologist who has taken Heidegger’s criticism to task is James 
Weiner. Weiner attacks social constructionism because ‘it avows that the cultural 
significance people make of the world is the way the world achieves an effect and 
reality for them’ (2001, p. xiii). Constructionism overemphasizes the point of 
view of the individual by ascribing agency to subjectivity. This is also 
Heidegger’s critique of anthropocentrism: ‘the emphasis on the negotiation of 
subjectivities’, which in turn neglects to recognize the relevance of the historical 
grounds of social practices and rituals (Weiner, 2001, p. xiii).  The question is 
always whether one can speak universally about human existence.  If it is private 
and subjective, where is the philosophical value? Heidegger believes that through 
philosophical investigation and interpretative analysis it is possible to provide an 
understanding of what it means to be (Gelven, 1989, p.44).  The conditions of 
possibility that are present in different entities and modes of being are to be 
understood in order to broaden our analysis “subjectivities”. In this sense, migrant 
experience as understood by the Diaspora studies fails to account for the 
conditions of possibility that allow both for migration and our understanding of it. 
Even though differences in migrating experience are undeniable, they can be 
understood as expressions of certain common conditions that made these 
differences possible.  
Weiner is concerned with ‘the work of concealment’ in human action and 
social relations (Weiner, 2001; Howarth, 2004).  In his view, focusing on 
individual agency overlooks what social practices conceal about the world and 
therefore what can be revealed through their study. Social practices reveal the 
intrinsic link between the world and humanity, as they are rooted in the structure 
of the world (i.e. seasons, weather, etc.). He aims to disclose ‘the grounding 
human conditions upon which social relations depend’, those ‘under which the 
world is perceived to be relationally based prior to our analysis of it’, that is, the 
way in which environment and language, determine sociability (Weiner, 2001, 
p.79). Although it is unclear whether Weiner fulfills his purpose in his 
ethnographic work, his critique of constructionism is not only close to 
Heidegger’s critique of the social sciences, but also takes an unusual position in 
the field. This position can be used to challenge current tendencies in Diaspora 
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studies and theories of migrant identity in terms of the emphasis given to agency 
and the prescriptive way in which some identities are proposed. By and large, 
these discourses tend to emphasize individual agency, and even though they do 
not forget the factors that shape migration, they overlook the conditions that make 
both agency and social factors possible. With Heidegger, we can say that these 
theories are to blame for ‘forgetting’ the grounds of being in that they focus on 
individual and cultural differences via empirical research without questioning the 
conditions that brought about such differences. Furthermore, they have taken their 
assumptions about subjectivity for granted (in terms of the power to bring about 
social change through individuality), without ever questioning whether they are 
justified or not.  
 Heidegger’s project can serve as an alternative way of understanding 
migrants and the dynamics of migration. When Heidegger criticizes traditional 
ontology for assuming timeless concepts and proposes its deconstruction by 
looking at our everyday lives, he shifts the focus of the enquiry from objective 
definitions to possible answers to concerns that are common in our existence. 
Although studies on migration research migrants’ reactions to their migrating 
process, the focus remains one of definition and categorization Fundamental 
ontology, for Heidegger, is of course distinct from empirical research, but it does 
not mean identifying the most general concepts or characteristics of particular 
beings either. Heidegger proposes ontology as phenomenology, which looks at 
everyday experience in order to disclose concerns that are common to the kind of 
being that we share. The contribution and challenge of a Heideggerian approach 
to the social research on migration is to look beyond the categories that particular 
contexts provide. That is, to look at the experience of migration as manifesting 
ontological issues that are not limited to migrants, but that reveal fundamental 
issues that are expressed through the particularities of the migrating experience 
and also in other situations, with other beings that share the same kind of 
fundamental issues as migrants do.  
Just like the critique of reductionism, the emphasis on the importance of 
the particular contexts in shaping individuals is now commonplace in social 
research. However, most theories of migration focus on the particular ontic 
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aspects of migration (such as marginalizing dynamics, identity issues, etc.) 
without considering the relevant ontological aspects, which are not reducible to 
empirical facts but instead, shape our mode of existence.  Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology is dynamic and relational; however, theories on migration 
take a more static and rigid approach especially when they prescribe ways for 
migrants to deal with social dynamics. Theories on migration fail to understand 
not only the ontological issues that arise for us but that our enquiry stems from 
our capability for grasping beings as an issue to be investigated. Thus, it means 
remaining blind to that which allows us to begin any enquiry or which allows us 
to reflect upon our existence. This is what Heidegger refers to as ‘mineness’ 
[Jemeinigkeit], which, as the ability of understanding oneself, already presupposes 
an understanding of other modes of being. Heidegger’s project allows for 
engagement amongst beings in a process of identification, and not merely one of 
definition, that is, as beings have Being, I can identify certain aspect of my Being 
to theirs. Through the being that I already understand, there is an openness to 
understanding others, and for others to understanding me. As it is a kind of being 
that is shared, there is always already a point of understanding of that being that is 
common.  
Heidegger allows for an understanding of being as one that is always 
already shaped by the world we live in. The latter eradicates the possibility of 
totalizing and universalizing any concept, and instead, roots concepts in their 
context. Against the assumption of the social sciences that we can define things 
and entities completely, Heidegger emphasizes that which remains concealed 
from us as a result of our own limitations. This does not mean that an enquiry 
cannot be successful at defining things or understanding the being of other 
entities, but it means that it is through a certain context that things are intelligible 
to us. In the contexts of our social world we understand migrants in the ways we 
do, and we may interpret issues relating to migration in different ways 
accordingly. For example, the way we understand migration now has been 
influenced by a global increase in this social phenomenon, and even the focus on 
the topic is a result of the current context. However, this does not mean that we 
understand anything about migration in its entirety.  The lack of fixity that defines 
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our understanding is the reason why continuous revision of concepts is necessary 
in the social sciences and also why philosophical contributions to the questioning 
of their assumptions are so important.  
 
2.2 DASEIN AND WORLD: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING EXISTENCE 	  
Heidegger’s concepts of Dasein and World contest subject/object dichotomies and 
reveal the intrinsic engagement of Dasein with its natural and cultural 
environments. The essential relation of Dasein with its world speaks of both the 
kind of being that Dasein is and of its always already contextualized nature. Both 
concepts aid the analysis of migration by further evidencing the link with between 
migrants and their environments, not ontically, as it has already been established 
in the literature of migration, but as an inherent part of the being of migrants.  
Because migrants are an expression of Dasein, they are also defined by their 
engagement in the world.  
 
2.2.1 Dasein 	  
Dasein is necessarily in the world and makes Being an issue. The relation between 
this entity and its being is what Heidegger calls existence, which also involves an 
understanding of its world and what is contained in it (Haar, 1993, p. xxv).  
Existence is Dasein’s disclosedness, that is, Dasein exists as long as it ‘is’ there 
(Beistegui, 2003, p. 20). Because Dasein exists factually, it is always already 
thrown into the world. What Heidegger calls ‘facticity’ refers to the way in which  
one is open or exposed to something (Beistegui, 2005, p. 14). It is the situation 
Dasein finds itself in, involved with its surroundings in a particular way (Harman, 
2007, p. 25).  Dasein exists in that it is present in the world amongst other entities 
that form part of the world (Olafson, 1993, p. 101). In this sense, what makes 
Dasein the kind of being that it is, is its ‘thrownness’ in the world and that 
‘thrownness’ already implies a particular situation. Migration, for instance, is a 
situation defined by certain social factors into which Dasein can be thrown. The 
context of migration then shapes the being of a migrant Dasein. That is, although 
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Dasein possesses ontological content, the circumstances and the context define its 
existence.  
In order to develop his fundamental ontology, Heidegger focuses first on 
our everyday involvement in the world, to bring to light the basis for the 
intelligibility of the practical world (Guignon, 1993, p. 7).  Every one of our 
projects is held against a culturally determined background of familiarity, which 
is for Heidegger, the world (Hall, 1993, p. 135). The practical world is what is 
more primordial to us, the specific forms of existence along with a particular 
equipmental context (Guignon, 1993, p. 13). In Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, Heidegger states: 
Self and world belong together in the single entity Dasein. Self and world 
are not two beings, like subject and object… [instead] self and world are 
the basic determination of Dasein in the unity of the structure of Being in 
the World. (BPP, 1988, p. 297) 
 
In this sense, Being-in-the-world is one of the fundamental structures of Dasein. It 
allows for the unity between the reality and its observer as interdependent entities. 
The world for us then is our world in its variety of manifestations; it is the world 
that is only accessible to us (Guignon, 1993, p. 13). For Dasein, this means that 
the intelligibility of things depend on its world and also on its basic structure as 
Being-in-the-world. In a later text, Heidegger explains: 
Dasein exhibits itself as a being which is in its world but at the same time 
is by virtue of the world in which it is.  Here we find a peculiar union of 
Being- in-the-World with the Being of Dasein which itself can be made 
comprehensible only insofar as that which here stands in this union, 
Dasein itself with its world, has been made clear in its basic structure 
(HCT, 1992, p. 202).  
 
Being-in-the-world evidences the link between world and our Being, a link that 
although present in the theories on migration, it is not taken as something 
ontologically prior to the social context. Being-in-the-world is the condition of 
possibility for the intelligibility of the world itself. Being-in-the-world is then an 
existentiale; it is an ontological structure of Dasein. Heidegger emphasizes the ‘in’ 
because it is what makes possible the feeling of familiarity we have in the world. 
‘Being-in’ says Heidegger ‘is a state of Dasein’s being; it is an existentiale’, that 
is, ‘in’ does not mean inclusion alone, but its primordial sense is ‘to reside’, ‘to 
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dwell’ (BT, 1962, p. 80). In his later texts Heidegger will continue to refer to the 
importance of “dwelling” in (an analysis of such activity is presented in Chapter 4 
in relation to migration).  Being-in gives Dasein the ability to be involved with its 
surroundings and with that which appears as meaningful within the world (Lafont, 
2005, p. 271). What is a priori is our ability to relate to things and care about 
them. ‘In’ does not denote inclusion, but involvement. In this way, Being-in is 
different from Being because Dasein’s involvement in the world is its definitive 
feature. The involvement that Heidegger considers as primary to our being (that of 
Being-in-the-world) shapes our engagements and our understanding of the world. 
The meanings we take for granted are shaped by the nature of our understanding, 
one that is always already engaged in its world.  The importance that Heidegger 
gives to the way our understanding is shaped by our engagement diffuses the 
fixity of any concept we coin.  Our familiarity with that world is our implicit 
understanding of being as making sense of our environment (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 
108). In Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of such understanding and familiarity 
in terms of the world: 
[…] that wherein Dasein already understands itself…. is always something 
with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the 
world…goes to make up Dasein’s understanding of Being. (BT, 1962, 
p.119) 
 
The connection between world and Dasein as something that we are 
always already familiar is an absent element in the studies of migration. Although 
they do emphasize the relevance of the social and historical contexts, they do not 
see our understanding of the world as the condition of possibility to make sense of 
it. The intrinsic familiarity with the world (although not necessarily particular 
worlds) conditions our understanding of ourselves in it. Within that world, Dasein 
always already finds itself as having a certain set of possibilities. Dasein is ‘ability 
to be’, its being unfolds through its interactions with the world, through the 
realization of its concrete possibilities (BT; Guignon, 1993, p. 9). That is, Dasein’s 
understanding of itself as possibility is necessarily linked to Dasein’s worldly 
situations (Couzens-Hoy, 1993, p. 178). Diaspora scholarship’s understanding of 
possibility is that it emerges from the individual’s agency, to bring about social 
change via collective understandings and actions. Possibility is not understood as 
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being determinant of our being, but as something our being can manipulate. This 
is not entirely false, but Heidegger points at the nature of concrete situations as 
also determining possibility. The world of Dasein then is more than just one of 
possibilities, but different possibilities correspond to each particular Dasein 
(Olafson, 1993, p.101).  
One of Dasein’s definitive characteristics is that its being is always an 
issue for it.  This means that it can reflect on its own existence. Thus, Dasein 
cannot be thought of without necessarily also thinking of the possible ways in 
which it exists (Gelven, 1989, p. 48). Dasein has the capability to think of itself in 
ontological terms. In our pre-ontological understanding, as Dasein, we are always 
already concerned with our being and with that of others. Heidegger states: ‘That 
being which is an issue for this entity [Dasein] in its very being, is in each case 
mine’ (BT, 1962, p. 69). Mineness (Jemeinigkeit) for Heidegger means that 
because my being always belongs to me, that is, because I always have being for 
as long as I exist, it is always an issue for me (Polt, 1999, p. 44). This means that 
the kind of being which belongs to Dasein is of a sort that any one may call one’s 
own. Moreover, as we are the entities in question, the being that is mine, is also a 
general mineness, a mineness that belongs to the Being which underlies all 
beings. Heidegger states: ‘We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The being 
of any such entity is in each case mine’ (BT, 1962, p. 67).  The being of Dasein is 
in each case mine because it is my own, but it also discloses Dasein’s openness to 
the world (Haar, 1993, p. xxv).  The ‘Da’ of Dasein already signifies an openness 
to the world. This also means that fundamental ontology cannot be developed 
from generic universals, but that they are rooted in that which we are. Kisiel 
interprets this as ‘distributive universals of “in each case mine” according to the 
circumstances’ (Kisiel, 1993, p. 426). The approach to migration in the social 
sciences lacks this kind of insight into the way they build their concepts. These 
theories do not address the ontological factors that shape our interactions in the 
world and the way we engage with ourselves. Making being an issue for ourselves 
is something that we share in a fundamental way, a question that we inherently 
have the capability to ask regardless of the context. The social sciences lack such 
depth of analysis as the only focus on the definite and contextual factors that 
	  	   64 
shape any entity.  In this sense, they focus on the region of migration and in its 
particular examples, while a fundamental issue is explained via the social context. 
Understanding that we share a kind of being that makes its own Being an issue 
can provide a new angle for the study on migrants as being subject not only to 
concrete and contextual factors but to ontological ones which they share with 
other beings.  
 
2.2.2 World 	  
Heidegger defines the structure of the world and its function as both the place 
‘wherein’ we live out our interests and purposes and the ‘relations whereby things 
within that realm get their meaning’ (Sheehan, 2005, p. 199).  The world discloses 
and opens meanings by providing and being ‘a set of possible relations in terms of 
which things get their significance’ (Sheehan 2005, ibid.). In this sense, the world 
is not just the totality of entities that are present, but it is a range of possibilities 
‘in terms of which anything within that context can have significance’ (Sheehan, 
2005, ibid.). The ‘whole which we understand as our world is already given in 
advance, so that we can encounter any particular entity’ (McNeill, 2006, p. 39). 
The possibility of encountering beings in their specific ‘beingness’ is enabled by 
the ‘whole’. The sense of world as the realm where relations acquire meaning and 
significance is relevant to the theories on migration because it is not then the 
individual who makes up independent meanings, but they are always already part 
of a ‘whole’.  We do not individually ascribe meaning to things, but these acquire 
meaning in a world made up by relations that make any particular thing 
significant. In Chapter 4 I develop an analysis of the theme of home in migration 
attending to these other factors that allow for the creation of meaning (for 
instance, historical factors). Heidegger continues to emphasize in his later texts 
the network of relations that allow us to understand existence in the way we do.  
The world is what constitutes meaning because it functions as a relational 
context that allows things to make sense. We are ‘our most general and 
fundamental way of “comporting” ourselves’ in the way we are towards things 
and other Dasein, and ‘these manners of comporting are the background without 
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which things and others could not be encountered, namely, the world’ (Hall, 1993, 
p. 133).  The world ‘worlding’, for Heidegger, is the context of meaning that we 
encounter things in. Heidegger said: 
The meaningful is the primary, [for] it gives itself immediately, without 
any detour of through across the apprehension of a thing. Overall and 
always, it signifies to me, who lives in an environing world, it is wholly 
worldlike, it worlds. (GA 63/67, 73; 71).3 
 
This worlding is a ‘living through’ our temporalized, historical individual 
experience of the world, against the background of intelligibility which allows us 
to understand it through its worlding. As a totality of significance, the worldhood 
of the world structures Dasein’s understanding of itself and of everything that 
shows up in the world (Lafont, 2005, p. 270).  The world that we form, with 
others, as Mit-dasein, is also many worlds. The meaning we give to things is a 
meaning we share with others, however, we also share different worlds. For 
example, the world of the human, as what is intelligible and relevant to us, is 
different from the world of sequoias or from the world of economics. In the 
human world, for instance, changing homes and migrating acquires a significant 
meaning to our existence. We share different worlds depending on how Dasein 
understands itself, or what worlds it belongs to. Hence, the world of migration is a 
world with elements common and relevant to migrants, or to those Dasein that 
understand themselves as migrants.4 Heidegger addresses the diverse realms of 
meaning by delineating four different senses of ‘world’ in Being and Time, two of 
which are ontical, and the other two, ontological.    
 The first sense of world in the ontic sense is the objective world (Lafont, 
2005, p. 271). It is the world of the entities that are present-at-hand, as Heidegger 
puts it: ‘the totality of entities that can be present-at-hand within the world’ (BT, 
1962, p.92). This is the conception of the world that belongs to the metaphysical 
tradition, which in Being and Time Heidegger calls nature or the real (BT, 1962, p. 
255). The second, ontological sense of the world is the being of a particular set of 
entities and the being that they have in common (Lafont, 2005, p. 271). In a sense, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 Translated by Theodore Kisiel in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time 4 Also, in migration, the plurality of worlds is different insofar, as there is a doubling up “from the 
start”: homeworld/alienworld, originary home/ new home, originary Das Man/ new Das Man, etc.  
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these are ‘regional ontologies’5 as they are frameworks according to which certain 
kind of entities ‘are’ (Carman, 2003, p.129). Nonetheless, these regions refer to 
entities which are present at hand, for example, the world of mathematics. 
Heidegger states that in this sense, the world ‘functions as an ontological term and 
means the being of entities’ of the first sense of the world (BT, 1962, p. 255). That 
is, although reality ‘as an ontological category is dependent on Dasein’s 
understanding of Being, the real is not’ (Carman, 2003, p. 131). Although the 
world is intelligible to us in a particular way, that world and what is within it is 
not dependent on our understanding; the world itself is real. This world refers to 
the Being without which certain kind of entities would not be such type of beings 
(Mulhall, 1996, p. 46).  These first two senses of the world, for Dreyfus, represent 
inclusion, or the presence of things or objects in the world, whereas the next two, 
since they refer to Dasein, express its involvement in the world, as necessarily 
engaged (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 90).  
 The third sense of the world is ontical but in an existentiell sense, that is, 
since existentiell possibilities only apply to Dasein, this sense applies to the 
specific worlds in which a factical Dasein lives, for example its domestic or 
working environments (Lafont, 2005, p. 271).  World in this sense has a pre-
ontological existential meaning in that it discloses Dasein as what it is, but it has 
ontic significance because it refers to specific features of the world (Carman, 
2003, p. 132).  Our understanding of the world is pre-ontological, yet we dwell in 
particular practices and environments. In this sense, ‘the world is always prior to 
my world’ (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 90). For example, the public world, or in our home 
environment, each have specific characteristics, yet, they allow us to exist as 
Dasein in it. Similarly, the world of migration is one defined by ontic 
characteristics (i.e. legal status). However, the world of migration differs in that a 
migrant also can have a domestic or a work environment, which, in the case of the 
latter, might be over at 5 pm everyday. On the other hand, the world of migration 
seems to be a world that sets much more general parameters for Dasein as a 
whole. These worlds are “modes” of a total system of practices and equipment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Regional ontologies are dealt more in detail in Chapter 3 and 4 
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The way in which they express themselves is what Heidegger calls the 
‘phenomenon of world’ (Dreyfus, 1991, ibid.). 
  The fourth sense of the world is ontologico-existential and it stands for the 
a priori character of worldhood in general. It makes any world in the third sense 
possible, that is, the worldhood of the world makes regional worlds possible 
(Mulhall, 1996, p. 46). While our worlds (domestic, working, etc.) vary greatly 
historically and culturally, worldhood is ‘the invariant ontological structure 
common to them all’ (Carman, 2003, p. 133).  It contains the a priori by virtue of 
which any particular world is itself, it structures the sub-worlds, rather than their 
being ‘a mere collection of entities’ (Carman, 2003, ibid).  The worldhood of the 
world is what constitutes the intelligibility from which we interpret any entity 
from any particular historical or social context. As a pre-conceptual, practical 
intelligibility, with which we can find our way in the world, the worldhood of the 
world, allows us to act towards things in a way ‘that has both a purpose and a 
point’ (Carman, 2003, p. 133). In this sense, this totality of significance also 
makes up the inter-subjectivity of the world as the world is always the one that I 
share with others. ‘The world of Dasein is a with-world’ (BT, 1962, p.153). As 
‘mineness’ reveals the possible understanding with others via the being that we 
share, the worldhood of the world is the network of meanings that we have in 
common. Any enquiry, for instance, one on migration, is based on the 
intelligibility that the worldhood of the world provides.  
 Heidegger’s four senses of the world provide a different understanding of 
the different contexts we live in. Not only social, cultural and historical factors 
shape our interactions and understandings, but also in the ontological sense, the 
worldhood of the world allows for the understanding of such factors. Similar to 
the “mineness” of Dasein, the worldhood of the world as something that we 
ontologically share is an aspect that has not been considered by the social sciences 
(and the studies of migration). There is no account of a fundamental network of 
meaning that we build up from, but only a superficial social construction of it. 
There is no link evidenced between our creation of meaning and the nature of our 
being. The ontological level of analysis is missing in the discourse on migrants 
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that destabilizes the idea that the individual via individual or collective action is a 
primary determinant of social change.  
 Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, in its phenomenological and 
hermeneutical nature, offers an understanding of existence through its 
everydayness. His existential analytic looks into our everyday experience, as this 
is the context from which our common understanding of things stems from. Thus, 
he reveals that any of our understandings are rooted both in our ontological 
capacity for such understanding and in the context in which we exist. Through his 
concept of Dasein, Heidegger exposes the relation between existence and Being, 
making it not only ontically defined but also ontologically. Dasein then is not an 
abstracted category nor can it be reduced to ontic characteristics. Furthermore, 
Dasein, as a being that necessarily exists, is ‘thrown’ into a world. The world 
provides a network of relations through which things obtain their meaning. We 
interact with things and others not as isolated entities, but as part of a context. We 
know objects through their use: for instance, I know in which contexts I can use a 
hammer as opposed to a fork. Similarly, we relate to others through the roles they 
play in our lives, as strangers, colleagues, family, etc. All of these relations take 
place in different ‘worlds’ in the ontic (yet existentiell) sense (the third sense of 
world mentioned above, i.e., the work world, the public world, etc). However, the 
worldhood of the world provides the intelligibility of any of these relations. The 
world, as it worlds, then delivers a referential totality significance that allows us 
to make sense of what we encounter in it (and also shapes and determines the 
construction of our concepts and values, i.e. those used in theories on migration).  
 The relationality that Heidegger emphasizes in his concepts and in his 
philosophy is twofold, as having ontic and ontological elements. It is the latter 
that can be an important contribution to the research on migration. Not 
considering migrants as entities defined by their ontic characteristics alone, but 
also through their ontological capacities offers a different understanding of their 
experience (for instance, the ‘mineness’ of their Being that they share with other 
Daseins). Furthermore, the ‘world of the migrant’ can also be understood both 
ontically and ontologically. In the ontic sense of world, the world of the migrant is 
defined by its ontic characteristics (i.e. border crossing, legal or illegal recognition 
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of migrant status, etc.). Ontologically, because the being of migrants is not 
different from that of Dasein, they do not share a different world, but the same. 
Nonetheless, the different aspects of the migrating experience regionally 
circumscribe their being.  
  World and Dasein are crucial to Heidegger’s philosophy and to 
understand the contributions his analysis of existence can make to the theory on 
migration. Through his fundamental ontology, Heidegger finds that there are 
certain issues that surface as relevant in our everyday existence and that shape our 
engagements. These issues are part of the kind of being that Dasein is and express 
themselves differently depending on the context. World and Dasein, intrinsically 
linked, thus give rise to the expression of such existential issues and the 
implications they have for any given Dasein.  Such issues can be analyzed in the 
understandings that Diaspora Studies has developed about migrants. In this first 
instance, normative claims regarding how to understand oneself are put into 
question by contrasting them with Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity.  
 
2.3. THE QUESTION OF AUTHENTICITY: AGAINST THE 
NORMATIVE BIAS IN DIASPORA STUDIES  
 
One of the main flaws that I have identified in the theory on migration has been 
the emphasis on narratives of empowerment and liberation via theoretical 
concepts. These concepts imply a “better” way to understand oneself as a migrant, 
one that is not marginalized and discriminated, but that sees and confidently 
asserts oneself as having a multi-faceted, ambiguous, hybrid identity; and as being 
able to challenge restrictive social norms and pre-existent prejudices. Challenging 
the norm by means of normative claims is as pointless as it is paradoxical. It 
implies a lack of understanding of the different instances in which not only the 
discriminating and oppressive norm, but also the proposed normative claims that 
are meant to help overcome it, fail to represent, bring together, liberate and/or 
empower individuals or groups of migrants, all of which are said to be the goal. 
Although these theorists resort to “active” means such as performativity, their 
suggestions already marginalize a vast number of migrants, for instance, those 
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who do not have access to Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and her deconstruction 
of gender proposing performativity as means for the transformation of gender 
roles. More than that, a presupposed “better way to be” is to imply that, if I 
embody or perform such understandings, I am somehow closer to some sort of 
liberation. Maybe in the “imagined spaces” they propose that might be the case, 
but that still leaves the question of why are such hybrids, mestiza 
consciousnesses, exploded hyphens deemed as somehow better and why should 
we ascribe to such normativity regarding ways of being and of understanding one 
another? If certain migrants happen to develop some of the characteristics of these 
identities, or if they understand themselves in similar ways to the proposed in the 
theories, that does not necessarily mean they should be presented as a prescriptive 
model.  
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity as a non-normative approach provides 
a different understanding regarding different ways of being and of understanding 
oneself. In the context of Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time, the topic of 
authenticity receives particular significance; and it has been the focus of debate in 
Heideggerian scholarship for decades.6 What is meant by the possibility for 
Dasein to be authentic remains a contentious question, also because of the 
purposeful lack of cues in Heidegger’s text as to how to be authentic. The answer 
heavily depends on one’s overall interpretation of Being and Time, while the 
relevance of the question is obvious even from a superficial perspective.  In some 
of the scholarship, it is just taken as an ethical formula, pointing out a definite 
path of how to remain ‘true to oneself’. However, a closer look at Heidegger’s 
analysis of the concept reveals the complexity and profundity of the question. 
Heidegger poses authenticity as an existential in the depth of Dasein’s 
fundamental ontological structure, and yet, at the same time as an existentiell 
modification of das Man. The first clarification to be made on this matter is that 
Heidegger at no point proposes an ethical system, either directly or indirectly. He 
does not enumerate steps to be followed in order to become an authentic Dasein 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 For authenticity as Dasein’s “realization” or “unified whole” see Guignon (1984) and Mulhall 
(2005).  For authenticity as “self-awareness” see Gelven (1989).  For authenticity as impossibility 
see Dreyfus (1991).  For debates see Carman (2003, 2005), Boedeker (2001), Olafson (1994) and 
Keller and Weberman (1998).  
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for the reason that this would turn authenticity into an ontic question. Neither does 
he conceive it as a teleological endeavor leading to some sort of ideal realization 
(Gelven, 1989, p.52). This would defeat the entire nature of his existential 
analytic.  
The analysis of authenticity for the current purposes is twofold, first 
addressing authenticity as a possibility for Dasein, and then taking Heidegger’s 
approach to revise the normative claims in the Diaspora studies literature. In the 
first instance, the problem of authenticity, according to Heidegger, emerges for all 
Dasein, whichever way they understand themselves: as migrants, as nihilists, as 
mortals, etc. Heidegger identifies structures that shape our everyday existence and 
in the case of Dasein, as having a social nature, as providing intelligibility for 
social interactions.  
2.3.1 Das Man7and Migration 	  
Das Man is the term that Heidegger uses to introduce the fundamental structure in 
Dasein that provides social meaning and allows Dasein to make sense of itself  
(Keller and Weberman, 1998, p. 277). ‘Das Man is an existentiale’ of Dasein, 
which means that it belongs to Dasein’s constitution (BT, 1962, p. 167). It 
provides ready-made meanings of a social world, which Dasein adopts, uses and 
conforms to. In answering the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein in its everydayness, 
Heidegger describes das Man as ‘nothing definite,’ but, at the same time, as that 
‘which we all are, though not as the sum’ (BT, 1962, p. 164). Das Man cannot be 
pinned down; it is everyone and no one. It is all of us, but it is not the sum of 
individuals, or societies, since that would be reducing such primordial existentiale 
to onticity. Das Man is ‘the realest subject of everydayness’ (BT, 1962, p. 166) 
because it is what provides the norms of everyone for any one. From how to use a 
door knob to how to show respect to an authority, das Man provides the comfort 
of that which is known and can be expected.  In this sense, ‘publicness’ is an 
‘essential ontological dimension of any shared human world as such’ (Carman, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Das Man has been translated differently across the scholarship as “The they”, “the anyone”, “the 
one”, etc. I have kept the original in order to steer away from intricate problems of translations, 
which, although of great scholarly importance, have no direct impact on my overall argument here.  
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2003, p. 140). In our daily lives, most encounters do not require that we ‘figure 
them out’. Das Man provides the pragmatic structure of everydayness. We already 
know what to do and what not to do in a restaurant, in a public bathroom, or in a 
lecture hall. Das Man makes everyday life easier for us, but it also ‘levels down’ 
our possibilities of being. It provides formats, but also narrows our envisioning of 
other alternatives. It ‘averages out’ our way to respond to our daily encounters. 
There are only so many ways (that we can easily think of) of asking for a coffee, 
so many ways to pay for it, and so many ways to deal with the counter that has the 
sugar, the milk, and the small spoons. Das Man averages the situation of getting a 
coffee, in the sense that we all get a coffee pretty much in the same way.  Dasein 
is ‘disburdened by das Man’ of its being. It makes Dasein turn away from itself 
since it makes things easy for it (BT, 1962, p. 166). Dasein has ‘surrendered’ its 
being to das Man. Dasein leaves its choices to das Man, including the question of 
its own being. ‘Because das Man presents every judgment and decision as its 
own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability’(BT, 1962, p. 166).  
Thus, das Man functions as a source of intelligibility. Das Man provides 
the social meaning and even selects what matters to us by making such meaning 
accessible for everyone.  However, the intelligibility of its anonymous and tacit 
social norms cannot be traced back to a specific origin, nor can they be made 
explicit, accepted or rejected, in some absolute moment of clarity. Das Man 
permeates Dasein in its social nature, and does so necessarily, since Dasein is 
essentially Being-with [Mitsein]. In other words, we are inevitably subject to the 
prescriptions of das Man because we are essentially social beings. Heidegger 
maintains that implicit social norms largely predetermine for us what is 
appropriate and inappropriate in our encounters with other beings (Carman, 2003, 
p. 142).  
Das Man, as the provider of cohesiveness in social norms, is tied to the 
historical and social context. For the migrant, this means that if the context 
changes, das Man will probably change as well. For example, das Man might 
have originally provided comfort, by allowing Dasein to blend in with everybody 
else. In this case, the migrant suddenly faces the possibility of being foreign to a 
new das Man, and of being singled out for not knowing the social norms of the 
	  	   73 
new society. At the same time, it is possible that das Man in the country or culture 
of origin did not provide comfort but alienation. In that case, assimilation in the 
new country might be able to in time provide the familiarity searched for in das 
Man. It could be said that as globalization continues to expand, a more general, 
yet ambiguous das Man is generated. For instance, most citizens in urban centres 
in the world are well acquainted with credit card use, or with the way one is 
expected to behave in a fast food restaurant. Nonetheless, the social specificities 
of each place remain, maybe in certain societies more strongly than in others, or 
with similar demographic environments (i.e. urban vs. rural). Thus, the new das 
Man for the migrant can represent a source of angst more than a source of 
comfort. The migrant has to adapt to the new social norms in order to be able to 
go about his or her everyday dealings efficiently. In the adaptation process, the 
migrant strives to achieve the comfort usually provided by das Man by learning 
the ways of the new society. A full recognition of the new das Man might never 
take place, but a minimal understanding of it is necessary. Das Man from different 
countries might be similar; for instance, ordering a pint in Canada is the same as 
ordering a pint in Ireland. However, looking closely at the social interactions, at, 
for instance, the degree of engagement of the bar tender with his/her costumers, 
differences may arise. 8 
As the migrant becomes more and more acquainted with the new das Man 
he/she may feel more or less comfortable in it. Some of the differences may be 
experienced negatively or might provoke confusion. It is also possible that the 
migrant acquires a better vantage point from which to critique a new society (or 
the previous one), precisely because he/she must learn explicitly (and thus be 
aware explicitly) the many tacit customs and assumptions that make up das Man. 
People that stay within their own culture have learned the social norms from a 
very early age. Once one migrates to a different culture, what it is assumed to be 
normal is suddenly put into question and thus our mistakes or awkwardness are 
explicitly revealed when we fail to conform to the foreign norm.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Examples of studies that have addressed the difficult adaptation process in migrants are Fortier 
(2003), Ahmed (2006), Hoffman (1989), amongst others.	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The response that migrants have to the new das Man varies as much as the 
social norms and the context in which they are grounded. Nonetheless, the aim to 
feel more comfortable is one that remains for any Dasein, even if that involves 
giving up some aspects of our own, or of a previous das Man. Heidegger’s 
concept of das Man, therefore, does not simply refer to the differences of social 
norms amongst cultures, but also to the existential comfort that is sought in the 
structure and the intelligibility it provides. Das Man, as an existential, expresses 
itself ontically through different contexts, such as different cultural forms. The 
concept of das Man provides an existential basis to social research on migration 
and on cultural differences that speaks of the web of social intelligibility that we 
always already partake of in different ways.  
 
2.3.2 Authenticity: An existential issue and a challenge to the Normative 
 
Heidegger identifies das Man as limiting of our possibilities and as inherent to 
Dasein’s structure. Can Dasein be anything other than das Man in its 
everydayness? Heidegger believes that the Dasein who “shrinks back” into the 
comfort of das Man is inauthentic. But if das Man is a necessary existential 
source of intelligibility in any public share world, the endeavor to step out of das 
Man seems pointless from the start. And yet, Dasein is a being that cares for itself, 
whose being matters to it, and which has the potential to answer to and about its 
own being. If this means that authenticity is possible for Dasein, then it must be 
possible without requiring the impossible complete neutralization or dissolution of 
das Man.  Inauthentic Dasein has ‘fallen’ into everydayness, away from the 
awareness of our Being. It has gotten lost in das Man, in the actuality of 
everydayness.  
When Heidegger states that ‘authentic being-one self’ is only possible 
through an existentiell modification of das Man, it brings up the question of 
whether it is possible to evade our facticity and throwness to be authentic.  
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Authenticity, from the German ‘Eigentlichkeit’9, stands in opposition to our 
falling in everydayness. It refers to something that is one’s own, and, presumably, 
not of das Man, and that is peculiar or specific to one’s own Dasein (Carman, 
2005, p. 285). Therefore, the question for Dasein is how to be its own self within 
the social world that supplies Dasein with intelligibility and that it cannot do 
without. As Dasein is necessarily absorbed in the world, Dasein is also affected by 
the world. This absorption, in the mode of das Man and everydayness, shapes 
Dasein’s routine involvement. However, even in fallenness, the care of Dasein is 
revealed as it is involved in the mode of das Man (Gelven, 1989, p. 119). Dasein 
surrenders to the comfort of das Man and turns away from what is its own. 
Therefore, authenticity consists in relating differently to das Man because das 
Man is an existentiale. As such, das Man has ‘various possibilities of becoming 
concrete as something characteristic of Dasein’ (BT, 1962, p.167.), that is, the 
way in which das Man is expressed is intrinsically linked to its context and thus 
depends on the ontic to be interpreted as authentic or inauthentic. Dasein cannot 
existentially evade das Man: 
Authentic being-oneself does not rest on some exceptional condition of   
the subject, detached from ‘the they’, rather, it is an existentiell 
modification of ‘the they -- of ‘the they’ as an essential existential (BT, 
1962, p. 168). 
 
Although Dasein is always social, its understanding of itself is not limited to or 
exhausted by das Man’s understanding (Keller and Weberman, 1998, p.275).   
Boedeker10 explains this through the existentiell modification posed by Heidegger 
as the possibility for authenticity. Existentiell modes are possible through the 
existential horizon, however, the existentiell mode in which Dasein enacts such 
existentials ‘is a possibility, but not a necessity’ (Boedeker, 2001, p. 213).  As an 
existential, das Man is a source of intelligibility and social codes. However, das 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 Also translated as self-owningly (Boedeker, 2001), self-determination, self-mode (Gelven, 
2007).   10 It should be clarified, however, that Boedeker translates authenticity as “self-ownership”, a 
loaded concept in terms of the implications for the conception of the self. In most literatura the 
concept of self-ownership is understood as the owning of my body and its resulting  interpretation 
is the justification for private property. I believe this translation can be misinterpreted since 
Heidegger, as explained previously, does not have such understanding of the individual, therefore, 
it deems inaccurate. Nonetheless, Boedeker explains that the ownership of the self is “taking 
responsibility for the negativity that belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being.” 
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Man Selbst, i.e., the self who is determined by das Man, is the mode of enacting 
such existentials. Das Man Selbst is then what can be transcended in moments of 
authenticity.  Therefore, the existentiell modification that Heidegger suggests in 
Being and Time has to do not only with the engagement in future possibilities 
through understanding, but also with the transcending of das Man Selbst 
(Boedeker, 2001, p.238). The priority remains das Man as an existential, over two 
possibilities: das Man Selbst or the Authentic Self, but the latter refers to what is 
actually Dasein’s own, as opposed to that of das Man.  If we applied this 
understanding to migration, the proposed identities by the Diaspora scholarship 
are not an example of the Authentic Selbst as they do not take into consideration 
the existentiell possibilities rooted on each context. On the contrary, they propose 
a more generalized and more positive understanding of the experience of 
migration, embracing, in a sense, what they are individually (what is their own), 
but in terms of their characteristics, not their possibilities. All of this can 
supposedly bring about social change. These ideas are not a reflection of either an 
authentic self or of das Man selbst, but they only denote the difference between 
their conception of what is, for Diaspora studies, an understanding of a migrant 
that can bring about social change and a positive outlook in each member of the 
group and Heidegger’s concept of authenticity.  
Charles Guignon also claims that das Man selbst is an existentiell 
modification of das Man. In fact, he quotes two passages from Being and Time 
that appear to involve a contradiction.  On the one hand, ‘authentic being one self’ 
takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of das Man’ (BT, 1962, 
p.267).  On the other hand, Heidegger states that das Man is an existentiell mode, 
clarifying that ‘proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself but lost in the 
das Man Selbst, which is an existentiell modification of the Authentic Self’ (BT, 
1962, p. 317).  Guignon resolves this apparent contradiction by arguing that there 
is a ‘distinction between the authentic self and das Man as existentialia’ while he 
describes das Man selbst and authentic Being-onself as existentiell modifications 
of such existentials (Guignon, 1984, p. 329, p. 30). The authentic Being one-self 
then has to do with an understanding of our concrete possibilities in the future, but 
also of possibility as possibility (as Heidegger defines understanding in this way). 
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Authentic being oneself, however, arises from das Man, as an existentiale, as a 
provider of social intelligibility. Thus, das Man allows for authentic one-self to 
occur. For this same reason, Dasein can swing back and forth between authentic 
moments and most of its daily life permeated by das Man.  
Authenticity then is the ‘surpassing of that common understanding which 
consists in reappropriating it in a way that is distinctively one’s own’ (Keller and 
Weberman, 1998, p. 276). Keller and Weberman rightly point out that that ‘much 
is intelligible to us outside the average, anonymous repertoire of das Man’ (Keller 
and Weberman, 1998, p.276). Authenticity, as a possible understanding that 
emerges from das Man, is also open for migrants. As long as it involves the 
understanding of the possibilities within which I exist while always already 
engaged in das Man, the experience of migration shares authentic possibilities 
with that of any other Dasein. In this sense, the question of authenticity is one of 
shared nature, that is open to all the beings that share our mode, that of Dasein. 
However, a few other important aspects related to das Man and authenticity, are 
to be considered before engaging in the challenge to the normative. If we 
understand the relation between das Man and authenticity in this way, then we 
can draw different conclusions for the issue of social liberation regarding 
migration as something that is not formulaic but an existential possibility.  
 
2.3.2.1 Anticipatory Resoluteness11 	  
Heidegger gives a specific term to how we relate to our future possibilities. 
Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] involves decisiveness, but it also means an 
opening up, or a remaining open in a disclosing fashion.  Specifically, Heidegger 
speaks of openly facing a particular and concrete situation that is already limited 
by certain possibilities. This situation reveals to us what is possible in the present 
moment (Harman, 2007, p. 73). Heidegger states: The situation is only through 
and in resoluteness’ (BT, 1962, p. 347).  Dasein can ‘own’ the concrete situation 
in which it finds itself by understanding its Being as its own. ‘The resolution is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 Also translated as “forerunning resoluteness” by Taylor Carman (2003) 
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precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible 
at the time’ (BT, 1962, p. 345). Resoluteness then is a ‘focused engagement’ with 
the actual, with the world and other Daseins, without being sucked into the 
lostness of das Man (Carman, 2003, p.  297). Resoluteness recognizes the 
‘fallenness’ and thus the limitations of my choices, but it is also a positive attitude 
towards the possibilities of the situation I find myself in. 
 The anticipating aspect of resoluteness [Vorlaufen] speaks for the kinds of 
beings that we are in that we are temporal beings and thus capable of anticipating. 
Anticipation is directly linked with Being-towards-death in the existential sense, 
as in, awareness of my own vulnerability and that of my possibilities, whatever or 
whomever they include. Being anticipatorily resolute is ‘projecting 
wholeheartedly into the dying of possibilities that necessarily attend and define 
one’s being anything or anyone at all’ (Carman, 2003, p. 299). It involves both 
engaging in actuality and projecting forward.12 Only inauthentic Dasein can 
believe itself to have some sort of permanent certainty. Authentic Dasein 
understands its finite nature but at the same time does not make that finitude rule 
its way of life, it does not make the momentary commitments fleeting and 
irrelevant matters, but remains open to change.  
Resoluteness has also been interpreted as Heidegger’s conception of 
freedom. This freedom is understood as the revelation of Dasein of its finitude 
and then ‘owning up’ to itself through resoluteness (Nichols, 2000). ‘The 
resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses the actual factical 
possibilities of authentic existing in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness 
takes over as thrown’ (BT, 1962, 383). Those factical possibilities have also been 
determined by the historical context.  The authentic disclosing of history reveals 
the sources of our possibilities and of our ways of being (Guignon, 1984, p. 335).  
In a way, the social pre-understanding of das Man is transmitted historically. Das 
Man is the transmitter of the historical possibilities within our social context, 
although Heidegger points out that our average understanding of it is distorted in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 Anticipatory resoluteness also allows to negate the proposed model by Guignon of authenticity 
as completed wholeness, since it involves a looking and engaging with future possibilities. (See 
Carman2, p 267). 
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the form of tradition. Following Heidegger’s understanding of historical das Man, 
migrants then already carry a social understanding. Although not necessarily 
understood as heritage, traditions in their home country become expressions of 
das Man that also determine their factical possibilities, including those of 
migration.  For instance, in post-colonial countries, the former colonizer is 
sometimes taken as a social example to be imitated. Such views may sway 
migrating tendencies towards the former colonizing country.  
Heidegger asserts that tradition can prevent Dasein from understanding its 
own history. It remains stuck in traditional ways of understanding without 
questioning them. Dasein can be authentically related to its history by recovering 
the reasons and sources for our traditional understanding. For Heidegger, Dasein 
is always already contextualized in a historical and social ‘happening’, which 
merges with the others who are part of that context, making a ‘co-happening’ 
which Heidegger calls ‘destiny’.  He says ‘Our fate has already been guided in 
advance in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness 
for determinate possibilities’ (BT, 1962, p. 436). He does not imply each action of 
ours is already pre-determined in an absolute sense, but that our history plays a 
role in the way we are in society and in the way we live. History of colonization, 
for instance, is a common factor in migration. Even though some migrants 
‘choose’ to migrate, their choices have already been influenced by different 
historical factors.  
Heidegger expands the notion of authenticity to history and the way 
Being-with-Others is transmitted historically in the form of heritage. The ‘co-
happening’ is what a society has brought, within its own possibilities, into 
determining future ones. Such ‘co-happening’ already determines our Being, and 
also the das Man of each society, even though the role of das Man remains the 
same in all societies. The expression of the different factors that shape a society 
are what make up the differences amongst cultures. This becomes increasingly 
relevant when those cultures meet as a result of contemporary migrating 
tendencies and globalization as they are faced with different social expectations of 
what is considered to be the norm. If Dasein understands its possibilities as 
historical, Heidegger states that authenticity takes the form of a ‘repetition’ of 
	  	   80 
such possibilities. This is what Heidegger calls ‘authentic historicity’. For 
example, if I understand the reasons and historical moments that brought about 
the celebration of the Day of the Dead in Mexico, and I look into the historical 
process it has undergone, maybe I will feel more inclined to give importance to 
this tradition and will make an effort to maintain it. For Heidegger this means that 
we have understood ourselves authentically as ‘heritage’ (Guignon, 1984, p. 337). 
Such heritage is grounded in Being-with-others, it is Dasein’s understanding of 
itself in the light of a communal past that has determined its current context.  This 
is relevant for Dasein’s future because by projecting into new possibilities, the 
way Dasein is, is always already influenced by its past, and by relating to it, it can 
better understand its own possibilities.  
 As an existential issue, authenticity arises in juxtaposition to the comfort 
of everydayness. It involves a questioning of the social norms that we cannot live 
without. Heidegger emphasizes the realization of both the actual and the possible 
as ways of understanding our being. Anticipatory resoluteness involves taking 
into consideration both the limitations of my context and the possibilities that 
arise as a result of it. Heidegger does not see a  “liberation” from das Man as an 
ideal, but as a mode of understanding our mode of being, concretely modifying 
our understanding of what is the norm via questioning our being. We are for the 
most part engaged in normative ways as in they dictate appropriate patterns of 
behavior, but that is an aspect of our lives that is not to be deemed as wrong or 
bad, it is just a mode of existence that we need as Mit-dasein. Heidegger says 
Dasein flees into the comfort of everydayness because confronting and 
questioning fundamental conditions of our being is not a simple task. However, 
Heidegger does not imply that we are “better” Dasein for not fleeing into das 
Man, but that to understand what is one’s own is to face the nature of our being.  
 In this sense, authenticity is not a mode of liberation, but via anticipatory 
resoluteness, or what is interpreted as freedom, but an engaging with and 
inquiring into who we are.  I do not think that the Diaspora Studies literature is 
entirely incorrect in stating that migrants, because of the discomfort of 
displacement, experience a type of questioning. However, to presume or to 
propose that the arising of such questioning is something that can be ascribed as 
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an ideal category for migrants is unjustified. The questions that emerge for 
migrants regarding their identity, their context, etc., reveal fundamental issues, for 
Heidegger, namely that of authenticity. The fact that such questions arise for 
migrants does not make them more authentic or liberated from the norm or from 
marginalizing dynamics. Thus, to propose normative claims as to how to 
understand themselves (as ambiguous, fragmented, hybrid, etc.), is to establish a 
new category that at its best serves as an ideal (one of an unjustified nature since 
these questions do not necessarily imply an automatic or permanent “improved” 
awareness of who they are and their surroundings) and at its worst, as an 
exclusionary practice for those who do not achieve such understandings of 
themselves.  
 What can be proposed to the literature on migration is that the context 
provides migrants more readily access to questions that are of a shared 
fundamental kind. Taking in consideration the criticism on the over-emphasis on 
agency in the literature, a point to be made is that it is the conditions that migrants 
find themselves in that bring about the possibility of such questions. However, 
migrants have the freedom, or the possibility of being anticipatory resolute to 
confront those questions and to look at both the actual and the possible in terms of 
their particular contexts. Physical displacement and finding themselves in a new 
society makes issues on identity more salient. What do I consider to be 
appropriate? What kind of humor or physical contact is expected of me? These 
questions are of a social kind, that might have not have arisen so evidently before 
migrating. As the migrant feels anxious about “fitting in” and “averaging” 
him/herself out with others, it is then possible to question the validity, the 
importance of social norms. It is possible then to consider one’s context and 
limitations in order to see ahead. It is also possible to question the norms and 
traditions from the place of origin and to understand one’s heritage. Although the 
reverse can also happen, where traditions are deemed, for instance, as a symbol of 
a past left behind that has no longer anything to do with us. To contrast one’s 
heritage with the one of another country is already to put into question how such 
traditions came about, although not necessarily an authentic understanding of 
one’s heritage. In this sense, maybe an initial phase is more accessible to 
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migrants, regarding issues on social intelligibility (das Man), one of a regional 
kind. Nevertheless, the possibility of an anticipatory resolute attitude, or of facing 
questions about the nature of our being in more depth, are not in any way 
intrinsic.13 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 Examples of theses questions will be addressed on chapter 4 (on finitude and groundlessness), 
which are also a crucial aspect for Heidegger’s authentic understanding.  
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CHAPTER 3: Home, Homelessness and Dwelling: a 
regional ontology 	  	  
The early Heidegger provides a fundamental ontology of Dasein as it is expressed 
in our everyday existence.  By outlining common fundamental issues, his analysis 
of our everydayness is imbued with an understanding of our Being. This provides 
an alternative approach to the methods of the social sciences, and offers, at least 
potentially, an ontological basis for what in the social sciences is researched only 
ontically. In this chapter, a closer comparison with issues in the social sciences is 
made with one of Heidegger’s topics: home. Home is an element that is crucial for 
the social research on migration. The scholarship has dedicated much of their 
investigations to describing the many forms of the importance that the home has 
for migrants. For this reason, Heidegger’s analysis of the home allows for a 
parallel comparison with the research on migration, also helping to elucidate why 
the Heideggerian analysis can offer a better understanding of the experience of the 
home, not only for migrants, but in our daily existence.  
Focusing on the concerns that are fundamental to our shared existence can 
be a means for bridging concrete differences that tend to divide and separate us if 
we exclusively understand ourselves through them. Without proposing an all too 
optimistic ideal of bridging all differences, I believe the view on common 
ontological issues offers a different, and perhaps less conflictual way of 
understanding ourselves and others, as not only defined by inflexible and divisive 
specific categorizations. For this reason, I believe Heidegger’s approach can also 
balance the agenda of social change in Diaspora studies by providing incentives to 
understand migrants as beings whose existence can be understood in terms of 
their particular engagements with ontological/ existential issues or concerns. 
Thus, the new understanding of migrant existence, which I can only begin to 
develop here focusing on the issue of home, rests, on the one side, on fundamental 
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shared concerns of Dasein which open an inter-subjective realm; and, on the other 
side, on the acknowledgment of the relevance of the specific context of migration, 
its ontic characteristics, and how these shape and constrain possible modes of 
responding to and taking up those shared concerns.  
In what follows I propose the beginnings of a regional ontology of 
migration, in this particular case, focusing on the issue of home.  A regional 
ontology of migration is thus understood as an application of Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, which provides a common ground of issues and concerns, 
to the specific existential contexts and aspects of migration. A regional ontology 
defines issues that are common and specific to migrants, but which also stands in 
relation to a shared fundamental ontology of Dasein. This regional ontology of 
migration mediates between the individual and contextual differences addressed 
by Diaspora studies and the fundamental structure of being proposed by 
Heidegger. It sheds new light on research on migration by turning our attention 
away from defining characteristics according to which migrants may be 
objectified, and by turning it towards issues that are shared not only by migrants, 
but for which migration constitutes a particular context. Those issues can 
therefore help migrants to identify with others (migrant or not), without thereby 
denying the particular social dynamics, constraints and pressures that migrants 
typically encounter.  
In Chapter 1 I briefly explained notions of ‘home’ according to Migration 
and Diaspora Studies, as a remembrance of the ‘narratives’ of migrants’ home-
countries, also described as a feeling ‘rooted’ in and familiar with a specific 
environment. In this chapter I first expand on the conceptualizations of ‘home’ by 
different theorists on migration in order to look at some contemporary debates on 
this topic in the social sciences.  I then review Heidegger´s approach to the notion 
of ‘home’ and to other related topics such as dwelling, homelessness, and 
journeying.  In the third and last section of this chapter I explain what a 
Heideggerian perspective adds to the already vast research on home and 
migration. Heidegger looks at home from a phenomenological perspective, which 
considers inhabiting places to be an essential aspect of human existence. 
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Furthermore, he also gives an account of its counterpart, the experience of 
homelessness, which he claims to be just as important as the former.  
   
 
3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORIGIN: A FIXED HOME  	  
Migration and Diaspora studies have classified different aspects of home in 
migration that surface as relevant in the experience of both the host country and 
the country of origin.  The experience of both sites shapes the way migrants 
experience their lives and affects what they consider homely.  
 
3.1.1  Home and Identity 	  
Implicit but always present is the connection between identity and home. 
Although identity is considered by Diaspora studies to be fluid, this scholarship 
recognizes that we are born into relationships that are already based in a place, 
and that the bonding that arises as a result is a primary and localizable one 
(Madan, 1996). Home is a ‘spatial context where identities are worked on’ 
(Fortier, 2003). The identities of those who inhabit the home are continuously re-
imagined and re-defined as much as the home is.  Identities, especially those that 
migrate, are considered to be always ‘plural and in process’ (Brah, 1996). 
Moreover, the experience of migration makes space seem ‘decentered and 
exploded into multiple settings’ (Gilroy, 1993). Mobility and migrancy destabilize 
identities insofar as they detach identity from place (Chambers, 1994), while they 
also allow for the creation of new identities (Braidotti, 1994).  Research on 
attachment to a place of origin has found that identities are not only enacted at the 
original home, but they are also recreated in the new place (Ralph and Staeheli, 
2011). Once home is left behind, it is theoretically possible to create a new 
identity, since in the new place of settlement there are no ‘witnesses’ of the 
previous one. The migrant therefore is able to modify certain aspects of his/her 
identity, sometimes willingly, and sometimes as a result of the migrating process. 
Migrants might highlight certain aspects of their identity in the new country, for 
instance, nationality; and in the case that they go back home, they might reassume 
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their previous identity or combine it with new acquired aspects. Their identity 
becomes contextual, but at the same time decentered, in the sense that it is no 
longer one identity that they are able to ascribe to.   
 The expectation of an eventual homecoming is important to some migrants 
as an ‘ongoing search for a stable sense of self’ in a context which is necessarily 
in flux (Conway, 2005). Christou (2002, 2004, 2006) has found in a series of 
studies that the instability of identity that migrants face while living away from 
home underlies ‘the quest for an authentic sense of self’ linked to the act of 
returning home.  These yearnings are interpreted as an idealization of a stable 
identity and a fixed home, while ‘in reality’, migrants tend to have ‘hybrid and 
dynamic identifications’ with multiple locales.  Sarah Ahmed (2006) calls these 
disorientating feelings ‘sea-sickness’, pointing at the importance of raising 
questions about identity when ‘the ground is disturbed’. 
 
3.1.2 Home and “feeling at Home” 	  
Much of the literature on the concept of ‘home’ intends to explain how homes 
come to be lived, felt and made (Allan and Crow, 1989; Davidoff and Hall, 1987; 
Chapman and Hockey, 1999), including how they are experienced in migration 
(Rapport and Dawson, 1998). Avtar Brah (1996) makes the basic differentiation 
between ‘home’ and ‘feeling at home’, that is, between the place of 
origin/residence and a feeling of familiarity and comfort associated with a certain 
place.  To put it differently, she differentiates between declaring one place as a 
home and feeling at home. For instance, I may reside in Berlin but feel that my 
home, or the place where I ‘feel at home’ is Ireland. It refers to a feeling of 
belonging to a social, cultural environment. Similarly, my place of origin may be 
Madrid, but I might feel more at home in Toronto.  Brah (1996) refers to ‘home’ 
generally as the locality of origin where ‘feelings of rootedness’ arise from daily 
experience and the mundane. This ‘home’ includes family and other social 
relations, which are not necessarily built by us but into which we are mostly, as 
Heidegger would put it, ‘thrown’.  Brah explains that this ‘home’ remains 
intimate to us even if we are alienated from it, in the sense that it remains the 
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place that has shaped us though its social and historical context. This originary 
home, as the place where social networks and emotional ties emerge, she claims, 
brings about the sense of ‘feeling at home’. 
In the context of migration, Brah (1996) speaks of ‘homing desires’, as the 
desires to feel at home in spaces that provide a sense of feeling comfortable, 
through the physical and symbolical reconstitution that migrating demands 
(Fortier, 2003). Brah explains ‘the difference between ‘feeling at home’ and 
taking claim to a place as one’s own as the difference between the originary sense 
of home as the ‘lived experience of locality’ and the search for a new feeling of 
that familiarity, which can eventually result in claiming a place as one´s own in a 
more active way. Fortier (2003) also uses the concept of ‘homing desires’ and 
defines it as a longing to belong.  Instead of deriving from an already constituted 
home, this longing to belong arises from the very movement of desire.  Once one 
has moved, the desire for familiarity arises as the wish to claim a place as one´s 
own. Such desire also travels with the geographical movement of migration. 
Among the many different desires that shape, push or lead migration, the search 
for a home that promises more stability, i.e. in the financial or political sense, but 
also a sense of ‘feeling at home’ is one of the strongest. The movement that 
defines migration, according to Fortier, is also the movement of desire (Fortier, 
2003). However, homes are always made and remade ‘as grounds and conditions 
change’ (Ahmed et al., 2003). ‘Homing’ entails processes of home building 
(Hage, 1997), whether at home, that is, at the place of origin, or in migration. For 
Eva Hoffman (1989), ‘making home’ is about recreating, or creating for the very 
first time, what she calls ‘soils of significance’.  This also means that the affective 
qualities of the home go hand in hand with more concrete materialities, such as 
objects, rooms, borders, etc.  
Phenomenological analyses have shown that home-ness (or feeling at 
home) is often experienced as ‘involving a sense of inside-ness, a boundedness 
that may be grounded in ‘taking for granted’ the environment and a socially 
known world’ (Rowles, 1983). The process of home building in migration is 
explained as ‘the gathering of intimations of home’, as fragments which are 
imagined to be traces of an equally imagined homely whole, ‘the imagined past 
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“home” of another time and another space’ (Hage, 1997, p. 74).  This explanation 
evidences again the link between the ‘material past’ home with a specific location 
and the desire for the homely. Thus, home-building involves a ‘continuous act of 
production and reproduction which is never fully complete’ (Gedalof, 2003).  
That is, a person can constantly be creating attachments and connections that 
allow them to feel more settled in a given place. In time, however, those 
attachments might get lost, while new ones might emerge, maintaining the 
building of a sense of home in a constant building process.  
The social research on home and migration distinguishes between the 
geographical site of origin and the experience of familiarity and belonging that 
arises there. In migration, this plays out as the desire for experiencing such 
familiarity and belonging again (or in some cases, for the first time).  Home thus 
becomes a crucial factor in the process of migration, namely as marking the 
distinction between the place of origin and the feeling that it evokes; a feeling that 
migrants search for in the host society.  
 
3.2  HOME AND BELONGING: THE OTHER INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE THE HOME  	  
Brah (1997) points out that the concept of ‘home’ implicitly refers to an existing 
‘other’.  Home signals inclusion for those who belong to ‘that’ home, but it is also 
‘intrinsically linked to processes of exclusion’. These processes socially regulate 
feelings of belonging, and they are also a common topic for those who migrate. 
Inclusion/exclusion dynamics and questions of privilege and marginality in terms 
of movement are the main focus of studies on diasporic communities and in 
feminist and post-colonial discourses. Since the concept of ‘diaspora’ has 
developed as a sign of multi-locality and hybridization within cultural theory, this 
scholarship questions the language of integration, assimilation or inclusion 
assumed within national frames (Ahmed et. al, 2003). For example, Gayatri 
Spivak states that our desire for a ‘home’ is unavoidable, especially for those 
people who stand in the margins of society. She explains that migrants create 
closed communities in order to emulate the feeling of home - a place where they 
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do not feel excluded, where nostalgia is elicited for a past that ‘never was’, where 
power relations did not affect them negatively. 
Processes of inclusion and exclusion depend on the categorization of 
people as belonging or not belonging (Ralph and Staeheli 2011).  Dominant 
groups impose categories of belonging on migrants. Even when belonging is a 
subjective feeling, it is socially defined. Feeling at home or belonging depend on 
being recognized by others. It is not enough to “claim membership of a particular 
home”, but such membership must be ‘validated’ by the society to which one 
claims to belong.  Validation normally depends on whether the ‘member-to-be’ 
shares certain criteria of similarity with others in that given society.  Surprisingly, 
the focus lies on the degree of sameness to members of the dominant social group 
(Braakman and Schlenkhoff, 2007; Devlin Trew, 2007).  Ralph and Staeheli 
(2011) interpret this as a teleological process, that is, as a process with the goal of 
‘coming to belong’ in their new homes by means of imitating certain mannerisms 
or practices typical of the host society.  
The home is understood as built from relationships and social networks. 
These are places dependent but also interconnected with other places, maybe other 
homes. Identities and feelings of belonging are also place dependent and are not 
constrained to a specific place (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). For instance, belonging 
has been divided in the literature into ‘being’ and ‘longing’ (Probyn, 1996).  
‘Being’ focuses on the ‘performance and reiteration’ of the normal codes of 
behavior that are acceptable in order to belong, while ‘longing’ suggests a 
different mode of membership that transcends the site where dynamics of 
belonging and not belonging take place. For the authors who use this distinction, 
’being’ represents the social norms that migrants, previous to their migration, 
would have followed in their place of origin, in a sense, their past “stable” identity 
that allowed them to ‘fit in’ their society.  ‘Longing’, on the other hand, is meant 
to represent some sort of resistance or alternative to the expected forms of 
belonging, since it is always tied to the desire for another place, which may 
include its own norms and ways of belonging. Regardless of where the migrant 
finds him/herself, if there is longing, there is the acknowledgment of an 
alternative to the present reality and a sense that a different reality is possible.  
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However, processes of inclusion/exclusion do not only occur for migrants 
in the host society. Home can establish a clear distinction between the initial site 
of estrangement (‘home as not home’; the originary home as unhomely) and a 
(futural) home as a ‘new site of possibility’ (Fortier, 2003).  The familiarity found 
in the home may even be rejected when one no longer feels familiar in it (Frontier, 
2003).  The discourse of migration directed towards a ‘homecoming’, to a home 
of comfort and belonging is then questioned (Fortier, 2003). Sometimes becoming 
a stranger does not occur after leaving home, but is instead the cause of leaving it. 
These groups range from LGBT migrant communities, to exiles and refugees who 
already feel not-at-home in their homelands and for whom the concept of home is 
already a myth and an ideal (Fortier, 2003). Under these conditions, leaving home 
is necessary for some kind of liberation from social constraints, which can be 
loosened from a distance. ‘Homing desires’ can thus provide motivations for 
leaving home. For instance, gay migrants may enact only some of their identities 
at any given time, depending on the place they are in. They might feel that they 
are able to enact their sexuality more freely in certain contexts and may hide it in 
others.  When leaving home is the condition of possibility for experiencing 
‘feeling at home’, a model of ‘multiple belongings’ allows migrants to re-assess 
and re-engage the initial site of estrangement (Fortier, 2003). In this way, multiple 
locales make possible the expression of different facets of identity.  
 
3.3 HOME: MOBILITY AND RETURN 	  
Although Brah makes a distinction between a physical home and the experience 
of feeling at home, other scholars in the field have problematized the 
conceptualization of the original home as being a fixed origin (Gilroy, 1993). The 
idea that roots are only in one place restricts the experience of home. Aspects of 
different places of residence can be as influential as those of the home. Also, the 
elements of the environment that culturally and socially shape individuals vary 
through time. Places are not static; the cultural and social environment that 
belongs to the home changes over time. Tradition is fluid and although we 
recognize some of the same elements of our culture over the years, elements of it 
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are reconstituted and reshaped (Madan, 1996).  For instance, certain dates, like 
Christmas, might be traditionally celebrated in certain ways, with specific dishes, 
songs, etc. Over time, factors like globalization and changes within a culture 
might re-shape the ways traditions are kept, adding or subtracting elements to and 
from the celebrations.  As migrants return to their homes, if they do, they might 
encounter such changes and may even contribute to them, while nonetheless being 
able to recognize them as aspects of their traditions.  
The idea of the home as origin and mobility as transcendence and 
transformation is put into question (Ahmed et. al, 2003). Instead, home and 
migration are understood in terms of a plurality of experiences (Ahmed, 2003, 
p.2). The experience of migration is complex and involves a diverse set of 
multiple relations and belongings, it is not a simple dichotomy of home vs. 
abroad. Being at home and migrating do not necessarily occur separately, and 
both of them may include experiences Ahmed (2003) calls ‘uprootings’ and 
‘regroundings’. Home is then conceptualized in an ambivalent fashion, as 
extending outward and, at the same time, as grounded. Mobility and stasis, 
displacement and placement go into making a home (Clifford, 1997). Although 
home plays an important role in grounding people to a place, people who do not 
cross borders still live in homes that are experienced as fluid (Ralph and Staeheli 
2011) Such fluidity is experienced through the passage of time and the social and 
cultural changes that naturally occur in places. The migrant can serve as a figure 
that evidences both aspects of home, however, home can be experienced as 
mobile through other changes that are not geographical. Cultural changes make 
some of the inhabitants aware of the transformations in their society and these 
inhabitants will adapt accordingly. However, in migration, the changes in the 
home are experienced more sharply because of the element of geographical 
displacement.   
 In addition to being mobile, home is also not necessarily located in only 
one particular locale. Home is built through a dynamic process of ‘localizing 
particular sets of relationships that do not necessarily depend on the essential 
qualities of a particular place’ (Nowicka, 2006, 2007) Home includes the people 
and the objects we share a home with, and therefore their connection to the world. 
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Emplacement revolves around mobility, given that those relationships that are 
built at home are not static. The changes experienced in personal relationships, 
familiar sites, etc. in the home, even the migration of others around us are what 
these authors consider makes a seemingly fixed home, mobile. Nonetheless, I 
suggest that although these examples express the non-fixity of the place of 
settlement, these changes are of a different nature than those that the migrant 
experiences, which are based on the geographical movement that takes place 
through migration.  
Nevertheless, a sense of a home that is ‘spatially extensible even as 
grounded’ is sustained in groups as marginalized as in low income migrants, 
regardless of the differences amongst exiles, refugees, business migrants, etc. 
(Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). Research on marginalized groups of migrants 
suggests that they remain emotionally and culturally attached to their place of 
origin and that they tend to form strong bonds with those in the new country who 
belong to their homeland (Levitt, 2001; Mahler, 1995). 
For migrants, the physical home becomes a mythic place, a place of no 
return (Brah, 1996). As the place left behind goes through physical and social 
transformations, the migrant will never be able to return to the place he/she left as 
it once was, other than in a geographical sense. Yet, that place often remains 
unchanged in the memory of the migrant, encapsulated in their attachments and 
emotional interpretations. Therefore, home is not only ‘a sense of place’, but it is 
also a material place, where attachments once emerged. The desire for a home is 
constituted “through both movement and attachment” (Brah, 1996). By 
developing emotional attachments we tend to feel more settled, and through the 
physical movement of migrating, the desire to create those attachments is also the 
desire to feel more at home.  
 Contemporary migrants seem to strengthen and deepen their ties to 
multiple places and not just to a singular home (Ralph and Staeheli, 2011). As 
some migrants develop attachments in the new place of residence with people that 
belong to the same country as they do, they form a sense of familiarity through 
these communities. However, it is not only through bonding with co-nationals that 
migrants get attached to a place. Many also develop bonds with migrants from 
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other countries or regions, or with people who are from the place they have 
migrated to. In many cases, the new country is at times considered a ‘second 
home’.  The concept of diaspora and/or migration gives home the possibility of 
bearing multiple places, which does not exclude the possibility of ‘feeling 
anchored in the place of settlement’ (Brah, 1996, p. 194).  It is certainly possible 
to find a `second home´ and remain attached to the place of origin. This also 
means that one is not tied to the ‘immediacy of location’. However, even as 
migrants are able to develop attachments to other places of settlement, they do not 
necessarily detach themselves from previous ones, and they cannot be described 
as ungrounded.   
Studies report that maintaining contact with the place of origin at times 
serves as an adaptive response to a hostile environment (Ralph and Staeheli, 
2011). For example, illegal immigrants in the United States, who often feel 
rejected by the society and often face economic failure, have been found to want 
to strengthen the ties with the home country. Mahler (1995) specifically looked at 
groups of migrants that had very negative experiences in the United States in 
economic, legal and social terms and discovered that this protective response of 
attaching more strongly to the homeland is often connected to a rejection of the 
new place they found themselves in.  
Maybe referring to the experience of finding the unhomely ‘at home’, 
Ahmed (1996) points out that in our sense of home there is an ongoing process of 
‘rehearsal and reconstitution’ that can be worked out through  ‘encounters with 
the stranger within’. Gedalof (2003) proposes something different, a modeling 
after an imagined community. She describes ‘home’ as produced through a 
constant process of ‘adjustment, transformation, negotiation, definition - a never 
ending ongoing work’ that intends to reproduce an appearance of ‘stability and 
fixity.’ What can be taken as valuable in Gedalof´s proposition is the revelation 
that ‘feeling at home’ is always emotional. It is a felt experience that is based on 
something that is neither fixed nor stable. In this sense, Heidegger will also focus 
on the felt experience of the homely, paying attention to the feelings that arise in 
places where we feel safe and comfortable.  
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The experience of migration comes with a variety of experiences of the 
‘home’, which must be acknowledged in their specificity (Fortier, 2003). There is 
no ‘migration in general’ as one describable experience or one set of 
characteristics shared by all migrants. The danger for the Diaspora studies on 
home and migration is to construct ‘migrant ontologies’: ‘when migration is 
elevated as a form of being in world’.  In the following sections I argue that it is 
possible to respect such specificities with the aid of a phenomenological 
discussion and a Heideggerian reading of the concept of focus.  
 
3.4 INTRODUCING A HEIDEGGERIAN HOME 	  
Heidegger starts analyzing the ‘unhomely’14 in Being and Time and it becomes a 
central focus in his later philosophy, in particular in his interpretation of 
Hölderlin’s poetry. Heidegger brings up the necessity of understanding the 
unhomely in order to understand the meaning of home, or being at home. In his 
later philosophy he refers to this experience as a passage through the foreign in 
order to become homely. Heidegger speaks of this passage in order to symbolize a 
process, a journey that begins by leaving the home, a home that for him is always 
already unhomely, since human beings are homeless at their very core. In the 
present section, I consider his idea of ‘home’ and the surrounding cluster of 
concepts that are necessary to understand it (for example: dwelling, the foreign, 
journeying, locality, the river, etc.). I also analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Hölderlin´s poetry insofar as it contributes to his discussion on home and 
dwelling.  
 I first lay out the definition of ‘home’ as presented by Heidegger and its 
relation to the process of ‘homecoming’ and Heidegger`s later conception of 
‘homelessness’. Finally, I discuss Heidegger´s concept of dwelling, which 
addresses the question of how do we come to be at home. Since Heidegger states 
that we must journey into the foreign, I expand on his concept of ‘journeying’, 
which is directly linked to that of ‘locality’ and his discussion of Hölderlin´s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 Heidegger translates Deinon as Unheimlich in German. Unheimlich is translated in the literature 
as uncanny or unhomely.  
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poetry and rivers, which is meant to explain why the journey takes place to begin 
with. Heidegger’s analysis of the home allows for a comparison with that of the 
studies on migration and also for his contribution to their notion, one which will 
be addressed in the different issues of the following sections. This allows for 
expanding the Diaspora studies analysis of the home into a regional ontology of 
such a relevant concept for migrants.  
3.4.1  Die Heimat15: Home and Homeland Explained 	  
Home in the social sciences has already been defined as the place of origin, or the 
place of residence, but also as the experience of ‘feeling at home’.  Similarly, 
from a Heideggerian perspective, the definition of home seems to be divided in 
two; the phenomenological and the physical place. Heidegger tends to 
differentiate between the facticity that is always already there in our existence and 
how we experience this physicality.  
 Heidegger has been criticized for his concept of ‘Heimat’ as it has been 
associated with provincialism and conservatism, implying that it has destructive 
political implications. The return to a physical “homeland” as it has been 
addressed in the social sciences, or its idealization, point at the possibility of less 
restrictive understandings of the concept itself. Although Heidegger did delve into 
an analysis of Germany as homeland, he also criticized its failure to make the 
passage through the foreign. Heidegger’s account of “home” is broader than some 
of his critics understand it to be.  Heidegger grounds meaning and commitment in 
the ‘thick facticity’ of the world.  There is the physical place where we feel safe, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 Although some authors only translate Heimat as ‘homeland’ (Beistegui, 1998, 2003; Wrathall 
and Malpas, 2000), in the translation of the lectures on Hölderlin, McNeill and Davis translate 
‘Heimat’ as either ‘home’ and ‘homeland’. In Casey (1997), Pattison (2000) and Young (in 
Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2002), it is only translated as ‘home’. Heimat contains both meanings, for 
homeland, signifying the historical relation between the place of origin and the individual, its 
cultural and social context, etc. Home entails the experience of the familiar, of a dwelling place 
where we develop attachments and where we feel a sense of comfort and belonging. Heidegger 
explains in his “Letter on Humanism”: ‘The word [“homeland”] is thought … in an essential 
sense, not patriotically or nationalistically, but in terms of the history of being’ [what does this 
mean???], whereas ‘home’ signals the dwelling of human beings in different sites with a sense of 
familiarity and belonging.  I will mostly use `home`as translation for Heimat, but will use 
‘homeland’ only when referring to that social and cultural history which Heidegger points at. 
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where we feel we belong, but the felt experience allows for more diverse and less 
fixed interpretations (PLT, 1975).  
Heidegger describes home as a human abode, a place of rest, security, and 
belonging. Heidegger thinks that rest is a ‘grounded repose in the steadfastness of 
one's own essence’ as opposed to mere cessation of activity (HHI, 1996, p. 20). 
The abode, says Heidegger, takes a while to become such, but once it has, it is 
where ‘human essence is preserved in its inviolability (ibid.).’ Angus (1987, p.30) 
interprets this as ‘anything that is truly present’.  In Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger declares that ‘Appearing is the very essence of being’ (p.101), so 
anything that presences, remains ‘inviolable in its centeredness’ (Angus, 2001, 
p.30).   The rest that is found in the abode is that centre around which action is 
concentrated, which allows for presencing to occur in a steadfast manner.  
Heidegger says that human abodes are resting sites where ‘nature is concentrated’, 
and where ‘something intimative’ (HHI, 1996, p.21) gathers around human 
beings. These places allow for nature or us to rest, but not necessarily in an 
inactive way, but where things and beings interact in a harmonious fashion. In 
Heidegger Reexamined, Young states that the home is the ‘hearth of ethos’ (1999, 
p.396). He describes the home as a ‘thick conception of human facticity’, where 
human beings reside, where their actions take place, and where their character and 
attitudes are formed. Home is where Dasein is initially ‘thrown’ in the world, and 
within this particular site, Dasein ‘must… seek to become homely’ (Young, 1999, 
p. 396). I interpret this “must” not in as a normative stance, but as Dasein always 
already trying to feel homely, Dasein must feel homely because it is what it 
strives for.  
Always pointing out the link between the spatial and the existential, 
Heidegger states that human abodes receive human beings, although always in a 
specific site.  To put it differently, Robert Mugerauer gives an existential 
definition of home where it is ‘the region that allows, admits arrival, abiding and 
is governed by giving’ (2008, p.22).  His definition follows Heidegger’s in that 
regions bring things together and require our involvement. In such regions we find 
intelligible relations with the things around us, which are always ‘nearing’. Home 
‘welcomes’ human beings and grants them being-at-home. While the literature on 
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home in migration gives importance to attachment in terms of relationships, 
objects, places, etc., Heidegger sees the region as that which grants the possibility 
of attachment, they require our involvement in order to find anything intelligible. 
The intelligibility of our environment in this sense, is a prerequisite to forming the 
“soils of significance” that are found in the home.  
It is because we are Being that we already find ourselves in a ‘home’, and 
simultaneously, Being is our very the ground of our existence, and so it ‘receives’ 
as well as it ‘gives’ us Being. Being remains that which allows us to be, it is the 
fundamental ground that binds us together but that remains concealed since each 
of us is a specific being that is in particular places. In the home we also find the 
intersection of temporality, between the past - what we remember of how the 
home came to be home - and the futural possibilities of ourselves in or outside of 
it (Young, 1999, p. 396).  As beings are historical, the home also holds 
temporality as a structural element, including a projection towards the future by 
being the place where plans are sketched out, while also stretching into the past by 
being the place where memories are kept and past events are remembered. The 
Diaspora studies literature also gives importance to the memory of the home and 
how the place of origin does not remain fixed, but changes over time. However, 
the difference lies in that the literature attributes these changes to the place. Home 
is not fixed, but mobile in a temporal sense. Conversely, Heidegger places 
temporality at the core of any of our encounters. We are temporal beings, thus, 
things are intelligible to us in a temporal sense. It is only because we are temporal, 
that is, temporality serves as a background to our understanding of anything, that 
we interpret our environment as changing. Thus, it is not that the home is fixed or 
not, but that temporality permeates our understanding of it.  
 
3.4.2 Away from home: the importance of being homeless 
 
One of Heidegger’s main points about home is the relation with its opposite. 
Homelessness for Heidegger is inherent in our lives, and stepping out of what we 
consider to be homely can have a positive value. For migrants, the experience of 
what is strange occurs in the host society, through the encounter with new social 
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norms, new language, new laws, etc. The migrant experiences the foreign 
concretely, through the daily interactions and the remembrance of the home. For 
Heidegger, however, the foreign and the not-being-at-home have an existential 
relevance. Their importance lies in what they can reveal about ourselves. The 
“homing desires” addressed in the literature on migration speak for an intrinsic 
desire to feel at home. Migrants reveal this fundamental concern in their concrete 
situation, but it is nevertheless one that has ontological meaning for humans.  
 
3.4.2.1   Homesickness, Homelessness and the Foreign 	  
From his early writings, Heidegger gives importance to the feeling of not-being-
at-home, but also to one of longing for the home. In his lecture course 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger speaks of homesickness not in 
relation to a concrete home but to our surroundings. Heidegger says that we are 
homesick, that we are “always waiting for something” or being “called upon by 
something” (p.5).  Heidegger relates homesickness to our relation to the world. 
For him, to be at home means to be “within the whole”, and that “whole” is the 
world (p.5). However, Heidegger says that in our homesickness, there is a drive 
that pushes us towards being as a whole. He states “We have somehow always 
already departed toward this whole, or better, we are always already on the way to 
it”. We are related to that world and that wholeness, and so we are called by it, 
nonetheless, our attunement is always partial. It is always in relation to the whole 
and not, and for Heidegger, that “not” rests on finitude. We are always in between 
the world and our finitude, and thus called by a wholeness that we cannot 
completely relate to. So for Heidegger, being-at-home is not only an impossibility 
(because we are always inherently homesick), but it is also related to our world 
and the way we engage in it. We have an intrinsic desire to be-at-home, and 
Heidegger seems to imply that we can at least understand our homesickness via 
the understanding of ourselves and the world (philosophizing, he believes, is an 
inquiry into the whole).  
For Heidegger the feeling of homelessness also goes beyond mere location 
and is instead of existential significance. In his later writings he does draw a more 
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concrete relation to places, but continues to speak of home and homelessness in 
the way in which we relate to ourselves and our world. Just as we are homesick, 
Heidegger believes we are also inherently homeless, and we turn away from that. 
Turning away from homelessness is interpreted as a turning away from one´s 
essence and being (Mugerauer, 2008,). Homelessness is, for Heidegger, ‘a 
symptom of the oblivion of being’ (O’Donoghue, 2011, p.13). To question 
homelessness is to investigate it beyond the human sense, in the realm of being.  
Being and human beings are intrinsically related; homecoming and homelessness 
concern both in their togetherness and in their mutual belonging. By the same 
token, Being at home necessarily includes its opposite, in a dialectical relation in 
which, in order to understand the homely, we must understand what unhomeliness 
means. Homelessness is ‘a separation within what already belongs together’; 
homecoming lies in a ‘coming back together’, even if separated (Mugerauer, 
2008). In the moment of turning, the start of homecoming, we begin to discover 
our nature as close to the abyss of nothingness, where the call emerges from 
nowhere.  Ereignis is a ‘turning back,’ into originary homelessness in order to 
gather oneself with the rest, including the unconcealed darkness of the abyss.  
 Human beings, Heidegger says, are ‘in their essence as Katastrophe’, that 
is, they turn away ‘from their own essence’ (HHI, 1996, p.  77). That is, we forget 
our groundlessness and our fragility in our everyday lives. Heidegger seems to 
imply that because this can be a cyclical movement, human beings are constantly 
becoming homeless, with possible moments of coming ‘into their own’. 
Moreover, in Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger states that ‘man is the 
strangest of all’ not only because he ‘assesses his life amid the strange’, but 
because he tends to depart from ‘the customary, familiar limits’; he ‘tends towards 
the strange’ because the strange, the uncanny, is overpowering (ITM, 2000, 
p.127).  Signaling the move towards the uncanny either as a rupture of the routine 
or out of curiosity, there seems to be a back and forth dynamic between the 
uncanny and the comfort of everydayness. 
According to the process that Heidegger draws between the venturing out 
into the foreign in order to become homely, it can be assumed that the foreign 
contains in itself the promise of the return.  
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For only where the foreign is known and acknowledged in its essential 
 oppositional character does there exist the possibility of a genuine  
 relationship, that is, of a uniting that is not a confused mixing but a 
 conjoining in distinction.  (HHI, 1996, p.54)  
 
The foreign, as containing the experience of the unhomely, is in a dialectical 
relation with the homely, where through its experience we can become homely.  
 Being properly at home ‘is always a matter of homecoming; the result of a 
journeying through the foreign, a return’ (Young, 1999, p.89).  Heidegger takes 
on Hölderlin´s idea that the untraveled spirit fails to be fully at home, in which 
case there can be no proper ‘appropriation’ or turning. The point of the passage 
through the foreign is to ‘learn from the foreign for the sake of what is one’s own, 
where the otherness of the foreign is acknowledged, and ‘its difference, 
respected’, without attempting to assimilate or imitate one another (Young, 1999, 
p.  91).  Young interprets Heidegger´s relationship to the other, or the foreign, as 
Hegelian, considering the other necessarily free and equal in order to have the 
possibility of an enriching relationship (1999, p.97).  The encounter with the 
foreign/other in these terms allows for clarity ‘with regards to one´s own unique 
identity.’ Young connects the concept of Sorge (Care) in Heidegger with that of 
the foreign, establishing a relationship of care and respect for the ‘preservation of 
the foreignness of the foreign’, whatever form the ‘foreign’ might take.  For 
example, Heidegger speaks of historical people ‘satisfying their own essence 
through the dialogue with other languages’, which could indicate that the foreign 
allows us to understand what is ‘our own’ better and more profoundly, based on 
linguistic, cultural and/or historical differences. The depth of how we get to 
understand these other cultures or languages, relates to how we understand our 
own. However, Heidegger does not see the relation towards the foreign as simple, 
as a ‘mere taking over the other’ or as ‘self-assured affirmation’ of that which is 
natural or organic (Young, 2002, p. 143).  
The homely/unhomely distinction is therefore a process. The passage 
through the foreign is not a simple outcome of ‘wandering around’ or of 
purposefully searching for the ‘unhomely’. Heidegger states the opposite, that 
‘Being unhomely… is a seeking and searching out the homely, a seeking that a 
time does not know itself’ (1996, p.74). It can be said that from a certain call of 
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our own Being, a felt need for a homely place, we venture out into the foreign. At 
times it might not be clear that it is the ‘homely’ that we are in search of, but as 
we wander out of a familiar zone, we encounter the strangeness that can bring 
about the understanding of the distinction, and maybe the understanding of the 
search itself. Julian Young explains: ‘The one who is unhomely always relates 
back to the homely, and can only do so by not attaining the homely’. Venturing 
out of the homely requires a turning away from it; however, it also implies a 
constant relating back to it. It is ‘a forgetting as well as it is a remembering.’  This 
‘forgetting’ of the home, is also a kind of ‘thinking’ initiated by thinking of the 
homely (Young, 2002, p.91). Relating back to the source is what makes up our 
history as beings. However, Heidegger does not mean ‘source’ as a return to a 
metaphysical ‘origin’, but as the search for the homely, for satisfying one of our 
fundamental ontological desires. Heidegger calls this relating back to the source 
‘thoughtful remembrance’, or the acknowledging that one belongs or belonged to 
a certain ‘elsewhere’.  Heidegger emphasizes how central is the encounter with 
the foreign; it is ‘the fundamental truth of history, a truth from out of which the 
essence of history must unveil itself’ (1996, p.49). To understand belonging to an 
‘elsewhere’ is to understand the relation between our being and that which shaped 
us, which could be the homeland, in a historical and cultural sense, or could be 
understanding the nature of our being.  Relating back to the source allows us to 
trace back and contextualize our existence and thereby understand it better.   
 Although Heidegger emphasizes the idea of venturing out of the ‘home’ in 
order to find the foreign and then become properly homely; it is also possible that 
we find the homely in that which is the opposite, for instance, a place that was 
strange and fearful before can become our home over time. The danger of that 
which is foreign looses its power and the distinction between homely and 
unhomely is lost, at least temporarily (Young, 2002, p. 75).  In contrast, we have a 
situation where the homely is found in what is unhomely, but not as a process of 
transforming the ‘unhomely’ into ‘homeliness’, but in the foreign by itself. 
Heidegger calls this phenomena ‘the adventurer’, where the difference between 
homely and unhomely is entirely lost, and danger loses its meaning. There is no 
‘remembering’ of the home permeated by care, and thus, the adventurer cannot 
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gain insight from his experiences ‘into his own essence’ (Young, 2002, p. 92). 
The experience of ‘feeling at home’ is a fundamental aspect of human existence. 
It allows us to build familiarity and seemingly stable relations.  
 Heidegger speaks of boldness as a type of courage to experience the 
foreign or the unhomely, and it is that boldness to venture out which allows us to 
‘appropriate one´s own.’ Quoting Hölderlin, he says that the ‘yet untraveled spirit 
fails to be fully at home in the Heimat’. The point of the journey is to ‘learn from 
the foreign for the sake of what is one´s own.’  Moreiras (2008) specifies that 
when one is capable of ‘binding together what the poet had at home and what is 
necessary in the foreign’; then he is finally ready to return home. However, being 
unhomely always remains a potential, as a re-understanding or re-
contextualization of what we experience as homely. Just as what was alien once 
can give rise to a homely environment, our experience and understanding of what 
is homely might change over time. That is, the venturing out towards the foreign 
can also be a cyclical process. Heidegger states in The Ister: ‘Becoming homely 
makes manifest the essential ambiguity of being unhomely' (1996, p.115). After 
the initial shock to our routine, eventually, we are able to find our way back into 
the comfort and familiarity of everydayness. Becoming unhomely allows for the 
return to the homely as much as becoming homely brings the possibility of the 
unhomely.  
As the passage through the foreign refers more to an experience of the 
unfamiliar than to the condition of possibility for understanding, it might be closer 
to the experience of migration. The migrant chooses to (or has to) accept 
venturing out into the foreign and is thus confronted with social differences that 
will allow him/her to make comparisons. Details like the time dinner is had are 
openings for small realizations in terms of how the migrant lives (-ed) his/her 
daily life in comparison to those inhabiting his/her new environment. The migrant 
thus necessarily learns about these differences that separate his lifestyle from 
others. In this sense, the migrant is already involved in a ‘forgetting as well as a 
remembering’ because he/she relates back to what was his/her own (or of his/her 
own culture), while at the same time having to make some changes in order to 
adapt to the new society. However, one could understand the analogy between the 
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foreign and migration in two ways: simply by comparing the necessity for the 
migrant to understand at least the basics of the foreign culture and having to learn 
from it for his/her own sake, or more importantly, as an invitation to remain open 
towards what is foreign. For the latter, just as with the uncanny, the openness is 
not necessarily implied in migration. The migrant might be reluctant to adapt to 
the new society for various reasons, or might only make the necessary changes 
and take a negative attitude towards the new culture. Such responses are easily 
brought about by marginalization dynamics that prevent the migrant from 
remaining open to the foreign culture. In this sense, both host society and migrant 
are very much likely to ‘accept’, or at least to resign themselves to the foreign 
while failing to be ‘open’ towards it.  
 
3.4.3 Coming to be at Home: Becoming homely and Homecoming 	  
Becoming homely entails the understanding of homelessness. Being unhomely, as 
a condition attached to human beings, also shows itself as something ‘not yet 
awakened, not yet decided, not yet assumed potential for being homely and 
becoming homely’ (HHI, 1996, p. 115).  Although it remains ‘a potential’, 
‘homecoming’ or turning towards one´s essence is not an easy task. Heidegger 
emphasizes this in a couple passages in The Ister: ‘Finding one’s own, and 
appropriating what one has found as one’s own is not that which is most self 
evident or easiest but what remains the most difficult (1996, p.49).’ 
Appropriation, is the turning directed towards a togetherness. Later on, in the 
same text, Heidegger restates his hypothesis:   ‘What is properly one’s own, and 
appropriating it is most difficult (1996, p.125).’ However, becoming homely ‘in 
one’s own’ entails that human beings ‘initially and for a long time, and sometimes 
forever’ are not at home (1996, p.49).  In assuming we are at home, ‘human 
beings are those who are unhomely’.  
 For Heidegger, becoming homely ‘entails the encounter between the 
foreign and one´s own as the fundamental truth of history.’ Therefore, we must 
experience a passage through the foreign in order to come to be at home.  
Heidegger states  
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The law of being homely as becoming homely consists in the fact that 
 historical human beings, at the beginning of their history, are not intimate 
 with what is homely, and indeed must even become unhomely with respect 
 to the latter in order to learn the proper appropriation of what is their own 
 in venturing into the foreign, and to first become homely in the return from 
 the foreign (HHI, 1996, p.125).  
 
Initially, then, we are not in connection with what is homely, so we must turn 
towards the foreign in order to appropriate what is our own.  	  
The Greek word for ‘homecoming’ is ‘nostos’, which, in Homer´s 
Odyssey, plays an important role for Odysseus, who strives to get back to his wife 
Penelope after the Trojan Wars. Nostalgia then, is pain for homecoming, or the 
yearning to go home, better understood as homesickness, although it now applies 
for a longing towards the past. In his study on homecoming, Brendan 
O´Donoghue summarizes Joseph Campbell´s examination of myths and the 
archetype of homecoming. In such stories the hero generally follows a three-part 
pattern of departure, initiation and return, where the reason for departure normally 
comes from a certain ‘call’ or mission.  In the Odyssey, Odysseus leaves Ithaca in 
order to go to war, but he also envisions his return home. This “type” of 
homecoming follows the more concrete aspect of home, as having a definite route 
and returning to a specific site.  In this sense for example, the traveler or the 
migrant always “relates back” to the homely. The experience of nostos is common 
as a ‘presencing in the manner of absencing’, where the home permeates the 
experience of travelling as well as the experience of homecoming (Young, 2002).  
Always parallel to the physical process of homecoming are the existential 
interpretations regarding the importance of the return. George Steiner for 
example, defines homecoming as the process and goal of authentic being, that is, 
other than homecoming to one´s homeland, a homecoming to what and who one 
is, is also important, if not necessary (O’Donoghue, 2011, p.12). Heidegger also 
interprets homecoming as more than just the factual returning to the geographical 
homeland. He understands it as a return to ‘nearness to the origin’ (1996, p.145). 
In nearness things occur in togetherness, but nearness is not measurable, nearness 
is always near, and so it is the origin. The origin is not something that can be 
pointed at in a specific location, but is a network of relations, made of things, 
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people, etc. The nearness to these things in not measurable in the sense that as 
they appear, they are always approaching, they are never here, exactly where I 
am, and simultaneously, other things and relations are also nearing in a certain 
togetherness.   
 Returning to ‘homecoming’, Robert Mugerauer interprets it beginning the 
turn into ‘one´s own.’ Homecoming is not achieved by arriving into one´s 
homeland from a journey abroad but once the source is‘re-experienced’, this 
return opens up ‘what is properly one´s own.’ Homecoming, in a way, is only the 
beginning of the turning.  It is only genuine when it is an arrival into what is one´s 
own.  ‘Eigen’ is a term already used by Heidegger when referring to ‘authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit)’ in Being and Time.  Just as he did for authenticity, Heidegger 
does not trace a definite path towards a genuine turning, but only points at the 
importance at the arrival to one´s own, that being authentic or genuine. Heidegger 
presents traces or glimpses of a homecoming, it is never a concrete ethics. Being 
at home and homecoming is a process and a felt experience, it is not definite.   
The return, then, is a self-opening to the place of arrival and origin. It is to re-
experience what was once possibly taken for granted. Such relations, objects that 
were part of our familiar environment and that for a period of time were no 
longer, are “re-discovered” both in their newness (for the time that they were not 
experienced and might have changed) and in their familiarity (for the past 
experience of them). This self-opening is a ‘freeing and a welcoming into one´s 
nature, place and proper relationships.’ It is a rediscovering and freeing oneself 
into the previously familiar.  
 In Rememberance of the Poet, Heidegger relates everydayness to the 
people and things at home that initially seem familiar, but ‘as yet they are not 
really so.’ The simple factual return does not make a homecoming. The familiar is 
‘near, and already coming to meet thee’, but even after arrival, the ‘returning one’ 
is still `returning’, he/she has not yet reached home. This newcomer should 
continue to search for the home, even as the home is already ‘coming to meet 
him.’ Finding home, in this case, is interpreted as ‘being able to dwell in it as 
possession.’ The arrival to the home does not imply the finding of it. 
Homecoming is a constant process, it is not a simple loss and attempted recovery, 
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but it is about ‘concealment and disclosure’ of the granting of being (Mugerauer, 
2008, p. 334) 
 When Heidegger refers to a coming back into ‘the nearness of the origin’, 
he refers to Hölderlin´s interpretation of home and homecoming, in which the 
former is the proximity to the source and the latter is the return to where what is 
sought after is ‘near’, in its immeasurability.  Only at the source can one find what 
is one`s own, in returning to its proximity.  As Mugerauer puts it in his book 
Heidegger and Homecoming, homecoming is ‘the granting of the gathering 
together, letting what gathers together come into its own, all together and each. 
(2008, p.22)’ Homecoming also means that one ‘receives’ such homecoming; it is 
a gift, just as Being is a gift. This homecoming is “primal” and foundational, not 
achieved or willed by humans. This homecoming is similar to the ‘home’ as 
‘governed by giving’. Home and homecoming then offer similar openings to 
humans; they both welcome human beings and grant them an ‘opening’ where 
they can receive the gift. Upon our arrival, as a beginning of the turning into one´s 
own, we encounter an openness to things, where we can begin ‘gather together’ 
into the world. Home and homecoming are linked in that the arrival home is the 
beginning of genuine homecoming (Mugerauer, 2008,). 
 The ‘turning’ is an event [Ereignis] or an appropriation, where there is 
such disclosing/granting of the abode with what is one’s own.  Although normally 
explained as an event or a happening, appropriation is more like a ‘gathering-
giving’ of ‘belonging-together’ (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 292). At the moment of 
arrival, world and mortals arrive together in mutual appropriation. For Heidegger, 
appropriation, or such event, brings man into ‘his own’ (TB, 1962, p. 23).  
Appropriation is a ‘law’, that which gathers mortals into ‘the appropriateness of 
their nature and there holds them’ (OWL, 1982, p. 129).  It is an inconspicuous 
phenomenon, ‘the simplest of simplicities’ as in it grants to mortals their home 
within their nature (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 359). World and mortals belong together 
in the sense that mortals cannot be without a world. To be in the world is to be in 
nature, but also, the world is our primary home. For this reason, the simplest of 
simplicities is this belonging together, since it cannot be otherwise.  
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 The definition of ‘appropriation’ in Heidegger is important in order to 
better understand the ‘gathering’, ‘granting’, and mutual bearing between world 
and mortals. This ‘gathered nature’ is the realm of homecoming. Appropriation, 
as the simplest of laws, is pre-spatial, it opens place, it brings things, beings 
together. In ‘Ereignis’ things come into their own as things: ‘no longer presencing 
as mere beings, they fit into their proper nature and in the appropriating of world’ 
(Mugerauer, 2008, p. 356).  Appropriation ‘gives homecoming as arrival, as the 
giving of the essence of mortals who arrive, and as the giving of language and 
thinking as all are given in homecoming (Mugerauer, 2008, p. 364).  In this 
‘giving’ as coming home to ‘Ereignis’, we are ‘given’ our belonging in the form 
of being gathered into it. Appropriation grants homecoming, it grants that initial 
transforming turn, now understood as the beginning of genuine homecoming.  In 
Time and Being, Heidegger summarizes ‘Thought at the moment of arrival, 
beyond man and being, mortals and world arrive together in mutual giving in 
appropriation’ (2002, p. 23).  
 The notion of homecoming addresses the realization of the belonging 
together of both world and mortals as part of their fundamental ontology.  In the 
gathering of world and mortals, homecoming is possible, since it is the realization 
of what makes up the home. The home, as world, provides intelligible and 
meaningful relations to mortals. Such realization enables mortals to understand 
the nature of the home as interdependent of them, but also as part of the process of 
coming ‘to their own’.  A particular expression of such realization is the openness 
to rediscover new acquired meanings in a home that we have not been in touch 
with for a long time. It is the understanding of how our relations in this home have 
shaped what we have become.  
 If we strive towards homecoming, according to Heidegger, we must first 
accept that humanity exists in a state of homelessness (O’Donognue, 2011). In the 
process of homecoming, the world reveals itself as holy, in experiencing the 
world as ‘gathered’, as bestowing and opening. Heidegger reveals the relation 
between ourselves and our homes, or homely places, as one of dwelling.  
 
3.4.4 Dwelling: A primordial activity 
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Heidegger declares the Earth16 as our first human abode, but also as the first 
relation to where we dwell (Young, 2002, p. 20). He says: ‘To be a human being 
means to be on earth as a mortal. It means to dwell’ (PLT, 1975, p. 147). 
Dwelling, for Heidegger, is one of Dasein’s main activities. As one primarily 
dwells at home, in a particular site or abode, dwelling is also ‘to take shelter’, its a 
kind of ‘rest’, where one is ‘in the inviolability of one´s essence’ (Young, 2000, p. 
20).  Similar to becoming homely, dwelling in what is one´s own ‘is what comes 
last and is seldom successful and always remains what is most difficult (HHI, 
1996, p.21.).’ The activity of dwelling is then intimately linked with homecoming. 
Dwelling is ‘to be at peace…to be protected from harm and threat, safeguarded… 
that  is, cared for and protected’ (Young, 2000, p.189).  Hence, the fundamental 
character of dwelling is this caring for and protection (Young, 1999).  
Heidegger often made a point on emphasizing the importance of care 
(Sorge) for beings. To be Dasein, to exist as a human, is to care for one´s being, to 
care for the being of other beings, to make ‘being’ an issue for ourselves. In 
dwelling, there is a sense of safety and protection, which simultaneously allows 
for the possibility of protecting and providing safety for others.  In Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking, Heidegger states: ‘To dwell, to be at peace, means to remain 
at peace within the free sphere that cares for each thing in its own nature. (1975, 
p.327)’ If we feel safe and comfortable, in theory we are not only free to care for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 In “The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger differentiates 'Earth' from 'World'. The world 
presents us with intelligible relations that we work with on a daily basis, that being the meaning  
and usefulness of objects as well as the understanding of our relations to our environment.  The 
Earth, however, remains concealed. It is the background that allows those meaningful relations to 
emerge. Heidegger states:  
Earth [...] shatters every attempt to penetrate it. [...] The earth appears openly cleared as 
itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable, 
that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up. (OWA 
172/36) 
The Earth is those objects and elements but stripped off their meaning, only standing in their 
materiality.  Without the world, objects are not significant, as the Earth cannot be networked into 
the significance that the world provides.  In this way, the world reveals the unintelligibility of the 
Earth, although it remains dependent on it. In this sense, the Earth is our first abode, although it 
remains concealed from us in terms of its intelligibility.  
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ourselves or for the matters of our being, but also to care for the being of others. 
The home is therefore not an isolated place of dwelling, but is always linked to a 
world, and the comfort experienced in the home is also dependent on the comfort 
felt in a given society or in how we feel in our world. The sense of safety and 
protection that dwelling brings about allows us to care for others. Caring enables 
dwelling, as feeling comfortable is already a form of caring for the status of my 
Being. Similarly, when I dwell, I am then able to provide a feeling of safety and 
protection for others, through my own caring for them. Caring for my Being is 
thus inherent in dwelling. 
The concept of dwelling has been given a more spatial interpretation in 
Edward Casey's Fate of Place adding that it is always an ‘in-dwelling’, pointing at 
the fact that it is always in a place, the place we inhabit (1998, p.274). Dwelling 
allows us to feel ‘centered’, but Casey reverses the equation by also focusing on 
the embodiment of the individual who dwells, by saying that I, the dweller, am 
also a ‘centering’, ‘insofar as I give direction to things and rooms in that same 
dwelling’ (1998, p.294). Casey states that such centeredness of both self and thing 
the ‘gift of dwelling,’ something that is necessarily connected to the inhabitation 
of a certain concrete place.  Heidegger evidences this connection vastly in 
Building, Dwelling, Thinking (1975), where he says ‘Everything that is, belongs 
(1975, p.158).’ Everything that is a ‘thing’ belongs to a certain context, a physical 
place, maybe a particular someone. For instance, a cup is a cup since a cup by 
definition is a container, which is an object that can contain something, since it 
has enclosed walls and a bottom, such an object cannot be made of liquid, but 
maybe of solid, etc. Each of these descriptive aspects refers to another one that 
can be explained by another set of references. In the same manner, the objects we 
interact with are somewhere; for example, my cup is on the table, next to the 
black binder, in the office. There is always the need to contextualize the object 
that we are referring to. In this same sense, our inhabiting a new culture  (in the 
case of migration) is also an “in-dwelling” of certain aspects that become 
meaningful as we become familiarized with its traditions and customs.  
 Dwelling, according to Heidegger, is the goal of building. We build 
places, houses, so that we can inhabit them and dwell. In a play with words, Buan 
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meaning dwelling and Bauen meaning building, Heidegger finds another way to 
connect the physicality with the experience of dwelling: ‘Dwelling is building and 
building is dwelling (1975, p.145)’. Dwelling is ‘the manner in which mortals are 
on earth’, but building, as it is paired up with dwelling ‘unfolds into the building 
that cultivates growing things ‘which also allows for ‘the building that erects 
buildings’ (PTL, 1975, p 147). The building of the home is a process or a journey 
towards a dwelling place.  For instance, some migrants, when they move to a new 
space, will put up pictures of their family back home, or decorate it in a certain 
way that reminds them their home, or that make the new space more homely. This 
is also part of such “building”, through the modification of the space we live in in 
order to dwell in it more comfortably.  
Similarly, dwelling does not only occur at a physical location, but it is 
historical, it represents the movement of the journey (Moreiras, 2008, p.2).  To be 
human is to be ‘a staring’ at such things one has built through one´s dwelling but 
it is also the looking ahead at such future creations that can also be dwelling 
places (Edwards, 2005, p. 120).  Also, to dwell is to ‘bring things to the presence 
before oneself and others, either through practices of cultivation or practices of 
construction' (Edwards, 2005, p. 119). Practices of cultivation are cultural, 
through poetry, art, music, etc.; whereas practices of construction are the building 
of “things” in their usefulness and “ready to hand-ness”. However such things 
gather the environment, or those other things that belong together with it. For 
instance, a fork makes reference to knives, spoons, plates, etc. In this sense, 
migrants may use such practices of cultivation in order to refer to their homeland, 
to their families, traditions, etc.   
Dwelling is not a solution to homelessness, but it is rather a learning to 
live with it (Young, 2000). Young (ibid.) calls Heidegger´s stance one of ‘heroic 
alienation’, which entails the ‘courage to carry in the face of the nihilating 
pressure of the nothing’, as fundamental to life and world.  Homecoming, 
dwelling, authenticity, amongst others, are used by Heidegger as indicators of 
how we deal with our existence, in terms of facing the nature of our Being or 
fleeing from it. It is often the question whether they become ethical aims or if 
Heidegger is ever too vague in elucidating the ways of achieving them. Heidegger 
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does not give us ethical maxims but only hints at what the experience might feel 
like. As the later Heidegger focuses more on the phenomenological aspects of our 
existence, what these concepts indicate is the felt experience of dwelling in the 
understanding of our own Being.  
 Heidegger states that: ‘To be a human being means to be on earth as a 
mortal. It means to dwell (BDT, 1975, p.150) ’. To dwell as a mortal is to be 
aware of the contingency of the circumstances, the unavoidable presence of 
finality, and so, as one builds, that which one builds reveals the conditionality of 
the dwelling that produced it (Edwards, 2005, p.127). To dwell as a mortal is not 
only the nearness of death, but also the vulnerability that holds life together, it is 
to be aware of our inevitable end. Edwards adds, ‘Death as an insuperable 
limitation and inevitable failure is what makes life distinctively human’. It is not 
only to know that one will die, but that everything is contingent upon a 
‘constellation of circumstances that will someday no longer hold together’ 
(Edwards, 2005, p. 127). In Poetically….Man Dwells, Heidegger clarifies: ‘Only 
man dies, and indeed, continually, so long as he stays on this earth, so long as he 
dwells' (1975, p.222)’. It is obviously not the case that only humans die, but they 
care about their own death and the death of others. They fear and even respect it; 
hence the diverse rituals dedicated to those who die. Therefore, dwelling is shaped 
by our concern about death and our caring for it.   
 As constantly facing death17, the ‘No-thing’, the groundlessness of being, 
Dasein is permeated by a ‘radical ontological insecurity’ (Young, 2000, p. 206).  
For Julian Young, this insecurity stands in opposition to dwelling. Dwelling is to 
feel safe, but not necessarily to fail to acknowledge the fragility of that safety.  
Dwelling, is not mere existing, but there is a “sublime” aspect of the place where 
we dwell.  By belonging to something ‘incomparably greater than any fragile 
human fragment can we look the finitude of that fragment squarely in the eye' 
(Young, 1999, p. 88). It is by acknowledging not only our own groundlessness but 
also the vastness of our Being that we can come to be at home and to dwell. The 
Holy, the sublime, is prior to any gods; it is a ‘reservoir of unconcealment, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 A more thorough discussion on the importance of death and groundlessness can be found in 
Chapter 4. 
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darkness illuminated for us only in the open we inhabit’ (Young, 1999, p. 88.). If 
we fail to feel at home in the world, the possible commitments we can make to it 
or to the beings in it lack any sort of importance and authority. Young states that 
‘Only in a world disclosed as sublime is the protectedness which constitutes 
dwelling possible’ (1999, p.88). The comfort and protection that is experienced in 
dwelling, allows for us to gather with things and world in a harmonious and 
comfortable fashion. The sublime is present in dwelling because it links both my 
care for my environment and the recognition of my fragility in the face it.  
   
3.4.5  Rivers, Locality and Journeying: Portraying Dwelling as a process 	  
Heidegger draws from Hölderlin´s poetry, in this case he specifically refers to The 
Ister, in order to illustrate his thoughts on dwelling but also as an image that 
speaks for many elements of human life. He says, they are evidently ‘bearers of 
and as yet veiled meaning’ (1996, p.15). The river is directly related to dwelling 
through its journey. The journey symbolizes the process of homecoming; through 
its journeying, the river determines our coming to be at home upon the earth. 
Heidegger states: ‘The river ‘is’ the locality that pervades the abode of human 
beings upon the earth, determines them to where they belong and where they are 
homely (heimisch)' (1996, p. 21). The river is essential in becoming homely into 
what is one's own. The river is a representation of the locality of dwelling of 
human beings, and its journeying is related to our historical essence (Young, 
2002).  
The river is both locality and journeying, it represents such unity. The 
river gives rise to a locale, a place where we can dwell, a home that is our own 
(Eigene), and in Hölderlin’s language, gives rise to a ‘Fatherland’. The river 
symbolizes a place of homecoming and its process (Young, 1999).  The river 
gives rise to a place of dwelling, as stated by Hölderlin in his poem: ‘Here, 
however, we wish to build, for rivers make arable the land’ (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.147). The river then becomes the rising and the building of die Heimat, the 
river, although in flux, is a locale, a physical reference with essential existential 
meaning. The river determines the ‘over there’ and the ‘there’ it arrives while 
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already departing (Young, 2002). The river in flux is a locale; locality is intrinsic 
to the river.  
Place begins where movement ceases (Angus, 2001, pg. 17)’. Locality is 
the ‘constituting movement’ prior to a place being defined. It is not the origin of 
place but it is an orientation (ibid.).  Angus exemplifies this orientation by 
explaining that the ‘here’ is defined as such in the movement of the return from 
the ‘there’. This movement creates a line, a border between both locales.  Here 
and there, once movement has stopped, become places. Locality is their intrinsic 
configuration.  On boundaries, Heidegger defines them as ‘not that at which 
something stops… but a boundary is that from which something begins its 
presencing. (1975, p. 154)’; the border is not a place, but a line between to places. 
Locality is understood as a returning back, and the border is the line that appears 
as crossed. Crossing, also a movement gives origin to the border. The ‘thing’ 
which begins its presencing in movement, is in return from the there.  Locality 
then requires Da-sein and Hier-sein, an opening out and a returning towards 
(Angus, 2001, p. 18). It comes to represent the dynamic way in which we speak of 
places. If, for instance, I was to explain where Cork is in relation to Dingle, I 
would say its located further to the east of Ireland. I would say how many miles 
there are in between them and maybe give the specific coordinates of Cork city. I 
could even draw a route in a map to show how to get from Dingle to Cork. Both 
places lack movement, but locality is the orientation I use in order to explain the 
relation between them. Heidegger states: ‘The river is the journeying of a 
historical coming to be at home at the locale of this locality. (HHI, 1996, p.33)’ 
The river journeys; it is in movement as a locality, it dwells by moving, bringing 
forth a dwelling place. The river is therefore both locality and journeying.  
The river is both temporal and spatial. The rivers ‘intimate and vanish into 
time’. The flow of the river can represent the flow of time, but they are also ‘of 
time and are time itself’ (HHI, 1996, p. 12).  In their flowing, rivers are oriented 
in a twofold direction; as vanishing ‘the river is underway into what has been. As 
full of intimation, it proceeds into what is coming’ (HHI, 1996, p. 29).  Heidegger 
poses the river as another representation of temporality, as a fleeting present, a 
past directed towards the source and as a directing towards an upcoming future.  
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The river, then, possesses a destiny; it is historical.  It includes ‘commemorative 
remembering’ (Andenken) but it also awaits for what is coming; it is futural 
(Young, 1999, p. 84). Hence, the river, through its temporality, is also a journey. 
Heidegger explains journeying as temporality in The Ister: ‘For journey the 
sequence of moments, in this case, the sequence of individual now points has after 
all, from time immemorial been named a “flowing”.’(1996, p.39) 
 Heidegger states that ‘The river dwells’ in order to point out the intrinsic 
element of the locale to the river. Our becoming homely can be traced to an ‘over 
there’, to a point of departure, and also to a point of arrival. ‘The river is in the 
state of wandering’, however, such wandering is not aimless (Pattison, 2000, p. 
178). The river retains the connection to its source as it shapes the landscape. ‘The 
river makes paths on the previously pathless earth’, and it is that state of 
wandering what allows to make oneself 'at home on earth' (Pattison, 2000, p. 
179). When the river ‘journeys’, it journeys between locales, between the point of 
departure and the point of arrival, and it is that journeying which allows both 
locales to exist and to be connected to one another. Heidegger explains  
The river determines the journey, and the relation grounded therein, the 
 relation of those locales that have been brought about in journeying and 
 thus themselves journey (HHI, 1996, p.36).  
 
It is the sequence of moments; of ‘now points’ that Heidegger calls the flow of the 
river. The river represents the journey of becoming homely, and it is this 
journeying what is its very nature. Heidegger states in his lectures on Hölderlin: 
‘What is proper to the river is thus the essential fullness of a journey. The river is 
a journey in a singular and consummate way' (HHI, 1996, p.30). Heidegger calls 
the ‘consummate essence of the journey’ one that corresponds to the locality of 
the locale. In the discussion of locality, it was defined as that which is in 
movement, it has not yet arrived into bringing forth the locale, and it is the 
movement of the place towards its ‘placeness’.  The river is the journeying of 
locality. The essence of the locale, within the locality, is that it journeys, and for 
Heidegger, this is not contingent, but it is concealed and intrinsic to the journey. 
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He states ‘The essence of the locale, in which becoming homely finds its point of 
departure and its point of entry, is such that it journeys’ (HHI, 1996, p.35). 
The river also has care [Sorge] for man’s locality; such is the river’s 
vocation; in allowing men to dwell, it safeguards them, allows them to experience 
a feeling of safety (Franz, 1998).  The journeying that the river is, in its vocation 
of care, is directed as well towards attainting the ‘earth as ground’ of the homely. 
Heidegger explains in a brief quote his conceptualization of journeying:  
Because vanishing can also be directed into what it is to come, and 
intimating into what has been, this naming of the rivers testifies to their 
rich, yet originarily unitary essence, which we have encapsulate in the 
name of journeying. (HHI, 1996, p.32)  
 
The river is then a concealed unity of both journeying and locality. For Heidegger 
not only are locale and journey less rigid, more fluid definitions of space and 
time, but further, that locale and journey more accurately encapsulate the 
experience of space and time.  
The river provides an insight into the historical past, indicating the rising 
of the dwelling place, as well as the upcoming journey, both intrinsic to the flux 
of the river. The river as journeying provides the way of explaining homecoming 
as movement through the foreign. The interaction between the foreign and the 
homely, the process of homecoming, constitutes the historicality of man (Franz, 
1998).  The river prevails through its journeying, while through its course; it 
makes ‘grounds’ for the homely. It is through the intrinsic quality of the river as 
journeying that the process of homecoming as a passage through the foreign 
becomes possible. Heidegger states:  
The journeying into the unhomely must go “almost” to a threshold of 
being annihilated in the fire in order for the locality of the homely to 
bestow its gladdening and rescuing. (HHI, 1996, p.134) 
 
Heidegger proposes that the reason why Hölderlin writes about rivers in his 
poems is because the spirit of the river is ‘what experiences the journeying of 
unhomeliness as becoming homely’ (Franz, 1998, p. 694). After all, it is the 
process of homecoming that is the point of the passage through the foreign and of 
journeying in general. The spirit, says Heidegger, is initially not at home, and it 
must relate back to the source in order to become homely. However, as 
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journeying, the river ‘can never forget the source, because in flowing, that is, in 
issuing from the source, it itself constantly is the source and remains the locality 
of its own essence’ (HHI, 1996, p.138). Like the river, the poet prepares the way 
for ‘the holy’ or ‘the sublime’ among men. Both are signs pointing the difference 
between mortals and divinities. 
The river is the representation of becoming in-the-midst-of-flux (Pattison, 
2000, p.178).  The stream is the context, but it is also the poetic, as grounding, 
dwelling and wandering (Sallis, 1993, p.385). The figure of the river is poetic 
because of the meaning it articulates. It is the in between, a demi-god, between the 
vision of the sublime, the arising of the poetic, and the dwelling places of mortals, 
sketching out where they are built.  The river is a ‘being between’ since it is seen 
to originate in the mountains, the place where the gods dwell, and descending into 
the lands, making habitable for mortals (Pattison, 2000, p. 178).  The poetic seeps 
through the flux of the river and our ontological homelessness bridging together 
gods and mortals ‘in their mutual boundedness’ (Pattison, 2000, p. 180).  
The river does not only present the journey towards a homecoming, but it 
also reveals how both journeying and locality paradoxically include each other. 
Locality journeys and the journeying itself is a locality, both which are made 
possible in the river. It represents also past and present and future as part of its 
flux, and the source of the river, again, as something that is always present, 
always referred back to. It expresses the dynamic nature of becoming homely, but 
it also posits it as a symbol of the connection between the sublime and mortal 
existence. The river allows for human existence by making “arable” land, but it 
also allows for the sublime. Heidegger compares the river to poets in the sense 
that it can point to such aspects of existence that can be experienced as holy.  
The complexity of the river image reflects also the complexity of the 
process of homecoming. One aspect has multiple meanings, always in paradoxical 
relation with its opposite. The experience of becoming homely, as existential or 
more specifically grounded in cases such as migration also reflects such 
complexity. The migrant, hence its name, even as it is located in a place, is to an 
extent still migrating; maybe through finding a way of becoming comfortable in 
the new place of residence, maybe from sketching out plans of when to return 
	  	   117 
home, etc. It is the temporalizing, the futural planning, or the looking back, which 
also speaks of such journeying. Throughout experience, there is also always the 
possibility of the poetic to arise, not only through realizing the sublime aspects of 
existence, but also necessarily, through the encounter with the foreign. Such 
situations can potentially raise the question of their meaning. In any case, 
Heidegger explains the routes through which such realizations come about. 
The migrating experience is easily compared to the river image because of 
the concrete similarities that run parallel to the existential journey that Heidegger 
describes. Venturing out from the source into other landscapes and 
making/finding dwelling places makes for an easy comparison between the river 
and migration. However, the river speaks more of a cyclical process. Migration 
can occur only from the homeland to the new country, sometimes including its 
return, or, as mentioned above, it may also include a continual migrating. 
However, the river is constantly journeying and constantly dwelling. In migration 
dwelling is what one aims at, a home, a dwelling place at the end of the/a journey. 
The river is always both, always arriving while already departing towards new 
grounds that will again demand its locality as dwelling. The river represents the 
possibility of understanding our being while such understanding remains 
impermanent. Even as we might come to authentically project our possibilities, as 
soon as we do, we are already encountering new situations that will demand the 
same from us, or the everyday will carry us in its familiarity towards new 
situations. The river as an existential process unifies the possibility of 
homecoming and its process.  
 
3.5  CONCLUSION: MIGRATING TOWARDS THE HOMELY 	  
 The social sciences have focused on important elements of the migrant 
experience, both physical and experiential.  Brah speaks of the material home as 
well as feeling at home, where the latter is not necessarily experienced only in one 
place or in the place of origin. Ties between the physical and the emotional are 
pointed out as intrinsic, for example in Eva Hoffman’s ‘soils of significance’, but 
they are realized as possibly paradoxical, where ‘homing desires’ or the desire to 
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feel at home emerges from not feeling at home within the homeland.  Cultural 
theories on migration and their relation to the homeland mostly propose home as 
dynamic and fluid. They depict the homeland as dependent on the relations that 
are built and maintained in different places of residence but whose attachments 
are subject to change as well as the relation to the place of origin. The meaning of 
a home changes out of the necessity of learning to dwell within the foreign. It is 
possible that the feeling of the uncanny and the unfamiliar never truly goes away, 
and so finding comfort within the foreign becomes a prerequisite for daily 
existence. As a result, the idea of home as the place where we feel safe and 
protected, where we ‘return to our own being’ becomes less fixed. It allows for 
example, for a multiplicity of homes, none of which provide a full sense of safety 
and protection. The ‘presencing in the manner of absencing’ is the memory of the 
original source, of the point of departure of the journey. The home left behind in 
order to look for ‘something different’, something unfamiliar and strange, 
becomes the promise of return, the mirror where one might or might not find 
oneself again. Migration allows, forcefully, building dwelling places, to build 
familiarity within the unfamiliar, to emulate the feeling of comfort through the 
memory of it. The distinction between homely and unhomely is blurred, while yet 
aspiring towards a ‘homelier’ place.   
Although Heidegger also focuses on the dual structure of the home and of 
experience in general, pointing at the importance of the physical elements and the 
existential relevance they bring to experience, his theory offers a much more 
complex description of the experience of what it means to feel at home. Social 
theories of migration state that home building is always an incomplete process, 
since new elements keep being added to the idea of the homely. Heidegger 
already defines homecoming as a process, as the beginning of the turn towards 
one’s own, where one’s own is never arrived at, but remains in nearness. While 
cultural theories on migration propose possible solutions in order to change 
specific aspects of the identity of the migrant, or of his self interpretation, 
Heidegger offers a more enigmatic and holistic interpretation of experience, 
calling for elements beyond our materiality that speak to us deeply about our 
being in the world. Heidegger contributes to the research on home in migration by 
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examining such experience from a phenomenological lens that also accounts for 
sets of shared issues that people respond to. To consider Heidegger’s account of 
the home is to understand experiences beyond their particularities, by taking into 
consideration those fundamental issues that shape any experience.  
Maybe the most important element Heidegger can add to the 
understanding of migration is that of homelessness. We do not start from the 
home as homely, but homecoming starts from homelessness as the root of human 
beings, which is also the reason why homecoming is only the beginning of the 
turn. Homelessness arises from anxiety in the face of death, of nothingness. To 
face the abyss is also to face that which we do not know, which might induce awe 
or fear in us. Because we turn away from our own essence, we remain and 
homeless. In fear of facing the No-thing, we flee into the comfort of seeming 
stability.  To turn to our essence, that which faces the groundlessness of Being, is 
to search for the uncanny, it is to pass through the foreign.  In this way, the 
foreign and the homely stand in a dialectical relationship with one another, 
building the process of homecoming and enriching the understanding of each 
other. Homelessness then is one of the fundamental aspects that Heidegger draws 
on to describe the homely and to explain how any of our experiences is shaped by 
certain defining aspects, in this case, our finitude and our constant avoidance of it.  
 To the homely, the foreign and the process of homecoming, Heidegger 
adds the human activity of dwelling. We not only live in places, but we make 
homes of them, we build places where we can feel safe, we dwell.  Heidegger 
relates our way of being in the world with the way we build that world, according 
to our necessities but also according to our permanent state of homelessness. We 
have a longing desire to build a home, to safeguard and to be safeguarded, and 
Heidegger puts that longing at the core of being human; he puts home and the 
homely (and homelessness, of course) at the center of our being, which in turn is 
expressed in our activities. The social sciences do not acknowledge such core 
aspects that shape any of our experiences.  
 His use of rivers as signs, as in between mortals and divinities, and 
referring to the sublime also points to something which is beyond our reach as 
humans, but that we need in order to realize our own smallness. That smallness, 
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which is ours, is the smallness with which we live and dwell; it is important 
insofar as it gives us a scale of our existence on earth. The acknowledgment of 
that human smallness is never present in the social sciences, maybe due to the 
ethical ways they propose in order to supersede certain social dynamics. The 
focus on the agency of the individual alone prevents from understanding our 
intrinsic smallness. Furthermore, the river symbolizes a journey, which holds 
locality within itself, which allows for dwelling. As if humans dwelled in the 
course of their life by building their own dwelling places, as if through the course 
of searching, we found dwelling, but also, we sensed our historical origin in its 
nearness, as it is carried through the journey. 
 Both Heidegger and research on migration have identified the concept of 
home as crucial. The latter takes home as an issue surfacing in the migrating 
process, and Heidegger deems it a fundamental concern in human experience, and 
homecoming as an existential cyclical process, although it can be linear alone in 
the case of migration. The migrant crosses actual borders and leaves a material 
home. Heidegger proposes home and its related concepts as crucial to the 
understanding of our existence. Through his philosophy, the migrant is an entity 
that serves both as an example and as an image of that which we all potentially 
experience.  	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CHAPTER 4: Fundamental questions in different 
regions: the void of the uncanny 
 
4.1 Migration: The fundamental rising through the regional   
  
In his early texts Heidegger presents a fundamental ontology of Dasein, including 
the elements that he considers to be at the root of our Being, those elements 
without which we would not be Dasein. These elements that make up our basic 
ontological structure express themselves throughout our existence. Heidegger’s 
later focus on home and dwelling speak for fundamental experiences of human 
beings: the experience of home, or of feeling safe and protected in a given place is 
matters that are existentially relevant. These common issues that Heidegger 
reveals throughout his writings are always necessarily linked with the ontic realm. 
The world that we live in, with its definite characteristics, its different social 
contexts, etc., allows for the expression of said issues. For these reasons, the 
fundamental common issues express themselves in different ways, as they are 
shaped always already by a given context.  
 In the case of migration, such experience is already defined by definite 
characteristics such as physical displacement of the homeland. The characteristics 
that define migration are ontic, and the literature has focused on these ontic 
properties. These specific characteristics of the experience of migration and 
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migrants already provide the context that shapes their experiences (for instance, 
border-crossing as a necessary characteristic of the migrating experience). 
However, their context is also defined by other particularities, like the place being 
migrated to, its society, the age of the migrant, the race, and so forth. Nonetheless, 
the common fundamental issues permeate any of these realms, but more 
importantly, in the regional framework of migration, they can provide an analysis 
that considers ontological and existential aspects and that not only focuses on the 
characteristics of migration. These fundamental aspects speak of that which 
allows migrants or any other kind of expression of Dasein to be what they are. 
This layered analysis starts off with the fundamental, going through the regional 
and acknowledging the particular, at every step being aware of the fundamental 
concerns that seep into any of these realms. What remains relevant is that the 
fundamental aspects of our existence – our caring, dwelling, the possibility of the 
uncanny – arise through all of our particular experiences, shaping, along with the 
context, our existence in the world.  
 Heidegger defines regions [Gegende] as providing the conditions of 
possibility for the intelligible relations that we encounter in the world. Regions 
allow things to emerge as intelligible in their relation to our environment. We 
‘discover’ the ready-to-hand in regions and they are essential to understanding the 
‘pre-given publicly shared parts of an environing world’ (Casey, 1997). For 
instance, we understand a piano as an instrument that produces music, that is, 
through its use, a use that has been given by the shared social elements of our 
environment. Through the specificity of regions we understand relations amongst 
objects and people. Regions point to what allows for the disclosure of the spatial 
world where we interact. Regions then are an in-between, pointing to the 
conditions of possibility for how we understand things in their particularity. 
Regions bring things together as meaningful parts of our environment and require 
of our involvement in order for such meaning to arise. A region is not stepped into 
as if one were an external entity, rather, we are already within one, we are 
involved in them as we encounter things and beings. Proposing a regional 
ontology of migration is acknowledging both the particularity of any situation and 
the conditions of possibility, the ontological structures and issues that we share 
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and that allow situations to be intelligible.  It is not only particular characteristics 
that define migrants, but the relation that these characteristics have to their 
context, which in turn, provides them with meaning. Such regional ontology 
entails relating the characteristics of migration to our possibility of understanding 
them also as the expression of the conditions that provide our possibility of 
finding such characteristics intelligible.  
 The mere categorization of beings forgets existential features and simply 
distinguishes types and entities. Diaspora studies scholarship has established its 
types and categories while remaining forgetful of ontological structures. It has 
investigated individual and cultural differences amongst migrants, and has also 
catalogued certain experiences migrants have in common. Theories on migration 
have only focused on the characteristics that bring migrants together. They have 
overlooked the structure that supports and allows for those characteristics to take 
place to begin with. Furthermore, their suggestions of ‘imagined spaces’ for 
transcending marginalizing social dynamics that some migrants are subjected to 
reveal a normative agenda. Heidegger’s existential analysis of Being through his 
concepts of authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness and becoming homely are not 
of an ethical kind. They point to an understanding of Being that takes into 
consideration both actuality and possibility. They ask for an understanding of 
ourselves and our circumstances, whatever they might be, in order to always 
project forwards. Such understanding emphasizes not only our own fragility, but 
the fragility of fixed concepts, thus standing in opposition to what the scholarship 
on migration proposes.  
A regional ontology allows for the possibility of unifying the ontic with 
the fundamental ontology. It provides an opening for an inter-subjective 
understanding of experiences through those aspects that are shared. It does not 
separate according to individual differences, but acknowledges them, while 
offering an understanding of ourselves that goes beyond them. This understanding 
brings together different experiences through the expression of fundamental issues 
within them. Thus, it is possible to understand oneself as a migrant, even if 
ontically one is not migrating, and migrants are not just an isolated kind of entity, 
defined only by their characteristics, but their experiences are shared and can be 
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identified with by other beings, allowing for a shared fundamental understanding 
of our existence. Identifying with such fundamental commonalities brings our 
ontological structures to the foreground, with which a regional ontology 
acknowledges both its ontic limitations and the conditions that allow migrants, or 
any of us, to exist in the ways in which we do.  
Diaspora studies scholarship has studied many of the relevant aspects that 
surface in the migrating experience. As shown in Chapter 2 and 3, however, some 
of these aspects are also existentially relevant for us in a fundamental way. 
Heidegger reveals the importance of the aspects found empirically in a different 
level of enquiry, that of our being. In the present chapter I focus on Heidegger’s 
criticism towards the social sciences regarding their forgetfulness of being, of the 
ontological aspects that define us. Heidegger pushes for an anti-anthropocentric 
understanding of existence where he takes into account other dimensions that 
impact our everyday lives and our understanding of them.  Any social account of 
human existence is not only to study the concrete social factors that define it, but 
also the ontological structures underlying our assumptions and values. With this 
in mind, I focus on Heidegger’s account of the groundlessness of being through 
his concepts of Being-towards-death, the uncanny both in early and later texts and 
also of the Fourfold. The purpose of such focus is to show that these factors also 
aid the development of regional ontologies, in this case, one on migration.  The 
issues that Heidegger considers to be fundamental are also revealed in situations 
like the ones migrants face.  
 
4.2 Beyond anthropocentrism: Heidegger’s being, dwelling and the 
fourfold 
 
Heidegger delineates different existential structures that manifest in whatever 
ways Dasein takes up its existence, depending on context and situation. Ontically, 
Dasein can be described by having definite and concrete characteristics, for 
instance, those attributed to migrants, medical doctors, mothers, criminals, etc.	  
However, Dasein cannot be reduced to any of these ontic descriptions. To put it 
simply, no migrant is merely a migrant, but also, for example, a mother, son, 
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teacher, tailor, nurse, lover, from an urban or rural background, of a certain class, 
gender, etc. Independently of different contexts and roles, migrants are, just like 
non-migrants, Dasein, irreducible to ontic 'objective' determinations or 
characteristics; 'there' and engaged in a world; ontological in the sense that their 
own being is an issue for them. Such is the link that Heidegger makes between the 
ontic realm and Dasein’s ontological structure, as always already present in our 
everyday existence. That which is thematized or interpreted is Being, that Being 
which is already an issue for us. For the early Heidegger, being is ‘grounded in an 
entity, namely Dasein’ (BP, 1982, p. 229). That is, Being is understood via the 
entity that we are and which necessarily exists somewhere.  
In his later texts, Heidegger becomes even less anthropocentric by making 
Dasein no longer the source of meaning of Being. An example of this occurs 
through his explanation of the ‘thinghood’ of the thing,  (as opposed to its ready-
to-hand-ness), which effects a decentering of Dasein from the picture (Harman, 
2007, p. 130). Even as Dasein is capable of creating objects, their ‘thinghood’ is 
not dependent on Dasein. Furthermore, Heidegger places more emphasis on that 
which is never fully disclosed but that is always present (i.e. the earth, the gift of 
Being, nearing nearness, etc). That which lies concealed reveals to us the 
limitations of our own being. In line with this view, Heidegger switches from a 
more scientific style to a poetic one. He emphasizes some of his early perspectives 
on interpretation and makes his writings more ambiguous and inconclusive, in 
order to reflect in writing the concealment of Being. Heidegger continues to 
oppose conceptual determination and to elucidate instead the limits of knowledge 
(Pattison, 2000, p. 193). This leads him to speak of the ‘mystery of Being’, which 
he describes as that which is not fully comprehensible and which can only be 
sensed indirectly (Young, 2002, p.19, Pattison, 2000, p.190).  
Regardless of the differences between Heidegger’s early and his later 
works, his project need not be viewed as changing substantially, and neither does 
his fundamental understanding of Being.18 What runs through both phases of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 Some of the scholars that agree with the thesis of continuity throughout Heidegger’s project are 
Charles Taylor (2005), Thomas Sheehan (2005), Gunter Figal (2007), Taylor Carman (2003), Jeff 
Malpas (2006), etc.  
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Heidegger’s work is the ‘thematization of what is already operative but 
overlooked’ (Sheehan, 2002, p.542). Heidegger’s proclaimed “turn” [Kehre] in 
his philosophy after the publication of Being and Time is a departure from a 
Dasein-centered fundamental ontology to the event of being (Ruin, 2002, p.362). 
Thomas Sheehan describes this ‘turn’ as contextualizing ‘one’s presential 
absorption in things by becoming explicitly aware of what one already 
experiences: the relative absentiality of oneself and of things (2002, p.542).  
Heidegger himself states in Letter on ‘Humanism’ regarding his ‘turn’: 
[…] this turning is not a change of standpoint (i.e., of the question of 
being) from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first 
arrives at the locality of the dimension out of which Being and Time is 
experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental experience of 
the oblivion of being. (1947, p. 249-50) 
Heidegger continues to focus on those issues that are existentially present for us 
and which are ontologically relevant, although he re-orientates our attention from 
a focus on individual (albeit social) Dasein to one that is less anthropocentric. The 
features Heidegger sees as existentially fundamental in his later texts are of a 
broader inter-subjective nature.  He focuses less on the individual’s relation to 
others and to its environment, and seems more concerned with the relation of the 
whole of Being to its many forms. But again, even though this has been often 
downplayed in the literature, the early Heidegger also emphasizes that Dasein is 
always already Mit-Sein (Being-with).  
Another concept of his later writings that emphasizes this anti-
anthropocentric perspective is that of the fourfold. The fourfold is a broader 
understanding of the coming together of what Heidegger distinguishes as four 
different dimensions of ‘thinghood’. A thing can gather the four elements of the 
fourfold: earth, sky, divinities and mortals. The unity that the thing brings can also 
be called ‘world’. The fourfold is then what allows the world to be as such. 
Heidegger describes the fourfold as belonging together in a ‘dance’.  
The round dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring. 
Appropriating, it lightens the four into the radiance of their simple 
 oneness. Radiantly, the ring joins the four, everywhere open to the riddle 
of their presence.  (PLT, 1975, p. 180) 
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Dance expresses the dynamic nature of the dimensions of the fourfold. The four 
elements mirror the thing in different ways. Appropriating is the gathering 
together of things, and thus the dance of the fourfold forms a unity, a ring, that 
mirrors the fourfold in any given thing we encounter, and which allows it to 
express its ‘thinghood’ as such. 
The four elements display different aspects of what makes up the world as 
conditions that make our lives possible in the way they are. Each of the four 
elements elucidates the life that ‘brought to presence the actual thing before us’.  
Each of the four is ‘a particular dimension of conditionality (BDT, 1975, p. 121).’ 
They also point at what is concealed and what is accessible to us. Earth and the 
divinities remain concealed from us.  They signal the limits of our own 
understanding and of our own incompleteness. For instance, describing the earth, 
Heidegger says that it ‘appears cleared as itself only when it is perceived and 
preserved as that which is by nature undisclosable […] The earth is essentially 
self-secluding’ (PLT, 1975, p. 46-7). Earth is the background against which the 
totality of the significance of the world emerges. It reminds of how what is 
concealed allows for the unconcealed to be revealed. The earth is everything that 
the world gives sense to, but without the already constructed social meaning. 
Edwards states that to speak of the earth is ‘to be reminded of that always 
unilluminated darkness’ from where all that is given a name or a word comes 
from. The earth signifies the ‘dark and unnamable substance of things’, even as 
that substance is the necessary condition, the source for ‘any thing that is’ 
(Edwards, 2005, p.  124). Earth and sky are usually associated with nature, while 
divinities and mortals with culture, not in opposition with one another, but as 
elements which are equally important in the fourfold.  The earth is usually 
contrasted with the sky, where the earth is more ‘spatial’ and the sky is more 
‘temporal’, as it speaks of the cycle of seasons and the course of stars and planets. 
Nonetheless, both are spatio-temporal horizons of dwelling.  
 Mortals, then, belong to the fourfold through dwelling, which is the ‘basic 
character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist (BDT, 1975, p. 151).’  
Mortals preserve the fourfold in its essential being, in its presencing.  To dwell is 
to bring ‘the presencing of the fourfold into things’; however, things “secure the 
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fourfold” when they, as things ‘are let be in their presencing’ (BDT, 1975, p.  
151). A thing ‘gathers the fourfold’ and gathers other things that belong together 
with it (BDT, 1975, p. 150). What Heidegger means is, for instance, that a cup 
belongs to its context, to the things around it, the room, the table, etc. and so also 
this context is brought together in it.  The divinities are not of this world, but they 
announce a place of wholeness. Mortals await for the divinities ‘in hope they hold 
up to the divinities what is unhoped for' (BDT, 1975, p. 150). The divinities allow 
for mortals to recognize their own limitations and their incompleteness, but also 
as looking towards the future in hopes of that ‘completion’.  Heidegger proposes 
that those divinities from another world are whatever ‘holds the promise of our 
healing self transformation’; which may come in the form of poems, paintings, 
works of philosophy, etc.  The wait for the divinities entails a hope for a better 
future.  
When Heidegger states that we “dwell under the sky” he means that we 
live in relation to those dimensions, also defined by the change of seasons that 
therefore impact our social practices. The divinities-mortals axis, on the other 
hand, embraces us as ‘mortals amongst mortals’ i.e. finite Mit-Dasein, while the 
divinities dimension, understood secularly, refers to ‘poets’ who can find new 
frames of intelligibility or meaning, or value, or show what it means to be and 
inspire hope about the future, and can possibly do so for an entire culture. Mortals 
dwell alongside divinities, on earth and under the sky. All dimensions are equally 
important. 
Heidegger uses the fourfold to lay out a more holistic explanation of our 
being in terms of the relationality of our existence and everything that is involved 
in it. It is not only the earth, as the place where we find ourselves in the cosmos, 
but the manner in which everything in it becomes intelligible, through social 
practices or through the given meaning to objects. Furthermore, as mortals, within 
our concern about our own death, we also understand our existence as incomplete 
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and tend to believe there are ideals that can be modeled after, for our own sake, 
for our relation with the world around us. 19 
  The fourfold provides another way of understanding the relations within a 
given context. In migration the objects and the landscape that migrants relate to 
and long for are shaped by different elements, the culture, the landscape and 
climate, the history of a given country, etc.  Thus, we can understand migrants 
also in relation to the significance they give they give to different elements of 
their homes and how that significance is constructed. In any given culture, nature, 
weather, climate, landscape, etc. influence the practices and understandings of 
spatiality and temporality. Migrants thus take their practices and understandings 
from one country to the next, and adapting these also to the new landscape, in a 
different climate, weather, etc. In this sense, the sky seems to be the more evident 
influence in the adaptation process. Nonetheless, the divinities pointing and new 
possible modes of intelligibility also can vary from culture to culture. What one 
culture considers as valuable and worthy of praise and hope may be different in 
another one. Eastern and Western cultures, for instance, have developed different 
values regarding individuality, thus, the characters that are to be considered poets, 
visionaries, thinkers, etc. may differ from China to North America. Furthermore, 
the relations amongst the inhabitants of a certain place, also influenced by 
weather, seasons, divinities, etc., are shown in their traditions. Traditions reflect 
the different values of each culture. However, death is an aspect of existence that 
all cultures deal with, although in different ways. The traditional ways in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 Heidegger states that the fourfold is not the final condition of the things that are brought to 
presence. The condition of the conditionality in the fourfold he calls Die Lichtung (clearing, 
openness).  It indicates the final condition of that which does not come into presence, which is the 
condition of any presence. “The clearing” allows for what is seen, to be seen for what it is.  ‘The 
clearing’ is another sort of gift, which we cannot create; the presence of human beings is also 
granted by the clearing (Edwards, 2002, p. 126). ‘The clearing’ allows for every ‘event of 
revelation’ to occur.  It opens the possibility of presence, and ‘grants the possible presencing of 
that presence itself.’ It is prior to anything that may be disclosed within it, it is ‘the undisclosable, 
unrepresentable condition of disclosure itself.’ (Edwards, 2002, p. 142).  	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death is dealt with speak of how the people of a given place relate to this feature 
of life. For Heidegger, our relation to death is a fundamental issue to be faced 
because it reveals other aspects of our being. Although migrants, for instance, 
carry different understandings and practices that depend upon factors in nature, 
they face, like any other humans, the critical question of the end of their existence. 
The fourfold allows us to expand our understanding of migration beyond history  
and culture into how these are determined by natural factors. However, a look into 
the issue of finitude brings another way of de-focusing the individual into what 
Heidegger calls the groundlessness of being.  	  	  
4.3 THE UNCANNY AND THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF BEING  
 
Heidegger emphasizes the crucial importance of the uncanny in both his early and 
later writings. The possibility of not-being for Heidegger is, paradoxically, one of 
the most determinant factors in our existence. Dealing with that possibility is to 
confront the question of our being, which is for Heidegger, the most fundamental. 
In the present section I review the different concepts that Heidegger uses to refer 
to the possibility of that nothingness and the different ways in which it is 
disclosed in our lives. I first give an account of anxiety as the permeating 
fundamental mood that brings about the realization of the Nothing as explained in 
What is Metaphysics? I then explain the experience of the Uncanny and how it 
relates to Anxiety as explained in Being and Time, as well as its relevance to the 
topic of migration. I also cover nothingness in relation to finitude. In the second 
part of this section, I give an account of the different ways of experiencing the 
Uncanny as explained in Heidegger’s later texts. 
 
4.3.1 The Uncanny and Anxiety: from not-Being to finitude 	  
There is no definite object to Anxiety; what threatens us ‘is already there, and yet 
nowhere’ (BT, 1962, p. 186).  There is no specific thing that can be pointed out as 
what is bothersome or instability provoking. Heidegger says that ‘we cannot say 
what it is before which one feels ill at ease’ (WIM, 1977, p. 101).  The experience 
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of Anxiety is described as a feeling in which the familiarity of the world seems to 
disappear (Gelven, 1989, p. 114). However, things and beings do not disappear, 
rather there is a:  
‘receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety and 
oppresses us. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings 
this “no hold on things” comes over us and remains (WIM, 1977, p. 101)’.  
 
The relation between anxiety and Nothing is explained in two different, yet not 
disconnected ways in Heidegger. The first, in What is Metaphysics? is the 
revelation of the relation between beings and Nothing. The fact that there are 
beings is found through anxiety. The second explanation of the relevance of the 
nothing is found in Being and Time and it has to do with our finitude. I begin with 
the first conceptualization of the relation between anxiety and Nothing to then 
explain Anxiety in relation to the Uncanny and the groundlessness of Being. I 
finish this section with Being and Time’s explanation of nothingness, finitude and 
Being-towards-death.  
In anxiety, Heidegger says, ‘the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a 
whole’ (WIM, 1977, p.102). What this means is that the nihilation of the nothing 
discloses ‘beings in their full’, but also in their ‘concealed strangeness as what is 
radically other’ (WIM, 1977, p. 103).  What is revealed is that there are beings, 
and not nothing. The openness of beings is disclosed to Dasein for the first time. 
Thus, the nothing is not a ‘counter concept of beings’, but it belongs to ‘their 
essential unfolding as such’. That is, nothing and the Being of beings belong 
together (WIM, 1977, p. 104).  In this sense, the anxiety explained in What is 
Metaphysics? discloses a Nothing that has to do with the amazement at the 
existence of beings.  It has to do with encountering beings, trees, birds, plants, 
etc., not as part of our daily lives, but as provoking instability in us because their 
being is connected to ours in that we are something as opposed to nothing at all. 
This anxiety is relevant to migration as much as it is relevant to any other context 
that can bring about such experience of bewilderment at beings, that is, it is of a 
fundamental kind, related to Being, that is not specific to migration.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger states that Dasein flees from das Unheimliche 
(translated as ‘the uncanny’). The uncanny poses anxiety for Dasein because it 
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pulls Dasein out of the comfort of familiarity. Facing the uncanny, we no longer 
feel safe and at home. The everydayness of das Man is broken to give space for 
what is utterly other. And yet, according to Heidegger, ‘the publicness of das Man 
suppresses everything unfamiliar’ (BT, 1962, p. 237), preventing the uncanny 
from revealing itself ‘in the basic state of mind of anxiety’ (BT, 1962, p.321).  
Heidegger states that Dasein is ‘anxious about Being-in-the-world itself’ (BT, 
1962, p. 185).  
Anxiety goes hand in hand with the experience of das Unheimliche20 
where that which is familiar seems to be broken by moments of utter 
inadequateness. This anxiety is related to the one described above in that there is a 
break in our routine, but it is not directed to encountering beings ‘as a whole’ 
through the nothing, but to realizing the groundlessness and the nothingness at the 
root of our being.  It is the feeling of such anxiety that brings Dasein back from its 
absorption in the world because ‘everyday familiarity collapses’ (BT, 1962, p. 
233/189).  Everyday familiarity in migration is an aspect that is necessarily 
confronted as the migrant uproots its life in a familiar space to an unfamiliar one.  
Once this realization occurs, our place in the world no longer feels so 
stable, let alone comfortable. The way in which I exist no longer appears as fixed, 
or something under my control. Groundlessness means that Dasein has ‘no 
meaning or content of its own; nothing individualizes it but its empty throwness’ 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p.180). It involves our being aware of the fact that there is no 
actual ground for meaning and that we rely on a loose network of assumptions 
about our world.  It also reveals that we lack a ground for what we think our 
meaningful existence depends on. We are disclosed as groundless and 
meaningless. Our seemingly stable lives are revealed as vulnerable and fragile. 
Some migrants experience such vulnerability when life as they knew it suddenly 
changes and any idea they had of a fixed identity is suddenly challenged by a new 
environment, showing the relevance of the social context against what we 
normally consider to be self-chosen, independent and fixed identities. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20 Normally translated as “uncanny” (Being and Time- Macquarrie and Robinson). The feeling of 
Angst, according to Heidegger is uncanny in the sense that we no longer feel at home. The 
familiarity of our mundane environment is lost.  
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experience of migration can also bring about the questioning of the ground that 
we stand on in the sense that it rests in a network of assumptions that we have 
taken for granted. The realization that feeling ‘out of place’ can have such a deep 
impact in our everyday lives makes migrants feel fragile, maybe initially, in their 
new environment. Anxiety, in this context, is a common feeling for migrants and 
it has the possibility of revealing the vulnerability intrinsic to our lives although it 
might not necessarily reveal the nothingness the No-thing that grounds our 
existence. 
Although covered up, the uncanny is ‘the basic kind of Being in the world’ 
(BT, 1962, p.322), and as such, it calls Dasein from the uncanniness of its Being.  
This is what Heidegger calls ‘the call of conscience’, where Dasein is called back 
to itself from itself, and outside of das Man. The call summons Dasein out of its 
comfortable understanding of itself and of its environment, away from the 
mundanity of its everydayness, where Dasein remains comfortably and possibly 
lost in such ‘averaging’ of his existence. This uncanny call brings with it the 
possibility of revealing Dasein’s incompleteness and finitude. The call, if Dasein 
responds, can strip away the assumption of stability in our lives and reveal our 
lives to be fragile and vulnerable due to their own finality and the instability of 
our own surroundings. In this sense, the uncanny is what allows for the possibility 
of the call, of a different understanding of our Being. By shaking Dasein out of its 
‘comfort zone’, the call provides Dasein with the possibility of questioning itself. 
Thus, in Being and Time, the uncanny serves as a channel out of das Man and into 
allowing Dasein to face fundamental aspects of its Being.  
 The existential meaning of Nothingness in Being and Time is the 
confrontation with our own finitude. Michael Gelven explains our anxiety about 
‘No-thing’ as the feeling of strangeness towards the possibility of our not-Being, 
which ‘cannot be compared to any other form of human experience’ (Gelven, 
1989, p. 116). Our finitude, Heidegger says, as our deepest limitation,  ‘ refuses to 
yield to our freedom’ (WIM, 1977, p.106).   Considering the possibility of not-
Being has no metaphysical referent for us, we cannot bring ourselves to confront 
the nothing by our own will. The realization of our finitude is the realization of 
our death. It is what reveals Dasein’s temporality, in so far as it is determined by 
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its finitude. Part of our existence and of understanding its possibilities is to 
comprehend its ontological structure. However, although our own death is an 
inescapable element of our ontology, we constantly flee from it. The image of our 
own death creates an uncanny feeling because we have no actual relation to it. 
‘Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists’ writes Heidegger, in order to reveal 
the constant decay and fragility not only of my life, but of its possibilities and of 
my surroundings (BT, 1962, p. 295).  In the event of migration, for instance, 
migrants have “shut down” the possibility of continuing their lives in their home 
country in exchange for something better and/or different. Nonetheless, to be 
confronted with death is to face the nature of our existence, a confrontation that is 
open to both migrants and non-migrants. In this sense, the “dying off” the 
possibility of staying in their home countries is a situation that defines the 
migrating experience, but does not necessarily confront migrants with their own 
death.  
To be aware of the utter possibility of death, is also to be aware of the 
possibility of the finality of what lies around us. Carman states that Dasein’s 
awareness of that ownmost possibility results in the realization that “every 
possibility open to Dasein leaves in its wake other possibilities that have been shut 
down, rendered null and void. ‘All possibility is bounded and conditioned by 
impossibility’ (Carman, 2005, p. 281). Every time I make a choice, for example, 
of moving to a new country instead of staying in my own, I have shut down 
numberless possibilities of what my life will be surrounded by. When Heidegger 
states that we are constantly dying, he refers also to other possibilities always 
being shut down for us. Dasein’s finitude is perceived as utterly uncanny, as 
furthest removed from the familiarity of its everydayness. Dasein, in order not to 
be subject to anxiety, immerses itself in everydayness assuming the stability and 
continuity of its existence. If we were constantly aware of our impending finitude, 
any project would seem pointless and irrelevant. Such an attitude is not what 
Heidegger refers to in Being-towards-death, but it is one of continuous projection 
forwards ‘in spite of’, as Heidegger says, being constantly dying. What Heidegger 
wants us to understand is that even though our lives, and our projects, are finite 
and transient, ignoring such aspects does not bring us any closer to an 
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understanding of ourselves. We constantly want to think of our lives as 
meaningful, and of our projects as relevant. Heidegger thinks that our lives are 
grounded in an abyss and that our Being is always facing the eventual nothingness 
of its existence. This, however, is not to prevent us from continuing to engage in 
projects even though any of these projects already speaks of the nullity of others, 
of the shutting down, the ‘dying off’ of other possible ones.  
Heidegger proposes that we acknowledge, and not turn away from, the 
defining elements of our existence as they help us understand our own 
possibilities and ourselves. Thus, understanding the vulnerability and the finality 
of our lives allows us to have a better ‘informed’ projection. Because we are ‘that 
inability to remain’ and yet unable to leave our place, we constantly throw 
ourselves into possibilities (FCOM, 1995, p. 365). We can be nothing but what we 
are in actuality, yet, we are enraptured in the transition of projection. We are 
‘seized by terror’ (in anxiety) but can also find the ‘bliss of astonishment’ through 
the understanding of the actual and the possible (FCOM, 1995, p. 366). Being-
towards-death reveals a fundamental existential aspect that defines such 
possibilities. Instead of refusing to make plans or deeming them irrelevant 
because of their pointlessness or of making plenty of them without considering 
their realizability or the limitations of our own lives, Heidegger calls for both an 
acknowledgment of the factors that define our lives and, at the same time, an 
awareness of the ontological nature of our finite existence. 
The importance of acknowledging concrete limitations might be a 
common issue for migrants, especially those referred to in the Diaspora Studies 
literature. Migrants often find themselves constrained legally and socially and 
cannot but become very aware of it. Working under those limitations is a common 
issue for migrants. Furthermore, many migrants (depending on whether they are 
illegal, marginalized, etc.) will try to decrease those constraints.  For instance, the 
multiple demonstrations in the U.S. for legal reform for migrants are an effort to 
decrease the constraints that many illegal migrants face.  Similarly, learning the 
language of the host country reveals limitations in terms of the possibilities to 
communicate with the population. Any such attempts already imply the 
acknowledgment of the concrete constraints that many migrants live with. 
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However, similarly to the previous concepts, particular and definite aspects (i.e. 
legal, social) are more easily acknowledged while the ontological ones are not 
necessarily so. The insight that Heidegger calls for through Being-towards-death 
comes from understanding the limitations of our being, most radically amongst 
them, our finitude. In this sense, migrants are not in a ‘better’ place regarding the 
possibility of such understanding, although ontically they have easier access to the 
projection of their existentiell possibilities.21. An ontological understanding of 
ourselves is the acknowledgment of our groundlessness, and as the kind of beings 
that migrants are, they share the possibility of such understanding with any other 
Dasein, in their case, maybe, although not necessarily exclusively, via their 
migrating experience.  
The importance of the uncanny feeling is somewhat addressed in the 
literature on migration as the “other”.  The other is meant to represent the migrant, 
as “other” to the host society, and vice versa. The “other” in these aspects is 
meant to represent that which is unknown, strange, different from what we know, 
and for the literature in social sciences, it is the basis from which dynamics of 
marginalization and discrimination emerge. From post-colonial, feminist, queer, 
etc. theories to current theories on migration, the concept of the “other” has 
represented those who are purposefully “unacknowledged” in society and 
relegated to a secondary status where such otherness is more easily discarded, 
marginalized and discriminated against (Brah, 1996; Butler, 1990, Hall, 2000; 
Spivak, 1996).  In an attempt to counteract such social phenomena, these theories 
propose to “welcome” and “promote” otherness. One, as an illegal migrant, as a 
black woman, as a queer student, etc., is to embrace that otherness and “battle” the 
society that is trying to maintain it in the shadows. Embracing such “othered” 
identity is supposed to be a way of resisting the falsely normalized and 
normativized ways of being (i.e. the white man going to his office drinking a 
Starbucks) by presenting the social diversity that actually exists. For these social 
theorists, representing society by those standards is a way of maintaining in power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Gloria Anzaldúa has made a point that the “mestiza” has a better understanding of ambiguity 
and tolerance for the fact of being a migrant (specifically Mexican in the United States). She 
engages in an idealization of the migrant status ascribing them a better and inherent understanding 
of aspects that are context dependent.	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sections of society (male, white, employed, etc.) that historically have had that 
power. Despite their honest attempts, simplifying as they normally normally do, 
such theories only attribute otherness to social groups. Their inquiry into the 
origin of otherness is only sociological, into the fear of facing a palpable 
unknown, but they do not question whether that unknown emerges from our own 
way of being. Heidegger will also propose a welcoming encounter with the 
uncanny, but from a different angle. Heidegger sees the uncanny (the utterly 
other) as a crucial experience in our lives that reveals fundamental aspects of our 
being.  
 
4.3.2 The Uncanny: Deinon and the uncanniest of all beings 
 
 In his later texts, Heidegger speaks of deinon, which he translates as 
‘unheimlich’, this time putting emphasis on the not-at-homeness of what is 
uncanny.22 If the home is where we dwell, where we feel comfortable in a 
familiar environment, an uncanny experience takes those feelings away from us. 
Deinon, however, expands his notion of the uncanny into different meanings, not 
all negative. For instance, experiences of awe can shake us out of our familiarity 
and bring us to a state of admiration for the world that surrounds us. His emphasis 
on the uncanny as also unhomely allows Heidegger to present the uncanny as a 
vessel towards homecoming. In Der Ister: Lectures on Hölderlin, Heidegger 
declares the human being ‘the uncanniest of the uncanny’ (1996, p.68).  
Uncanniness is in all beings, but in humans it is evoked in its constant journeying 
and flowing; ‘humankind emerges from uncanniness and remains within it - 
looms out of it and stirs within it’ (1996, p.72). Heidegger paradoxically states 
“human beings are, in a singular sense, not homely, and that their care is to 
become homely” (HHI, 1996, p.71). The uncanny is the ground of human beings 
because it is in their nature to turn away from their essence. Heidegger explains 
the uncanny as part of what human beings are, moving between striving to be at 
home and turning away from themselves, and thus being unhomely. Uncanny as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 Unheimlich is connected to the German Word “Heim” that means “home”.  
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we are, the relation between uncanny experiences and striving to be at home can 
be seen to parallel migration. Although both can be encountered in different 
contexts, the existential relevance and understanding of both remains a possibility 
open for migrants and non-migrants.  
Heidegger explains that the concept of the uncanny comes from the Greek 
deinon, meaning that which is fearful.  Heidegger states: ‘ The fear that deinon 
awakens can also be the fear pertaining to reverence and awe’, however, fear in 
‘such reverence is not avoidance or flight, but rather a turning toward something 
in heed and respect… the awe pertaining to admiration, a standing firm in 
honoring that which awakes such fear’ (1996, p. 63). According to Julian Young, 
Heidegger defines four polarities of deinon, each of them having two poles, one 
representing ‘human nobility’ and the other, a ‘counter-turning’ of the human 
against its own essence.  
The first refers to the uncanny as the object of fear and awe (Young, 
1999). According to Heidegger, there are incidents that interrupt our everydayness 
and can inspire either awe or fear. The uncanny, that which is unknown and 
strange, which is seen as ‘out of the ordinary’ and can therefore allow for the ‘call 
of conscience’ can take these two forms. An awe-inspiring experience can be our 
admiration at a beautiful sky or natural landscape. It could also be a moment of 
experiencing love for someone, which can make everything else seem to fade into 
the background, as it might perhaps for a mother when she sees her child for the 
first time.  On the other hand, the uncanny in its fearsome version can take place 
in a near death experience, attending the funeral of a loved one, or experiencing a 
natural disaster like an earthquake. The second polarity shows the uncanny as 
‘violent’ and ‘powerful’.  As the former, the uncanny is only frightful, but as the 
latter, it can be ‘something that towers above us and then it approaches what is 
worthy of honor’. Heidegger states that the uncanny is necessarily ‘inhabitual’. 
This is the third polarity, which may involve being ‘exceptionally skilled within 
the sphere of the ordinary’, a kind of ‘mastery’, or the quality of being genuinely 
extraordinary.  The fourth and final polarity grasps the ‘unheimlich’ (uncanny) as 
equivalent to ‘unheimisch’ (unhomely). The uncanny one is one who is not at 
home, that which is not homely in what is homely. According to Young, one may 
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be ‘unhomely’ either in relation to beings or to Being (1996).  It is for this reason 
that the un-homely can also be uncanny, in the sense of ‘something that has 
alienating or frightening effect that gives rise to anxiety’.   
Uncanny moments, both fearful and awe inspiring, remind us of our 
mortality and/or our vulnerability. However, we cannot remain in the uncanny and 
forget that we are also live through routines and in a seeming stability that we 
share with others. Summarizing, the uncanny is first, the experience that allows 
the call of conscience to take place, second, deinon, which includes positive and 
negative experiences of the unfamiliar, and third, the ground of human beings 
making them the most uncanny of the uncanny. The first two act as conditions of 
possibility for a different understanding. The third is always already implied by 
our ontological structure. It contains our striving towards comfort and familiarity 
and our turning away from our essence. Nonetheless, Heidegger thinks that we 
can, if only temporarily, become homely. We can face the uncanny inherent in us 
and allow it to shed light on a different understanding of ourselves.  
 In migration, the uncanny is necessarily an inherent possibility. Although 
Heidegger deems the uncanny something we might encounter in any of our 
experiences, it is possible that the migrant has a higher likelihood to find 
him/herself in an uncanny place. If I live in the same house, have a secure job and 
a nice family, for instance, it might be easier to lay back in the comfort of my life 
and to be content with it. However, the migrant decides or is pushed to step into a 
new society and all the different factors that come with it. Shock and anxiety are 
common feelings that migrants attest to, mostly due to the lack of familiarity and 
the demands of the new society. However, although the likelihood of 
encountering the uncanny is higher in migration, this does not mean that the 
migrant will necessarily view the uncanny as a possibility for reflection upon 
him/herself. The uncanny is an opening of the possibility to understand ourselves 
as transient and fundamentally incomplete. The migrant will not necessarily act 
on such possibility and might quickly flee into another ready-made comfort zone 
in order to rid himself/herself of his/her anxiety. Such comfort can be found by 
assimilating different aspects of the new culture, by finding other groups of 
people with similar experiences or cultural backgrounds, by reaffirming one’s 
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difference against the new society as one’s defining characteristic, or by a mix of 
any of these factors. None of them imply a reflective attitude towards the 
migrant’s Being. So, even as the migrant might more readily encounter the 
uncanny that does not make him/her more open towards it than any other Dasein 
is.  
 The awareness of our finality, although uncanny, comes to all Dasein.  
Because it is not only a property “attached to us”, but “our fundamental way of 
being”, the realization of our finitude is also of a fundamental kind (FCOM, 1995, 
p. 6). The fragility of what holds our lives together, of our projects and of our 
circumstances is something we will not necessarily face and reflect on. The 
possibility of such reflection can arise through a variety of experiences, some of 
them, as Heidegger notes, of an uncanny nature. In migration, the life back in the 
homeland marks a point of rupture from what once was possibly considered 
stable. If migration was desired, such rupture might be experienced positively, 
nonetheless migration remains a separation between what was and the creation of 
new ‘stable’ circumstances. For some migrants, however, the at least merely 
physical separation of one life along with its context and its elements within it in 
order to inhabit a new environment might not reveal the fragility and transience of 
the network of the migrant’s familiar elements. The ‘uprooting’ of a life for 
another might still be viewed as something one is ‘in control of’, depending on the 
factors that shape different migrating experiences. One might still fail to realize 
that certain conditions have allowed for any migration to take place and continue 
assuming a certain level of constancy and stability. In this sense, migration is a 
region that may also allow for the expression of fundamental issues, such as our 
own finitude, but that do not necessarily result in a coming face-to-face with the 
groundlessness of our being.  
However, the possibility of recognizing transience in migration remains. 
For instance, if one continuously moves countries for work, education, economy, 
etc., a feeling of un-fixedness can arise. The lives lived are plenty in the sense that 
they happened in different places and in different contexts. Uprooting oneself 
constantly, while continuing to look for a feeling of familiarity, can bring about 
the realization of the transience and finality of our lives, whatever shape they may 
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take. This does not necessarily imply a constant awareness of death, but of ‘small 
deaths’, of the people, the homes and familiar places left behind in order to find 
new ones. The relationships that are experienced as constant are marked by 
‘expiration dates’ that will no longer make them so. In this sense, the finality 
inherent in our lives is realized in smaller ways, as transitioning in between 
certain endings and future beginnings, between former homes and future ones, 
while in a state of moving. Plans are shaped by an ongoing awareness of their 
temporal and contextual limitations. Experiencing endings and beginnings 
brought about by different factors and that imply the shutting off of one lifestyle 
in a given place for another in a different one can lead one to question the stability 
of any of them, of our own. Swinging back and forth between the search for the 
familiar and the encounter with its opposite can become a lifestyle that may or 
may not contain the realization of its fragility. Although the literature on 
migration has not addressed the instability and transience of our lives as 
fundamental issues, they can however show up through the migrating experience. 
The regional aspects of migration, the impermanence lived in different places can 
bring about the fundamental issues to the surface. For Heidegger, this is 
confronting crucial aspects of our being, it is no longer a turning away from it, but 
facing its most uncanny elements.  
 
4.4 BEYOND PARTICULARITIES: THE GROUNDLESS GROUND 
THAT GATHERS  	  
In the discourse on migration, the realization of our existential 
homelessness as revealing our groundless grounds is an aspect that has not been 
addressed. Only the ontic aspects of feelings of not being at home and their effects 
on migrants are studied (Ahmed et al., 2003; Fortier, 2003; Ralph and Staeheli, 
2001, etc.). A frailty is encountered through the unfamiliarity of a new 
environment that comes not only from the context but that calls the migrant to 
turn towards his/her being. Existential homelessness allows for the understanding 
of a shared fragility and the future encounter with our finitude. It only understands 
not feeling at home as not just being isolated in a foreign country but as revealing 
a shared vulnerability. The transience of our lives, however, reveals that there are 
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no absolute foundations or truths that sustain us, and that we are always already 
facing the Nothing in our existence, and our impendent finitude. The 
groundlessness of our Being discloses that we have no meaning of our own. Das 
Man provides our meaning historically and socially, but we are not the source of 
such meaning in any individual way. We are thrown ‘empty’ into a world that 
provides meanings for us, and such meanings are based on contingent and 
unstable assumptions about anything that is. There is no ground to then 
corroborate those meanings and our own, but only the impossibility of 
guaranteeing any sort of permanence or stability. In this sense, Heidegger’s 
groundlessness allows us to make two fundamental criticisms against the social 
sciences.   
First, it challenges the illusion of objectivity in its concepts. The research 
on migration is keen to provide different meanings for the migrant and for the 
migrating process (i.e. hybrids and third spaces) without questioning the 
foundations of those meanings. Assumptions are made that these meanings are 
true or that set up an ideal to aspire to. There is even an implicit stance that certain 
kind of migrants are more capable of understand a wider variety of meanings (i.e. 
Anzaldúa’s mestiza consciousness). These Diaspora scholars posit concepts that 
can be ascribed to as they provide a more solid ground to stand on, more 
categories to define us better, more ways in which we can conceive ourselves as 
meaningful. The meanings and concepts that they provide are as equally grounded 
as the rest, that is, in a groundless ground. For Heidegger these all form a network 
of assumptions that may allow us to feel more stable. They do not actually provide 
more stability or more solid grounds to stand on. As there are no absolute truths, 
we cannot claim that the concepts on migration, especially the normative ones, as 
they are based on contextual values, give a complete or absolute account of this 
experience. The possibility of normative claims is severely compromised if we 
understand groundlessness as the basis for our concepts. Second, groundlessness 
reveals the complexity not only of our being, but also, the complex task of the 
common attempt to apply philosophy to empirical studies. While Heidegger 
presents a groundless ground over which we build systems and concepts to better 
our understanding of existence, social scientists have sometimes simplified his 
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explanations and adapt them to their studies without understanding the depth of 
his ontology (see Malhotra, 1987, Ortega, 2004). 
Furthermore, groundlessness, as a fundamental aspect of our Being, runs 
through the regional and the particular. All our experiences are imbued with a 
groundless ground, even if it remains concealed. Groundlessness is in a sense a 
gathering together of the ontic, the regional and the fundamental aspects of our 
Being. All of what we understand, the specificities of our lives, the characteristics 
of migration, all which is meaningful is gathered together in groundlessness. Just 
as there is no escape from facing the No-thing, there is no escape from our 
groundlessness. We can only conceive of it as that which lies underneath any 
thing in our lives that we think of as meaningful. The lack of ground is something 
that we share; it is an inter-subjective abyss. We can acknowledge this groundless 
ground as the condition of possibility for such meanings, maybe acquiring then a 
better understanding of the kind of beings that we are. The uncanny, our inherent 
finitude and groundlessness are thus fundamental structures of existence that 
manifest themselves and show their relevance both in migration and in individual 
instances. Groundlessness, appears in our everyday dealings, experienced through 
angst, by confronting our finitude or by realizing the groundless ground of our 
concepts.  
 
4.5  CONCLUSION: A REGIONAL ONTOLOGY OF MIGRATION 	  
The philosophy of Heidegger, through its phenomenological and hermeneutical 
ontology, offers a more balanced and holistic view of migration. The Diaspora 
studies scholarship has dedicated its research to defining the different issues that 
migrants face through their experience and promoted concepts that aim at the 
bettering of the migrant status via identifying with them (i.e. hybrid, transnational 
community, hyphenated identities, diaspora space, etc.). Heidegger’s contribution 
to the research is the ontological relevance that existential factors have. Home, 
dwelling, groundlessness, and the uncanny, amongst others, are interpreted in two 
ways. The first interpretation acknowledges the concrete aspects of our 
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experience, and the second analyzes the ontological relevance through which the 
concrete aspects of our experience shape us.  
By analyzing shared concerns that express themselves experientially and 
that we necessarily respond to, Heidegger opens a common ground that is to be 
understood ontologically. A regional ontology of migration brings together both 
the particularities of migrants and the importance of our fundamental ontology. It 
speaks for how fundamental issues are expressed regionally, through the ontic 
characteristics of migration, and particularly through individual experience. 
Heidegger’s ontological difference shows through the relation between the 
fundamental, regional and ontic aspects in a dynamic and relational way. 
Heidegger does not provide a necessary or universal foundation, but a dynamic 
relation amongst these three different levels of enquiry where each feeds off the 
other by being manifested in particular instances while still speaking of 
fundamental ontological aspects. There is an inter-dependence amongst these 
realms, yet no stable ground. Thus, the research is to be conducted towards a 
mediating principle amongst the realms, not towards finding absolute claims.  
Heidegger’s philosophy elucidates the pointlessness of such normative claims. 
Via concepts like authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness and becoming homely, 
Heidegger affirms the importance of understanding one’s ontological structure 
while acknowledging the limitations of our context. He does not establish a way 
to “improve” ourselves as individuals, but only points at how understanding both 
sides of our experience (ontic and ontological) can elucidate a more integral 
understanding of our Being.   
A regional understanding then provides a ground that welcomes both 
differences that are contextually defined and shared issues that we engage in at 
different times in our lives. Using Heidegger critically, challenging the social 
sciences, but also extending the analysis of key concepts with which there is an 
affinity in the case of the migrant, can provide a groundless ground and yet a 
more in-depth analysis on the experience of migration.  
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CONCLUSION 	  
The task of philosophy in the university is to deepen the consciousness of 
 both science and life. It is the obligation of each individual to form his own 
worldview. Philosophy can only awaken critical consciousness, which would put 
not only worldviews, but the very process of forming them, to the test of life.  
(Kisiel, 1993, p. 68) 
 
The current trend in the social sciences to preach ‘otherness’ as the source of 
individuality and thus to emphasize social divisions and cultural differences is 
lacking in depth and rigor. Although it is certainly necessary to draw attention to 
cultural differences emerging from and leading to issues of race, class, gender, 
etc., focusing exclusively on these differences does not result in an accurate 
analysis and portrayal of social dynamics. In the case of migration, the Diaspora 
studies scholarship has developed definitions as well as proposed terms that do 
not describe concrete structures of experienced existence, but present a kind of 
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ideal referent. These terms presuppose particular conceptions of what the ‘good’ 
migrant is: one who is a hybrid subject, who creates imagined/diaspora spaces, 
who ‘explodes the hyphen’ and who is equipped with a ‘mestiza consciousness”. 
None of these terms merely describe aspects of how migration is experience, but 
instead present metaphors that migrants are expected to use to overcome the 
different marginalization dynamics that they are subjected to via the accentuation 
of difference and otherness.  
Heidegger’s statement about ‘forgetting the question of Being’ in the 
social sciences can now be expanded by saying that, if not forgotten, philosophy’s 
role has been relegated in the social sciences.  Heidegger contends that the terms 
and assumptions in the sciences must be revised, and philosophy provides a more 
rigorous method of problematizing not only the terms but also the process through 
which the terms are coined. Through the current project, my objective was to 
provide a different angle to analyze migration without discarding cultural 
differences, in order to question some of the concepts that are currently in use (i.e. 
hybrid subject, diaspora space, mestiza consciousness, etc.).  
Experiences serve both as separating and bonding grounds, thus, 
highlighting one aspect of them does not provide a complete study of any kind of 
experience. Heidegger’s philosophy acknowledges both the different aspects of 
experience that separate us, and those that bring us together. He develops this 
fundamental ontology by focusing on everyday experience. He reveals that 
although our everyday lives differ, there are questions that remain common to us 
all. In both his early and later philosophy Heidegger continues to look at both the 
particular instances of experience and the fundamental issues that arise through 
them. I used both his early fundamental ontology and specifically his later focus 
on the experience of home to provide a more balanced and thorough approach to 
the migrating experience. The issues addressed (Das Man, Authenticity, Care, 
Being towards Death, Becoming homely, the passage through the Foreign, the 
Uncanny, etc.), can all be illustrated in migration, but also speak for a 
fundamental network of concerns that we share. Migration is shaped by certain 
social factors that delimit this experience from others. In this sense, it is neither an 
isolated individual incident, nor a universalist term. As an ‘in-between region’, it 
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allows for the expression of the fundamental without relegating the specific. In 
fact, the specific elements of migration meet with the fundamental issues through 
the analysis of such experience. For this reason, I propose a regional ontology of 
migration in the sense that it recognizes the individual differences amongst 
migrants, the particular factors that delimit migration, and the fundamental issues 
that are not only common to migrants, but to others.  These issues can serve as a 
counter-balance against the over-emphasis in the literature on difference, which 
effectively celebrate individuality through otherness. Furthermore, these issues 
can also provide a deeper understanding of social factors and categories by 
analyzing them alongside with the fundamental questions that shape our 
engagement in any of these social factors.  
Further analysis is necessary regarding a regional ontology of migration.  
Although in the current project ‘home’ was one of the issues that were addressed 
as relevant both existentially and in the migrating experience, other issues need 
further philosophical and phenomenological analysis. Borders, for instance, are 
also particularly crucial in migration (Ahmed et.al, 2003; Brah, 1999; Clifford, 
1997 etc.) Heidegger develops in Being and Time an analysis of space, place, 
region and locality that the current project could not include but that could shed 
light into the understanding of borders in Migration23. Furthermore, temporality is 
another issue that could not be addressed in the current project but that is an 
integral part of Heidegger’s project. His understanding of time and temporality 
thus should also be considered and applied to the analysis of migration, as it 
certainly has an impact on how migration is experienced. For instance, the length 
of time that one has spent away from home, the perceived notions of past and 
present regarding the homeland, etc., are issues that can be further investigated 
through Heidegger’s analysis of temporality. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope 
of this project to elaborate on either of these issues, but there is certainly room for 
further development.  
These investigations can then provide alternative ways to address the 
migrating experience, and maybe influence the Diaspora studies scholarship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Edward Casey (1997) in his analysis of place already develops a phenomenological analysis that 
takes into consideration that of Heidegger. 
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towards a more rigorous revision of their terms. Especially the presentation of 
normative ideals is in urgent need of revision. Heidegger, in this matter, can also 
provide ‘pointers’ as opposed to specific ethical maxims that can refer to a more 
holistic understanding of experience, one beyond already made assumptions of the 
kind of beings that migrants are or that they should aspire to be. Heidegger 
summons inquirers to first ask the question of Being considering our nullity, 
fragility and finitude, and not just to develop ethical claims that are set on political 
agendas. As researchers on social dynamics then, appealing to Heidegger’s 
philosophy is a constant reminder of the unattainability of timeless truths and of 
definite ethical norms. Such understanding will necessarily change our approach 
to the study of experiences, that of migrants or of any other person. 
In this sense, Heidegger’s project can both provide rigor and a constant 
reminder of the need for revising concepts while understanding that such concepts 
are developed through an understanding that is impermanent and contextual. 
Philosophy can help make research on migration more critical and more inclusive, 
by providing an understanding of fundamental issues, which are always already 
contextualized, and not by postulating merely hopeful ideals. In my future work I 
intend to continue emphasizing these crucial aspects that both Heidegger in 
particular and philosophy in general can contribute to current debates on 
migration in the social sciences. 	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